Showing posts with label ICBM. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ICBM. Show all posts

Wednesday, 25 September 2024

A Chinese ICBM test launch at full range, into the central Pacific, on September 25

click image to enlarge

click image to enlarge

In a surprise move, China conducted a (for them) unusual ICBM test launch on September 25, 2024. They launched an ICBM at full range, targetting an RV splash-down area in the central Pacific.

According to China the missile, with a "dummy warhead", was launched at 00:44 UTC (Sept 25) "to the high seas in the Pacific Ocean". Several countries (including the US, Japan) were reportedly informed before the test, and Navigational Warnings were issued for the RV impact area and missile stage splashdown areas two days before the test.

The Navigational Warnings and NOTAM's indicate that the missile was launched from the northern part of Hainan Island, with RV splashdown near 10.4 S, 146.5 W near French Polynesia, some 700 km west of Nuku Hiva and 875 km northeast of Bora Bora. The indicated range flown by the ICBM was about 11 700 km.

I have plotted the relevant hazard areas from the Navigational Warnings (HYDROPAC 3118/24, HYDROPAC 3121/24) and a NOTAM (A3054/24) with a matching reconstructed ballistic flight path on the map below, while the two illustrations in top of this post show the approximate trajectory in 3D (assuming apogee at 1200 km and launch on the Hainan coast).

click map to enlarge

Given the launch from Hainan, it was likely a road-mobile ICBM (perhaps a DF-31 or DF-41 [UPDATE: it was a road-mobile DF-31A or AG, see update at bottom of post]) launched from a TEL. The exact launch location is still unclear at the moment. The location of the hazard areas (especially that from NOTAM A3054/24) seem to rule out launch from the Wenchang Space Launch Complex, as they rather point to slightly more north on Hainan.

China usually test launches its ICBM's over land, on lofted trajectories (e.g. see this 2019 blog post). The last time they launched one at full range on a non-lofted trajectory into the Pacific was 44 years ago, in 1980. So this launch is far from a standard test.

In addition to being an ICBM non-lofted test, the test could perhaps also have been for the purpose of testing China's TJS/Huoyan early warning satellites in geosynchronous orbit.

Relevant Navigational Warnings and NOTAM:


231141Z SEP 24
HYDROPAC 3118/24(91,93).
PHILIPPINE SEA.
PHILIPPINES.
DNC 23.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS, SPACE DEBRIS
   242200Z TO 250400Z SEP IN AREAS BOUND BY:
   A. 19-46.00N 118-15.00E, 19-36.00N 119-48.00E,
      18-33.00N 119-41.00E, 18-44.00N 118-08.00E.
   B. 19-06.00N 124-41.00E, 18-57.00N 125-42.00E,
      18-11.00N 125-36.00E, 18-21.00N 124-34.00E.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 250500Z SEP 24.


231521Z SEP 24
HYDROPAC 3121/24(83).
SOUTH PACIFIC.
DNC 06.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS, SPACE DEBRIS
   242200Z TO 250400Z SEP IN AREA BOUND BY
   09-37.00S 147-14.00W, 10-18.00S 145-31.00W,
   11-08.00S 145-44.00W, 10-27.00S 147-29.00W.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 250500Z SEP 24.


A3054/24 NOTAMN
Q) ZGZU/QRDCA/IV/BO/W/000/999/1952N11145E018
A) ZGZU B) 2409250020 C) 2409250230
E) A TEMPORARY DANGER AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY:
N200247E1113156-N200222E1120118-N194011E1120042-N194142E1113027,BAC
K TO START.
VERTICAL LIMITS:SFC-UNL.
F) SFC G) UNL

 

There are three more NOTAM's that correspond to the areas from the Navigational Warnings. (HT to Cosmic Penguin on Twitter for the NOTAM).

 

UPDATE 26 Sep 2024:

China has published images of the launch. It shows a launch from a TEL, with a missile and TEL consistent with a DF-31A or AG.

Image: PLA

Saturday, 13 April 2024

Russian ICBM test launch (Topol?) from Kapustin Yar seen from the Middle East

click to enlarge

On 12 April 2024 near 16:00 UTC, the Russian Armed Forces test-fired an unarmed ICBM from Kapustin Yar, targetting the test range at Sary Shagan at a distance of some 2000 km. The missile was likely a TOPOL-M.

In the image above, I have modelled the likely trajectory, assuming apogee at 1000 km altitude as in previous tests. Below is Russian MoD footage of the launch:

 


The missile launch was widely seen as a bright comet-like object in the sky, in Russia as well as in the Middle East, with reports from as far south as a.o. Iran and Iraq. As many there where in anxiety about an expected Iranian retaliation attack on Israel, it created  a bit of a stir.



 

In the aftermath, there were some people that expressed doubt whether a Russian ICBM test would be visible from the Middle East. So I reconstructed the area of visibility to show that it is in fact visible. 

In the map below, I have drawn isocircles around the estimated point of cut-off of the missile's third stage. That stage cut-off happened after 3 minutes of flight at an altitude of about 570 km (there is some leeway in both figures possible, but in general the figure below will give you a good indication of the area of visibility).

click map to enlarge

 

The isocircles give you the altitude in the local sky as seen from a region encompassing southern Russia and the Middle East. 

As can be seen, the area of visibility is large, and horizontally extends about 2600 km from the geographic location of stage engine cut-off, to as far as southern Iran. 

Bar the first few tens of kilometers, the trajectory was fully sun-illuminated, and as a result the exhaust clouds of the missile were also sun-illuminated, making them  shine brightly in the sky.

That exhaust clouds from the upper stages of missile launches can be seen over a avery large area isn't something new. Russian ICBM tests from Plesetsk have multiple times resulted in sightings of bright "spirals" in the Arctic sky (e.g. here). Chinese tests have also been observed, e.g. this example that was observed from South Korea in 2019, which I further analysed here. Meanwhile, the post-boost vehicles of ICBM's/SLBM's sometimes also cause visible phenomena in the sky: see my analysis of one such sighting from La Palma in 2013 related to a US Trident SLBM test for example.

Wednesday, 21 February 2024

January UK Trident-II D5 SLBM test failed


It probably generated a lot of Stiff Upper Lip and an "Ow well, that is regrettable Old Boy...." from the UK Defense Secretary and the UK Royal Navy Commander that were on scene to witness the test.

For British media (e.g. The Sun here and the BBC here) report that the 30 January Trident-II D5 SLBM test launch from the British Royal Navy submarine HMS Vanguard, on which I wrote earlier here, failed.

From the description of the failure by The Sun, the suggestion is that the first stage failed to ignite after ejection of the missile from the submarine. As a result, it fell back into sea close to the submarine.

A previous British Royal Navy Trident test launch, in 2016, failed as well when the missile veered into the wrong direction after launch and had to be destroyed in flight.

In general, the Trident-II D5 is a reliable missile. The US Navy test-fires Trident SLBM's frequently, and most of their tests reportedly were successful. It just seems the British have bad luck lately.

UPDATE:  Statement by the UK Ministry of Defense to UK Parliament on the matter.

Monday, 29 January 2024

An upcoming British Royal Navy Trident SLBM test in the Atlantic [UPDATED]

click map to enlarge

Over the past month, there was much anticipation for a (almost certainly) British Royal Navy Trident-II D5 SLBM test in the Atlantic. The arrival of the British nuclear ballistic missile armed submarine HMS Vanguard and several support ships at Port Canaveral in the past weeks suggested as much. Port Canaveral is the home base for such Trident SLBM tests.

And now the corresponding Navigational Warnings have appeared, for the period January 30 - Feb 4.

290215Z JAN 24
NAVAREA IV 89/24(GEN).
NORTH ATLANTIC.
WESTERN NORTH ATLANTIC.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 302100 TO 040356 FEB
   IN AREAS BOUND BY:
   A. 29-00.00N 079-56.00W, 29-05.00N 079-35.00W,
      29-00.00N 079-07.00W, 28-38.00N 079-06.00W,
      28-36.00N 079-33.00W, 28-42.00N 079-52.00W.
   B. 28-28.00N 076-03.00W, 28-19.00N 075-04.00W,
      28-06.00N 075-07.00W, 28-16.00N 076-01.00W.
   C. 27-03.00N 069-40.00W, 27-20.00N 069-37.00W,
      26-58.00N 068-02.00W, 26-43.00N 068-05.00W.
   D. 19-42.00N 050-06.00W, 20-19.00N 049-55.00W,
      19-02.00N 046-24.00W, 18-23.00N 046-46.00W.
   E. 08-32.00N 031-06.00W, 08-39.00N 031-01.00W,
      08-03.00N 028-55.00W, 06-43.00N 027-40.00W,
      05-49.00N 028-16.00W, 05-59.00N 028-34.00W,
      05-25.00N 028-53.00W, 06-25.00N 029-17.00W.
2. CANCEL NAVAREA IV 88/24
3. CANCEL THIS MSG 040456Z FEB 24.

I have depicted the five hazard zones from this Navigational Warning (also issued as HYDROLANT 214/24, and a re-issue of an earlier warning that had a typo in the coordinates of Area A) in the map in top of this post. Area A is the launch area. Areas B, C and D are the splash-down zones of the first, second and third stages. Area E is the RV target area.

The launch is from one of two standard test firing areas, some 80-90 km in front of the coast of Florida (see also this earlier post). The launch will be visible from Florida, so from previous experience I expect it to generate a number of 'UFO' reports from eyewitnesses who don't know what they are seeing.

The first thing of note is that the range of this test, at approximately 5900 km, is rather short compared to other Trident tests.

That can be seen in the map below, which depicts the RV target area of this test along with the target areas of earlier Trident-II D5 tests fired from the same test launch area 1.

click map to enlarge

Whereas the other RV target areas are at latitudes 9 S to 18 S, the target area for this test is much more north, near latitude 7 N, i.e. a range some 3000-5000 km short of earlier tests. It is effectively about half the range of a typical Trident test.

HMS Vanguard (S28) has recently come out of a long 7.5 years maintenance overhaul and refuel period, and this test likely is part of its recertification as an operational SLBM submarine. The Royal British Navy has four Vanguard-class submarines in active service. Each of them carries 16 Trident-II D5 missiles.

In June 2016, the previous Royal British Navy Trident missile test, a Trident test-fired from HMS Vengeance, went awry when the missile veered into the wrong direction (towards Florida) after launch: according to newspaper The Guardian because if was given wrong trajectory information. It had to be destroyed in flight. That test targetted a target area just east-southeast of Ascension Island. I guess some nervous officials will watch the upcoming launch carefully with their finger on the destruct button.

UPDATE 21 Feb 2024:

The missile test failed, according to UK Media (.e.g. BBC here and The Sun here). It appears that the first stage did not ignite after missile ejection from the submarine. As a result, the missile plunged back into sea close to the submarine. The test was reportedly witnessed by the UK Defense Secretary Shapps and the Commander of the Royal Navy, so I guess there was a lot of Stiff Upper Lip that day, with some "Ow well, that's unfortunate Old Boy...".
A previous UK Royal Navy test launch, in 2016, failed as well (see discussion above in blogpost).

Thursday, 2 November 2023

An upcoming French SLBM test in the Atlantic, ARRW, and a failed Minuteman test in the Pacific

click map to enlarge

 

click image to enlarge

While strong Autumn storms and rainshowers (the image above is an APT image my radio received from NOAA 19 this morning, showing storm Ciarán over the Channel) are making satellite observations impossible, various missile test activities the past and upcoming weeks keep me occupied.

In a previous post I wrote about a Missile Defense test, FTM-48 north of Hawaii on October 25, and indications for another LRHW test from Cape Canaveral (it is unknown whether the latter test happened: FTM-48 reportedly was a success).

In this post, I will write about three other missile tests

 

French M51 SLBM test

First, an upcoming French M51 SLBM test to be launched from DGA Essais de missiles near Biscarrosse on the southwest coast of France. Its trajectory is over the Gulf of Biscaye and northern Atlantic towards a target area some 830 km south of Saint-Pierre et Miquelon (two French islands in front of the Newfoundland coast). 

Two Navigational Warnings (HYDROLANT 2484/23 and NAVAREA IV 1273/23 ) have appeared that indicate the test, with a window running from November 6 to December 1. Below is a map with the hazard zones for this test and the text of the Navigational Warnings:

click map to enlarge

311957Z OCT 23
HYDROLANT 2484/23(36,37,38).
BAY OF BISCAY.
NORTH ATLANTIC.
FRANCE.
DNC 08.
1. MISSILE OPERATIONS 0200Z TO 1200Z
   DAILY 06 NOV THRU 01 DEC
   IN AREAS BOUND BY:
   A. 44-26.33N 001-15.67W, 44-28.00N 001-20.00W,
      44-35.00N 001-27.75W, 44-44.75N 002-17.25W,
      44-23.50N 002-25.00W, 44-14.75N 001-35.75W,
      44-17.25N 001-26.75W, 44-18.00N 001-17.00W.
   B. 45-14.20N 005-17.58W, 45-22.57N 006-11.45W,
      45-05.33N 006-16.65W, 44-57.02N 005-23.05W.
   C. 45-14.20N 005-17.58W, 44-57.02N 005-23.05W,
      44-23.50N 002-24.98W, 44-44.75N 002-17.25W.
   D. 47-08.05N 014-18.15W, 47-20.18N 017-10.22W,
      45-33.87N 017-23.13W, 45-22.12N 014-36.47W.
   E. 47-05.02N 029-54.25W, 46-58.67N 031-53.87W,
      46-11.73N 031-47.78W, 46-17.98N 029-49.87W.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 011300Z DEC 23.


020945Z NOV 23
NAVAREA IV 1273/23(14).
WESTERN NORTH ATLANTIC.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 0200Z TO 1200Z DAILY
   06 NOV THRU 01 DEC IN AREA WITHIN
   80 MILES OF 39-21.36N 057-43.60W.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 011300Z DEC 23.//

The indicated range for this test is about 5100 km, which is somewhat less than the test on 28 April 2021, as can be seen in this map comparing the two tests:

click map to enlarge

The test involves a manoeuvre changing the heading of the missile somewhere after jettison of the third stage. The shorter range, and closer range to the splashdown zones of the stages, could indicate either a more loftet test or (more likely) a heavier payload.

UPDATE:

The Navigational Warnings have been re-issued for Nov 16 - Dec 1 and adding an additional time window (18:00-23:59 UTC):

161904Z NOV 23
HYDROLANT 2631/23(36,37,38).
BAY OF BISCAY.
NORTH ATLANTIC.
FRANCE.
DNC 08.
1. MISSILE OPERATIONS 0001Z TO 1200Z AND
   1800Z TO 2359Z DAILY 16 NOV THRU 01 DEC
   IN AREAS BOUND BY:
A. 44-18.00N 001-17.00W, 44-17.25N 001-26.75W,
   44-14.75N 001-35.75W, 44-23.50N 002-25.00W,
   44-44.75N 002-17.25W, 44-35.00N 001-27.75W,
   44-28.00N 001-20.00W, 44-26.33N 001-15.67W.
B. 45-22.57N 006-11.45W, 45-05.33N 006-16.65W,
   44-57.02N 005-23.05W, 45-14.20N 005-17.58W.
C. 44-57.02N 005-23.05W, 45-14.20N 005-17.58W,
   44-44.75N 002-17.25W, 44-23.50N 002-24.98W.
D. 47-20.18N 017-10.22W, 45-33.87N 017-23.13W,
   45-22.12N 014-36.47W, 47-08.05N 014-18.15W.
E. 46-58.67N 031-53.87W, 46-11.73N 031-47.78W,
   46-17.98N 029-49.87W, 47-05.02N 029-54.25W.
2. CANCEL HYDROLANT 2628/23.
3. CANCEL THIS MSG 020100Z DEC 23.

UPDATE 18 Nov 2023:

The SLBM test happened this evening, 18 Nov 2023, around 18:20 UTC. Several spectacular images and video footage of illuminated exhaust cloluds were obtained from France, Spain and Italy.


US AGM-183 ARRW hypersonic test

On the other side of the World, in the Northwest Pacific between California and Hawaii, another AGM-183 ARRW hypersonic missile test appears to be on the calendar for November 4th, with an alternative window between Nov 7 and 13, as indicated by this Navigational Warning:

300930Z OCT 23
NAVAREA XII 760/23(18,19).
EASTERN NORTH PACIFIC.
CALIFORNIA.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 041200Z TO 042030Z NOV,
   ALTERNATE 1300Z TO 2130Z DAILY 07 AND 13 NOV
   IN AREAS BOUND BY:
   A. 31-55.63N 127-43.18W, 33-12.37N 122-41.36W,
      33-06.52N 119-53.89W, 32-55.31N 119-51.90W,
      32-03.13N 122-28.33W, 31-40.94N 127-39.48W.
   B. 28-34.12N 135-59.93W, 30-09.63N 136-34.60W,
      30-52.95N 133-51.97W, 29-16.77N 133-19.65W.
   C. 26-17.92N 141-50.77W, 27-26.72N 142-21.67W,
      28-20.65N 139-47.33W, 27-11.27N 139-17.77W.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 132230Z NOV 23.//

click map to enlarge

 The areas are similar to earlier known or suspected ARRW tests:

click map to enlarge

This missile must be one of the last of the (scrapped) AGM-183 program left.


Failed Minuteman-III ICBM test

Meanwhile, November 1 saw what should have been a rather routine Minuteman-III ICBM test from Vandenberg to Illegini Island, Kwajalein, going awry.

According to the Air Force Global Strike Command, an anomaly occurred and the missile was terminated in flight. A nice photograph of the launch is here.

Below is the map with the trajectory the missile should have flown, and the relevant Navigational Warnings:

click map to enlarge

260936Z OCT 23
NAVAREA XII 749/23(18,19,81).
EASTERN NORTH PACIFIC.
CALIFORNIA.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 01 AND 02 NOV:
   A. 0631Z TO 1335Z IN AREA BOUND BY
      34-40.00N 121-25.00W, 34-40.00N 120-54.00W,
      34-46.00N 120-37.00W, 34-57.00N 120-37.00W,
      34-58.00N 120-58.00W, 34-58.00N 121-24.00W.
   B. 0631Z TO 1340Z IN AREA BOUND BY
      34-19.00N 124-36.00W, 34-40.00N 124-39.00W,
      34-56.00N 121-59.00W, 34-36.00N 121-56.00W.
   C. 0631Z TO 1347Z IN AREA BOUND BY
      32-30.00N 137-13.00W, 32-48.00N 137-18.00W,
      33-04.00N 136-01.00W, 32-45.00N 135-56.00W.
   D. 0631Z TO 1431Z IN AREA BOUND BY
      14-36.00N 175-34.00E, 14-54.00N 175-13.00E,
      14-35.00N 174-55.00E, 14-23.00N 174-49.00E,
      14-17.00N 174-54.00E, 14-17.00N 175-15.00E.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 021531Z NOV 23.//


270329Z OCT 23
HYDROPAC 3397/23(81).
NORTH PACIFIC.
MARSHALL ISLANDS.
DNC 12.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 010700Z TO 011411Z NOV,
   ALTERNATE 020700Z TO 021411Z NOV
   IN AREAS BOUND BY
   A. 09-53.00N 168-50.00E, 09-55.00N 168-47.00E,
      09-32.00N 168-09.00E, 09-24.00N 167-35.00E,
      09-09.00N 167-08.00E, 08-45.00N 167-23.00E,
      09-01.00N 167-49.00E, 08-51.00N 168-22.00E,
      08-54.00N 168-32.00E, 09-18.00N 169-10.00E,
      09-20.00N 169-11.00E.
   B. 11-08.00N 172-02.00E, 12-18.00N 171-37.00E
      13-20.00N 170-42.00E, 13-28.00N 170-33.00E
      13-20.00N 170-07.00E, 13-14.00N 170-00.00E,
      13-07.00N 169-54.00E, 12-01.00N 170-24.00E,
      11-54.00N 170-31.00E, 10-59.00N 171-14.00E,
      10-52.00N 171-22.00E, 10-57.00N 171-47.00E,
      10-59.00N 171-54.00E.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 021511Z NOV 23.//

Sunday, 9 April 2023

An upcoming French SLBM test in the Atlantic [UPDATED]

click map to enlarge

Spring has arrived, and this spring the fledgeling missiles fly, as I already noted in a previous post

And now the French join in this springtime Missile Mêlée too: two Navigational Warnings have appeared (HYDROLANT 759/23 and NAVAREA IV 396/23) that indicate a French Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) test for the period 14 April - 7 May, 2023.

I have mapped the hazard areas from the two Navigational Warnings (text below) in the map above.

 

070934Z APR 23
HYDROLANT 759/23(36,37,38).
BAY OF BISCAY.
CELTIC SEA.
NORTH ATLANTIC.
FRANCE.
DNC 08, DNC 19.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS, ROCKET LAUNCHING
   0030Z TO 1000Z DAILY 14 APR THRU 07 MAY
   IN AREAS BOUND BY:
   A. 47-39.00N 004-01.00W, 47-48.71N 004-31.00W,
      47-44.70N 005-23.50W, 47-16.46N 005-17.68W,
      47-24.00N 004-11.00W.
   B. 47-44.70N 005-23.50W, 47-35.30N 007-15.13W,
      47-04.30N 007-08.53W, 47-16.46N 005-17.68W.
   C. 47-35.30N 007-15.13W, 47-29.72N 008-09.53W,
      46-58.78N 008-02.44W, 47-04.30N 007-08.53W.
   D. 48-04.60N 008-59.32W, 47-46.75N 011-31.33W,
      46-00.58N 011-02.17W, 46-17.87N 008-34.97W.
   E. 45-25.54N 025-00.90W, 44-55.65N 027-03.41W,
      43-42.92N 026-27.47W, 44-12.20N 024-27.20W.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 071100Z MAY 23.


070934Z APR 23
NAVAREA IV 396/23(14,51).
NORTH ATLANTIC.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS, ROCKET LAUNCHING
   0030Z TO 1000Z DAILY 14 APR THRU 07 MAY
   IN AREA WITHIN 150 MILES OF 37-35.15N 045-40.37W.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 071100Z MAY 23.

 

The missile is likely an M51, and will be launched from a French submarine south of the Breton coast. The target area is in the mid-Atlantic, near 37.6 N, 45.7 W. The indicated range is about 3500 km

A previous test three years ago, on 12 June 2020, had over 1.5 times that range. So this test either has a more significant payload (e.g. multiple MIRV's or heavier warhead(s)), or uses reduced power in the first stage, or (less likely, also looking at the locations of the hazard areas) is a highly lofted test for some reason.

The target area in the mid-Atlantic is about 1.6 times bigger than it was with the 2020 test (300 Nautical mile wide now, versus 184 Nautical mile wide in 2020) even though the range is ~1.6 times shorter, which might perhaps indicate multiple warheads (MIRV).

The map below compares the 12 June 2020 test (red) to the upcoming test (blue):

click map to enlarge

UPDATE 19 April 2023:

Tweets by the French Navy and the French Minister of Defense on April 19 confirm a successful test firing of an M51 SLBM from the submarine Le Terrible on 19 April 2023.

Thursday, 7 July 2022

A failed US missile test on July 7

 

click to enlarge

In the first week of July, two Navigational Warnings appeared (NAVAREA XII 431/22 and HYDROPAC 1811/22) that indicated an ICBM-type missile test in the Pacific for a multiple day window starting July 7, with launch from Vandenberg AFB in California and target the Reagan Test Site at Kwajalein.

These are the Navigational Warnings in question:

030348Z JUL 22
NAVAREA XII 431/22(18,19).
EASTERN NORTH PACIFIC.
CALIFORNIA
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 0531Z TO 1234Z DAILY
   07 THRU 11 JUL IN AREAS BOUND BY:
   A. 34-47.00N 120-37.00W, 34-51.00N 120-36.00W,
      34-52.00N 121-25.00W, 34-39.00N 121-25.00W,
      34-40.00N 121-01.00W, 34-47.00N 120-37.00W.
   B. 34-56.00N 123-14.00W, 34-51.00N 123-57.00W,
      34-05.00N 123-49.00W, 34-10.00N 123-06.00W,
      34-56.00N 123-14.00W.
   C. 35-01.00N 124-11.00W, 34-48.00N 126-00.00W,
      33-40.00N 125-47.00W, 33-54.00N 123-59.00W,
      35-01.00N 124-11.00W.
   D. 34-34.00N 128-22.00W, 34-17.00N 130-07.00W,
      33-03.00N 129-49.00W, 33-20.00N 128-05.00W,
      34-34.00N 128-22.00W.
   E. 33-04.00N 136-33.00W, 32-51.00N 137-30.00W,
      31-54.00N 137-11.00W, 32-06.00N 136-15.00W,
      33-04.00N 136-33.00W.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 111344Z JUL 22.


030450Z JUL 22
HYDROPAC 1811/22(81).
NORTH PACIFIC.
MARSHALL ISLANDS.
DNC 12.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS, 070600Z TO 071258Z JUL,
   ALTERNATE 080600Z TO 081258Z JUL
   IN AREAS BOUND BY:
   A. 09-16.00N 167-22.00E, 09-23.00N 167-33.00E,
      09-32.00N 167-26.00E, 09-37.00N 167-29.00E,
      09-37.00N 167-45.00E, 09-38.00N 168-00.00E,
      09-37.00N 168-03.00E, 09-07.00N 168-05.00E,
      09-05.00N 168-03.00E, 08-56.00N 167-34.00E.
   B. 08-56.00N 163-29.00E, 09-14.00N 165-41.00E,
      09-03.00N 166-19.00E, 08-18.00N 166-49.00E,
      07-25.00N 166-58.00E, 06-18.00N 166-54.00E,
      06-00.00N 165-11.00E, 06-15.00N 164-09.00E,
      07-30.00N 163-18.00E, 08-10.00N 163-12.00E.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 081358Z JUL 22.


The number and geographic locations of the hazard areas indicated to me that this was not a standard Minuteman-III test. In the map below, blue are the hazard areas from the 7 July Area Warnings; red that for a typical Minuteman III test (shown example is the 29 Oct 2020 test). Near California, the number and positions of the hazard areas are clearly different.

click map to enlarge

As it turns out, this indeed was not a Minuteman-III launch, but a test launch of a Minotaur-II with a new experimental reentry vehicle, the Mk21A developed by Lockheed Martin. This warhead is a future  replacement for the W87 warhead on the future LGM-35 Sentinel missile being developed by Northop-Grumman.

The launch at 6:01 UT on July 7, was a failure: according to a press release from Vandenberg, the missile exploded about 11 seconds in flight, starting a fire in the area.

Friday, 25 March 2022

North Korea's Hwasong-17 ICBM: capable of (briefly) bringing warheads into orbit?

image: KCNA/RodongSinmun

According to multiple western sources and North Korea, North Korea conducted a first full-power test-flight of its new Hwasong-17 ICBM on March 24, 2022, at 5:34 UT, from Sunan close to Pyongyang.

The Hwasong-17 is the Behemoth missile that was first revealed to the outside world one-and-a-half-years-ago during the 2020 October 10 parade in Pyongyang and surprised everyone by its massive size at the time. It is North-Korea's largest, heaviest missile so far and visually looks like a Hwasong-15 on steroids.

[NOTE: some sources are now casting some doubt on the missile identity, suggesting that footage from the failed March 16 launch (see below) was used. See comment at end of post]

The test launch was confirmed by North Korean State sources which produced a written account on their KCNA and Rodong Sinmun websites, accompanied by photographs, while KCNA also broadcast a video of the test. The imagery underlines how impressive the size of the Hwasong-17 is: it is a Monster of a missile!

 

image KCNA/Rodong Sinmun

 
image KCNA/Rodong Sinmun

 

image KCNA/Rodong Sinmun

The video report on the test as broadcast by the North Korean State Agency KCNA is spectacular, with a glamour role for the sunglasses-clad North Korean leader Kim Jung Un (look at 3:55 to 4:05 in the video below!). It evokes shades of a Hollywood action movie trailer. 

(the actual footage of the test and test preparations starts at 3:25 in the video, after the usual bombastic introductions by news anchor Ri Chun-hee)




Earlier test flights of components of the same missile might have taken place in Februari and early March (but not on full power), according to western sources. North Korea claimed at the time that it was testing components for a reconnaisance satellite program. 

We also know that on March 16, another test flight from the same launch-site (near Sunan Airport), possibly also a Hwasong-17, failed shortly after launch at an altitude of less than 20 km.

But the March 24 test flight appears to have been successfull, as claimed by both North Korea and western sources. According to North Korean official State sources it reached an apogee at a whopping 6248.5 km altitude, with a ground range of 1090 km and a flight time of long duration (1h 7m 30s).

Western sources that independently tracked the launch mention similar ballpark values for this test: apogee "6200 km" and range "1080 km" according to the S-Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff; apogee "6000 km" and range "1100 km" according to the Japanese Government. The missile came down in front of the Japanese coast inside Japan's EEZ, at some 180 km from Cape Tappi. 

The apogee is at an extreme altitude, and this test was hence extremely lofted, as can be seen in this trajectory reconstruction I made:


click to enlarge

Looking into the necessary impulse in order to assess maximum range of the missile, I realized that the resulting nominal impulse of 7.85 km/s I reconstruct, actually means that the Hwasong-17 can achieve orbital speed. In other words: this means it is powerfull enough to, in principle, loft a payload to (low) earth orbit and get it (briefly) orbital!

Objects can complete at least one revolution around the earth if they have enough orbital velocity such that they can orbit at at least 100 km altitude (the exact value of the lower limit of orbital flight is debated: for circular orbits it might be possible at altitudes as low as 80-90 km, but it anyway strongly hinges on the drag characteristics of the object in question). The corresponding orbital speed at 100 km altitude is 7.84 km/s (for a circular orbit). The nominal impulse I get for the March 24 launch, at 7.85 km/s, matches that (in reality, it is more complex, as the missile will experience atmospheric drag during the initial phase of launch, which was not part of my reconstruction. And part of the initial impulse will be lost due to gravity pull before reaching 100 km altitude).

So in theory, this missile could briefly get an object (e.g. a warhead) in orbit around the earth, rather than on a suborbital ballistic trajectory. In case you wonder: it didn't on March 24, because it was not launched on an orbit insertion trajectory, but rather straight up.

 

image: KCNA/RodongSinmun

image: KCNA/Rodong Sinmun

image: KCNA/Rodong Sinmun

 

This was not something I had expected. But it gives a new meaning to North Korean claims from earlier this year that tests conducted then, possibly with Hwasong-17 components, where in connection to a space launch program.

They did fairly and squarely present the latest March 24 test as an ICBM  test flight though.

The launch location at 39.188 N, 125.667 E (as geolocated from the imagery by Joseph Dempsey) was on a concrete strip about 1.75 km from the main buildings of Pyongyang Sunan airport. That concrete strip is part of the Si-Li Ballistic Missile Support Facility which itself is some 2.5 km southwest of the airport:

click map to enlarge

click map to enlarge

But let's get back to the realization that this missile can apparently reach orbital speeds. This means that it - or components of it - in theory can be used for road mobile satellite launches. But it can also mean that you can briefly bring a warhead in orbit, either for a full revolution or more, or - cough - for a "fractional" orbit....

Remember the discussion of the Chinese test of a FOBS ('Fractional Orbital Bombardment System') in July last year?! See this earlier post.

I have been doing some modelling. Based on specs of an early '60-era US warhead, the W56, I modelled whether a launch of a similar warhead into a very low 100 x 105 km, 98.0 degree inclined polar orbit from Sunan, could reach the USA. 

I used the General Mission Analysis Tool for this, with the MISE90 model atmosphere and F10.7 solar flux set at 100. I modelled for a 275 kg warhead with assumed Cd 1.0 and a drag surface of ~0.15 m2 (comments on how realistic those values are, are welcome) and under the assumption that the launch vehicle does achive sufficient orbital speed to insert it in such a 100 x 105 km orbit. The modelled launch was in southern direction, taking the long but undefended southern Polar route over Antarctica, approaching the USA from the south after finishing just over half an orbital revolution. [info added later: The model is strictly for the warhead assuming release from the missile upon orbit insertion: I did not model prolonged coasting as part of a post-boost vehicle of any kind].

With the mentioned specifications, I model it to nominally come down fairly and squarely in Ohio (or any other place within the continental USA if you adjust the orbital plane launched into somewhat), as the map below in which I have plotted the modelled trajectory for the warhead shows....

click map to enlarge
 

So: is the development of this missile perhaps a prelude to the development of a North Korean FOBS? With a suitable warhead, it appears they could do it with this missile.

Incidentally: the flight-time of the March 24 test was similar to the on-orbit flight time needed to get from Sunan to the United States via the southern polar route. But that is likely coincidence.

Leaving FOBS aside for the moment: at any rate a missile with this power launched on a more conventional ballistic trajectory can easily reach any location within the continental United States, as well as Europe and the Pacific (but would need a working reentry vehicle of course, which is another matter). In addition to that, it means that North Korea now in theory also has a potential road-mobile reconnaisance satellite launcher in their arsenal.

 

image: KCNA/Rodong Sinmun

image: KCNA/Rodong Sinmun

image: KCNA/Rodong Sinmun


image: KCNA/Rodong Sinmun

 

Added note: some sources are now casting some doubt on the missile identity, suggesting (with arguments from image analysis) that footage from the failed March 16 launch was perhaps presented by North Korea as being from the March 24 launch. The added suggestion is that the March 24 test missile might have been a Hwasong-15, not a Hwasong-17 as North Korea is claiming.

These objections are interesting, but multiple scenario's are possible. For example, they might have used footage from both test launches, certainly if iconic scripted propaganda scenes (e.g. KJU marching in front of the TEL leading his Rocket men) were shot during the preparations for the failed March 16 test. North Korea has been known to have doctored launch imagery for aesthetic/propaganda purposes before in the past, as I have shown for the historic first Hwasong-15 launch of 28 November 2017.

Whatever missile it really was: the missile performance shown by this test is remarkable and well beyond that of earlier North Korean ICBM launches. Western tracking of the missile test confirms the performance, so it is not just North Korean propaganda that can easily be waved away. This is a significant development, no matter how you look at it.

Sunday, 17 October 2021

A Chinese FOBS surprise (and other stuff of nightmares) [UPDATED]

 

[this post was updated on October 18 to reflect new information and a refutal of the claim by the Chinese Government. It was again updated on October 21 to reflect new information, including claims that it concerned *two* tests, on July 27 and August 13]


If you want to have nightmares for days, then listen to Jeffrey Lewis menacingly whispering "fòòòòòòòòòòbs..." in the first few seconds of this October 7 episode of the Arms Control Wonk Podcast...

I bet some people connected to US Missile Defense hear this whisper in their sleep currently, given news that broke yesterday about an alledged Chinese FOBS test in August.

FOBS (Fractional Orbital Bombardment System) has menacingly been lurking in the background for a while. In the earlier mentioned podcast it was brought up in the context of discussing new pictures from North Korea showing various missile systems: including a new one which looks like a hypersonic glide vehicle on top of an ICBM (which is not FOBS, but FOBS was brought up later in the podcasts as another potential future exotic goal for the North Korean missile test program).

image: Rodong Sinmun/KCNA

But the days of FOBS being something exclusively lurking as a menace in the overstressed minds of Arms Control Wonks like Jeffrey are over: the whole of Missile Twitter is currently abuzz about it.

The reason? Yesterday (16 Oct 2021) the Financial Times dropped a bombshell in an article, based on undisclosed intelligence sources, that claims China did a test in August with a system that, given the description, seems to combine FOBS with a hypersonic glide vehicle. [edit: but see update at end of this post]

That last element is still odd to me, and to be honest I wonder whether things have gotten mixed up here: e.g., a mix-up with a reported Chinese suborbital test flight of an experimental space plane from Jiuquan on 16 July this year. [edit: and this might be right, see update at the end of this post]

Anyhow: the FT claims that China:

"tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile in August that circled the globe before speeding towards its target".

"Circled the globe" before reaching it's target: that is FOBS.

 

FOBS

So, for those still in the dark: what is FOBS?

FOBS stands for Fractional Orbital Bombardment System. Unlike an ICBM, which is launched on a ballistic trajectory on the principle of "what goes up must come down", FOBS actually brings a nuclear payload in orbit around the earth, like a satellite.  

For example, a very Low Earth Orbit at an orbital altitude of 150 km, which is enough to last a few revolutions around the earth. At some point in this orbit, a retrorocket is fired that causes the warhead to deorbit, and hit a target on earth.

FOBS was developed as an alternative to ICBM's by the Soviet Union in the late 1960-ies, as a ways to evade the growing US Early Warning radar system over the Arctic. Soviet ICBM's would be fired over the Arctic and picked up by these radar systems (triggering countermeasures even before the warheads hit target). But FOBS allowed the Soviet Union to evade this by attacking from unforseen directions: for example by a trajectory over the Antarctic, which would mean approaching the US from the south, totally evading the Early Warning radars deployed in the Arctic region.

In addition, because FOBS flies a low orbital trajectory (say at 150 km altitude), whereas ICBM's fly a ballistic trajectory with a much higher apogee (typically 1200 km), even when a conventional trajectory over the North Pole would be used, the US radars would pick up the FOBS relatively late, drastically lowering warning times (the actual flight times of an ICBM and a FOBS over a northern Arctic trajectory are not much different: ~30 minutes. Over the Antarctic takes FOBS over an hour. But of relevance here is when the missiles would be picked up by US warning radars).

The Soviet Union fielded operational FOBS during the 1970-ies, but eventually abandoned them because new western Early Warning systems made them obsolete. This notably concerned the construction of an Early Warning system in space, consisting of satellites that continuously scan the globe for the heat signatures of missile launches. DSP (Defense Support Program) was the first of such systems: the current incarnation is a follow-up system called SBIRS (Space-Based Infra-Red System). This eliminated the surprise attack angle of FOBS, because their launches would instantly be detected..

 

Reenter FOBS

But now China has revived the idea, moreover with an alledged test of an actual new FOBS system (while Russia also has indicated they are looking into FOBS again). From the description in the Financial Times, which is based on undisclosed intelligence sources, the Chinese FOBS system moreover includes a hypersonic gliding phase. [edit: but see update at the end of this post]

Initially this surprised me: I was of the opinion (and quarrelled with Jeffrey Lewis about this, but am man enough to now admit I was wrong and he was right. Sorry Jeffrey, I bow in deep reverance...)  that FOBS in 2021 had very little over regular ICBM technology and was therefore a very unlikely strategy, feasible only as a desperate last defensive act of revenge before total annihilation in case of an attack by others. Because using FOBS in an offensive tactical role would guarantee you to lead to Mutually Assured Destruction.

I still stand behind that last part, but clearly, China thinks they nevertheless need FOBS. Why?

FOBS still has one advantage over regular ICBM's. That is, that a southern trajectory over Antarctica approaching the US mainland from the south, while not going undetected by SBIRS, still avoids warhead intercepts by the US anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems, that are currently geared to intercept a regular ICBM-attack over the Arctic or from the west (North Korea).

I should ad here: "for the time being".... The logical answer by the US (unless they chose to continue to ignore China with regard to BMD, as they did untill now) will now be to extend their BMD coverage to the south. For countering FOBS, they could use the same AEGIS SM-3 technology that they used to down the USA 193 satellite in 2008 (Operation Burnt Frost).

Here are two maps I made, one for a FOBS attack on Washington DC from China and one for a FOBS attack on Washington DC from North Korea. The red lines are ballistic ICBM trajectories (over the Arctic), and current BMD sites are meant to intercept these kind of trajectories. The yellow lines are FOBS trajectories over the Antarctic, showing how these attack the USA "in the back" of their missile defenses by coming from the south instead.

hypothetical FOBS attach from China. Click maps to enlarge

 
hypothetical FOBS attack from North Korea. Click map to enlarge

As the USA is currently putting much effort in Ballistic Missile Defense, developing a new FOBS capacity could be a way by which China is warning the USA that even with BMD, they are still vulnerable: i.e. that they shouldn't attempt a nuclear attack on China from a notion that their BMD systems make them invulnerable to a Chinese answer to such an attack. 

FOBS is hence a way of creating and utilizing weaknesses in the current BMD capacity of the USA, as a counter capacity.

It should be remarked here that the US BMD capacity is geared towards missiles fired by Russia or by  'Rogue Nations' like North Korea and Iran. The USA seems to have largely ignored China so far with regard to BMD. Meanwhile, China is concerned with the US BMD development, particularly deployment of BMD elements in their immediate region.

So this FOBS experiment could also be a way in which China tries to force the US to finally take the Chinese concerns about US BMD deployments and the inclusion of their region into such deployments, serious. 

 

Outer Space Treaty

China (like the US and Russia) is a signatory of the Outer Space Treaty (or, in full: the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies). 

FOBS seems to be a violation of this treaty, as Article IV of the treaty clearly states that:

 "States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction"

This is exactly what FOBS does: it (temporarily) places a nuclear weapon in orbit around earth, so that they can later bring it down over a target.

The Soviet Union, when testing FOBS in the late '60-ies, tried to get out from under this by claiming that, as their FOBS did not complete a full orbit around the Earth, article IV of the treaty didn't apply. The US Government, surprisingly -and for opportunistic reasons- went along with this interpretation (see this article in The Space Review). Which is, pardon me the word, of course bullshit: in the sense of orbital mechanics (that is to say; physics), FOBS clearly does place an object in orbit, and it is very clear too by the fact that after launch it needs an actual, separate deorbit burn to get it down on the target.

 

North Korea and FOBS

How about North Korea? As I mentioned, FOBS has been repeatedly mentioned as a potential route North Korea might take with its nuclear missile program. Some fear that NK could be developing a FOBS capacity in order to have a means of final-revenge-from-over-the-grave from the Kim Jong Un regime in case of a 'decapitation' attempt (an attempt to end the Kim Jong Un regime by a targetted military strike on KJU and  his family members).

One reason behind this fear is that North Korean Kwangmyŏngsŏng (KMS) satellite launches were on a trajectory over Antarctica, bringing the payload over the US only half a revolution after the launch.

Compare this launch trajectory of KMS 3-2 in December 2012 for example (which comes from this 2012 blog post), to the hypothetical FOBS trajectory in the map below it: the similarities are obvious (if perhaps superficial).



KMS satellite launch trajectory (above) and hypothetical FOBS attack from North Korea (below). Click map to enlarge


It wouldn't surprise me if FOBS will quickly replace the EMP 'threath' that over the past decade has been hyped by certain hawkish circles in the US defense world, as the horror-scenario-en-vogue.

 

Something worse than FOBS? DSBS!

So, can we think of something even more sinister than FOBS? Yes, yes we can, even though so far it is completely fictional and a bit out there (pun intended).

Let us call this very hypothetical menace DSBS. It is truely something out of your nightmares.

DSBS is a name I coined myself for a so far nameless concept: it stands for Deep Space Bombardment System. DSBS at this point is purely fictional, with no evidence that any nation is actively working on it: but the concept nevertheless popped up, as a distant worry, in a recent small international meeting of which I was part (as the meeting was under Chatham House rules, I am not allowed to name participants). So I am not entirely making this up myself (I only made up the name to go with this so far unnamed concept).

The idea of DSBS is that you park and hide a nuclear payload in Deep Space, well beyond the Earth-Moon system: for example in one of the Earth's Lagrange points. There you let it lurk, unseen (because it is too far away for detection). When Geopolitical shit hits the fan, all is lost and the moment is there, you let your DSBS payload return to earth, and impact on its target.

With the current lack of any military Xspace (Deep Space) survey capacity,  such an attack could go largely undetected untill very shortly before impact. Your best hope would be that some Near Earth Asteroid survey picks it up, but even then, warning times will be short. Moreover, with the kind of impact velocities involved (12+ km/s), no existing Ballistic Missile Defense system likely is a match for these objects.

Far-fetched? Yes. But that is also something once said about FOBS...

(Note: I hereby claim all movie rights incorporating DSBS scenario's)

(added note: I only now realized, when answering a comment to this blogpost below, that, unlike FOBS or placing something in GEO, a DSBS parked in one of the Lagrange points would NOT violate Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, because the device would NOT be in orbit around Earth (but co-orbital with Earth).

 

UPDATE 18 Oct 2021 10:45 UT and 20:10 UT: 

NOT FOBS?

China denies that they did a FOBS test: "this was a routine test of a space vehicle to verify technology of spacecraft's reusability", says a Chinese government spokesman. They reportedly also say the test happened in July, not August. That could mean that this earlier reported test flight of a prototype space plane on July 16 was concerned (a suspicion I already voiced earlier in this blogpost and at the Seesat-L list). 

Of course, as Jeffrey Lewis rightfully remarks, spaceplane technology shares a lot with FOBS technology. In Jeffrey's words:  "China just used a rocket to put a space plane in orbit and the space plane glided back to earth. Orbital bombardment is the same concept, except you put a nuclear weapon on the glider and don’t bother with a landing gear."

At the time, this space plane test was interpreted to have been suborbital, as the space plane reportedly landed in Alxa League, 800 km Badanjilin Airport, 220 km from the launch site, Jiuquan. I today however realised that this might have been a misinterpretation: it might actually have been an orbital, not suborbital, test fligth landing at the end of the first revolution. 

Indeed, I managed to create a hypothetical 41.2 degree inclined proxy orbit for a  launch from Jiuquan that brings it over Alxa League Badajilin Airport at the end of the first revolution.

Slightly more on this in this follow-up blogpost. which also points out that a Chinese source confusingly points to yet another airport as the landing site of the July 16 space plane test (if it was a space plane at all and not some upper atmospheric aircraft vehicle).

It could be that the Chinese Government is now seizing on the July 16 test to explain away a later FOBS test.

click map to enlarge

 UPDATE 21 October 2021 10:25 UT:

New information circulated by Demetri Sevastopulo, the FT journalist that broke the story, indicates that there were *two* tests, on July 27 and August 13. The first date tallies with rumours that reached me on July 29 about an 'unusual' Chinese test apparently having taken place (that I at the time erroneously though might refer to the July 16 'space plane' test).