Showing posts with label nuclear. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nuclear. Show all posts

Friday, 17 September 2021

An upcoming Trident-II D5 SLBM test in the Atlantic

click map to enlarge

A few days ago a Navigational Warning (NAVAREA IV 838/21, also issued as HYDROLANT 2336/21) appeared which points to an upcoming Trident-II D5 SLBM (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile) test from a US or Royal Navy SSBN on the Atlantic Eastern Missile Range between 12:30 UT on September 17, and 1:23 UT on Sept 20. The distance between the launch area and MIRV target area is about 9900 km.

This is the text of the Navigational Warning (the map in top of this post shows them mapped, along with a simple ballistic trajectory):

151459Z SEP 21
NAVAREA IV 838/21(11,24,26).
ATLANTIC OCEAN.
FLORIDA.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 171230Z THRU 200123Z SEP
   IN AREAS BOUND BY:
   A. 28-56N 079-59W, 29-02N 079-53W,
      29-06N 079-37W, 28-59N 079-10W,
      28-37N 079-10W, 28-36N 079-35W,
      28-45N 079-56W.             
   B. 28-24N 076-44W, 28-42N 076-42W,
      28-21N 074-40W, 28-06N 074-44W.
   C. 27-27N 071-21W, 27-52N 071-15W,
      27-25N 068-46W, 26-54N 068-54W.
   D. 17-22N 044-54W, 18-33N 044-32W,
      16-54N 040-55W, 16-00N 041-23W.
   E. 09-00S 003-51W, 08-22S 003-22W,
      12-35S 002-40E, 13-05S 002-19E,
      11-56S 000-16E, 12-09S 000-16W,
      11-34S 000-20W.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 200223Z SEP 21.

The launch area (area A) is one of two launch areas used for these kind of tests in the Atlantic (see an earlier post from 2019 analyzing several of these launches). It is the variant closest to the Florida coast, one which I suspect is used when the launch has an 'audience' of officials.

The area is close enough to the Florida coast that Florida east coast residents might see the launch, as has previously happened.

The target area is the regular target area in the southern Atlantic some 1000 km out of the coast of Angola.

Areas B, C and D are where the first, second and third stage splash down.

 

 

The location of the hazard areas does not match a simple ballistic trajectory well (such a trajectory is indicated by the line in the map in the top of this post), which might point to some mid-flight manoeuvering of the MIRV-bus.

The test launch is probably a DASO ("Demonstration and Shakedown Operation"), done to recertify the readiness of the submarine and its crew after major overhauls. One candidate submarine for this test launch is the Ohio-class SSBN USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) which reportedly completed a major overhaul at Kings Bay on July 1. [EDIT 18 sept 2021 15:45 UT: it actually was USS Wyoming, which fired two Trident missiles as part of the test]

 

UPDATE 18 Sep 2021 15:45 UT

The US Navy has announced that as part of DASO-31, the Ohio-class SSBN-742 USS Wyoming has fired two Trident missiles on September 17th.

image: US Navy/David Holmes
image US Navy/David Holmes



Monday, 8 February 2021

A possible (now CONFIRMED) Trident-II SLBM test launch between February 9 and 14, 2021 [UPDATED]

click map to enlarge

A Navigational Warning, NAVAREA IV 117/21, appeared yesterday, and is suggestive of an upcoming Trident-II SLBM test in the Atlantic. I have posted on such test launches before.

This is the text of the Navigational Warning:

 071431Z FEB 21
 NAVAREA IV 117/21(GEN).
 ATLANTIC OCEAN.

 1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS, ROCKET LAUNCHING
    091340Z TO 140226Z FEB IN AREAS BOUND BY:
    A. 28-56N 76-17W, 28-56N 75-34W,
       28-36N 75-34W, 28-43N 76-17W.
    B. 28-02N 73-18W, 28-17N 73-13W,
       27-47N 71-11W, 27-34N 71-17W,
       27-44N 72-10W.
    C. 26-25N 67-23W, 26-47N 67-10W,
       25-44N 63-47W, 25-06N 63-57W,
       25-32N 65-52W.
    D. 17-10N 45-30W, 17-37N 45-11W,
       16-53N 43-06W, 15-23N 41-22W,
       14-46N 41-42W, 16-11N 44-26W.
    E. 06-00S 09-39W, 05-13S 09-08W,
       06-37S 06-56W, 07-17S 07-22W,
       06-55S 07-57W, 07-00S 08-05W.
 2. CANCEL THIS MSG 140326Z FEB 21.


The map in top of this post shows the hazard areas A to E from this Navigational Warning plotted, and a fitted ballistic trajectory. Together they define what strongly looks like a Trident-II Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) trajectory

Area 'A' is the launch area where the submarine is located; areas 'B', 'C' and 'D' is where respectively the first, second and third stages of the missile splash down; area 'E' is the target area of the warhead(s).

The indicated range, from the distance between area's A and E, is about 8400 km. That is somewhat shorter than most earlier Trident-II tests in the Atlantic.

Earlier tests in the Atlantic typically had a range near  9800 km, in one case even 10 600 km (see my overview here). So this test falls short from a  typical test by about 1500 km. 

An earlier clearly shorter range was however indicated for the infamous June 2016 Royal British Navy Trident-II test, which would have had a 8900 km range with a target area west of Ascension Island if it had not failed. The range of the upcoming February 2021 test is 500 km shorter than that of this June 2016 test, with a target area slightly more north and the launch area further out of the Florida coast. 

The launch area is nevertheless a familiar one: one of two areas regularly used for Atlantic Trident test launches

It is the same as that for the 10 Sep 2013, March 2016 and June 2018 Trident tests. It is the area labelled 'launch area B' in the map below, which plots the launch areas of several previous Trident tests. The figure comes from this previous post and is discussed there (including a suggestion for why there might be two distinct launch areas).

click map to enlarge
 

The target area near Ascension Island and shorter range might perhaps indicate that this will be a British Royal Navy test with the SLBM launched from a Vanguard-class submarine rather than a US Navy test, but this is by no means certain. It could also mean a US Navy test with new hardware, e.g. a more heavy dummy warhead or a new stage engine.

US Navy tests are usually acknowledged after the test, so it will be interesting to see whether such an acknowledgement will appear from either the US or British Navy.


UPDATE  10 Feb 2021 10:50 UT

Overnight, images and footage have appeared from Florida and Bahama residents that show an exhaust plume, indicating that the test indeed took place, near 23:30 UT on Feb 9. These are a few of them:


 

The imagery shows the sun-illuminated exhaust plume of the missile. The missile itself is in space by that time, ascending towards its ~1200-1800 km apogee.

I did a quick calculation: for a launch at 23:30 UT on 9 February 2021, the missile (and its expanding exhaust plume) should break into sunlight about a minute after launch once above ~147 km altitude. I have indicated the sunlit part of the trajectory in the map below in yellow. This means that the exhaust plume on the imagery is from either the second or third stage of the missile.

click map to enlarge

UPDATE 16 Feb 2021:

The Drive reports that the US Navy has now confirmed that this was a Trident test. The name of the submarine from which the missile was launched has not been released.

Tuesday, 22 October 2019

A reanalysis of the Trident SLBM test of 10 September 2013 and other tests

9 May 2019 Trident-II D5 test launch from USS Rhode Island in front of Florida
Photo: John Kowalski/US Navy


NOTE: This post reanalyses a case from September 2013 that turned out to be a Trident SLBM test launch. New information on the launch trajectory allows to glean information on the missile's apogee. The 10 September 2013 test launch trajectory is compared to those of several other Atlantic Trident test launches in subsequent years

Elements of this re-analysis were already published in May of this year in two Twitter threads here and here. As Twitter is highly ephemeral in nature, this blog post serves to preserve and consolidate the two analysis.

*********


On 9 May 2019, I noted a Maritime Broadcast Warning issued for the period of May 9 to 12, that clearly defined the trajectory of  a Trident-II SLBM test in the Atlantic (this was was later confirmed to be a Trident test launch from the submarine USS Rhode Island):

NAVAREA IV 394/2019 

(Cancelled by NAVAREA IV 403/2019)

WESTERN NORTH ATLANTIC.
FLORIDA.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS, ROCKET LAUNCHING
   091340Z TO 120026Z MAY IN AREAS BOUND BY:
   A. 28-53N 080-01W, 29-00N 079-35W, 28-55N 078-58W,
      28-38N 079-00W, 28-40N 079-37W, 28-50N 080-01W.
   B. 28-34N 076-26W, 28-24N 075-24W, 28-10N 075-27W,
      28-21N 076-29W.
   C. 27-45N 070-22W, 27-14N 068-45W, 26-48N 068-56W,
      27-18N 070-32W.
   D. 17-46N 045-38W, 16-22N 042-18W, 15-44N 042-36W,
      17-09N 045-55W.
   E. 15-47S 004-32E, 17-17S 007-04E, 17-10S 007-08E,
      17-29S 007-49E, 17-20S 007-52E, 17-19S 008-07E,
      17-28S 008-12E, 17-41S 008-04E, 17-45S 008-14E,
      18-27S 007-50E, 17-51S 006-44E, 17-43S 006-50E,
      16-11S 004-16E.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 120126Z MAY 19.

071718Z MAY 2019 EASTERN RANGE 071600Z MAY 19.

The five hazard areas defined in the Broadcast Warning correspond to: the launch area in front of the coast of Florida; the splash-down zones of the three booster stages;  and the MIRV target area in front of the Namibian coast. This is what it looks like when the coordinates are mapped - the dashed line in the map below is a modelled simple ballistic trajectory between the lauch area and target area:

click map to enlarge

The case brought me back six years, to September 2013, when I was asked to look at photographs made by German astrophotographer Jan Hattenbach that showed something mysterious. I suggested it was a missile test, a suggestion which was later confirmed.

In this blog post, I revisit the 2013 analysis in the light of new information about this test, and compare it to other tests for which I could find trajectory information.

In the evening of 10 September 2013, Jan Hattenbach was making a time-lapse of the night sky near the GranTeCa dome at the Roque de los Muchachos observatory on La Palma in the Canary Islands, at 2300 meter altitude.

Suddenly, a strange fuzzy objects producing cloudy "puffs" moved through the sky. I wrote about it in two blog posts in 2013 (here, and follow-up here), identifying the phenomena as a Trident-II SLBM test launch conducted from a US Navy Ohio-class submarine.

This is Hattenbach's time lapse of the phenomena: the fuzzy cloud moving from bottom center to upper left is the missile (the other moving object briefly visible above the dome is a Russian satellite, Kosmos 1410). The distinct "puffs" are likely the missile's Post-Boost Control System (PBCS) reorienting while deploying RV's during the post-boost phase:





Here is a stack of the frames from the time-lapse, and a detail of one of the frames:

click to enlarge

click to enlarge

At that time, Ted Molczan had managed to dig up a Broadcast Warning that appeared to be for the MIRV target area:

( 090508Z SEP 2013 )
HYDROLANT 2203/2013 (57) 
(Cancelled by HYDROLANT 2203/2013)

SOUTH ATLANTIC.
ROCKETS.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 091400Z TO 140130Z SEP
   IN AREA BOUND BY
   09-18S 000-26W, 09-50S 000-32E,
   12-03S 002-39E, 13-40S 004-09E,
   14-09S 003-49E, 13-06S 001-56E,
   11-05S 000-58W, 10-55S 001-05W,
   09-56S 000-50W.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 140230Z SEP 13.



The case of May this year made me realize there should be Broadcast Warnings for the launch area and stage splashdown zones as well. Searching the database for such Navigational Warnings, I indeed managed to find them, as a separate Broadcast Warning:

( 082155Z SEP 2013 )
NAVAREA IV 546/2013 (24,25,26) 
(Cancelled by NAVAREA IV 546/2013)

WESTERN NORTH ATLANTIC.
ROCKETS.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 091400Z TO 140130Z SEP
   IN AREAS BOUND BY:
   A. 28-57N 076-17W, 28-56N 075-54W,
      28-44N 075-11W, 28-29N 075-13W,
      28-43N 076-17W.
   B. 27-53N 073-02W, 28-14N 072-56W,
      27-58N 071-52W, 27-46N 071-08W,
      27-38N 071-11W, 27-39N 071-43W,
      27-39N 071-48W, 27-41N 072-04W.
   C. 26-42N 066-58W, 26-16N 065-36W,
      25-37N 063-38W, 25-18N 063-35W,
      25-06N 063-42W, 25-02N 063-52W,
      25-39N 065-51W, 26-07N 067-12W.
   D. 15-59N 043-47W, 16-51N 043-14W,
      15-54N 040-54W, 14-19N 038-09W,
      13-48N 038-28W, 13-30N 039-26W.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 140230Z SEP 13.


When the coordinates of these two Broadcast Warnings are mapped, they define a clear trajectory for this test (map below). It is somewhat different from the hypothetical trajectory we reconstructed in 2013 (the launch site is at a different location, much closer to Florida) and it is very similar to that of the recent May 2019 test. The dashed line is, again, a modelled simple Ballistic trajectory between the launch area and MIRV impact area, this time fitting the hazard areas extremely well:


click map to enlarge

The trajectory depicted is for an apogee height of 1800 km. This altitude was found by modelling ballistic trajectories for various apogee altitudes, and next looking which one of them matches the actual sky positions seen in Hattenbach's photographs from La Palma best.

In order to do so, I astrometrically measured Jan Hattenbach's images in AstroRecord, measuring RA and declination of the missile in each image using the stars on the images as a reference. The starmap below shows these measured sky positions, as red crosses.

When compared to various modelled apogee altitudes (black lines in the starmap), the measured positions best match an apogee altitude of ~1800 km:


click starmap to enlarge

So, we have learned something new about the Trident-II D5 apogee from Hattenbach's La Palma observations. At 1800 km the apogee is a bit higher than initially expected (ICBM/SLBM apogees normally are in the 1200-1400 km range).

This is how it approximately looks like in 3D (green lines depict the approximate trajectories of the missile stages). The ground range of this test was about 9800 km:



click to enlarge


Out of curiosity, and now knowing what to look for in terms of locations, I next searched the Broadcast Warning database for more Broadcast Warnings connected to potential Trident-II tests. I found six of them between 2013 and 2019, including the 10 September 2013 and 9 May 2019 test launches. It concerns additional test launches in June 2014, March 2016, June 2016, and June 2018. Putting them on a map reveals some interesting patterns, similarities and dissimilarities:


click map to enlarge

The set of Broadcast warnings points to at least two different launch areas, and three different MIRV target areas.

The two launch areas are in front of the Florida coast, out of Port Canaveral. One (labelled A in the map) is located some 60 km out of the coast, the other (labelled B in the map) is further away, some 400 km out of the coast.

I suspect that the area closest to Florida is used for test launches special enough to gather an audience of high ranking military officials. The recent test of 9 May 2019 belongs into this category, as well as a test in June 2014, and also the infamous British Royal Navy test of June 2016 (I will tell you why this test has become infamous a bit later in this blog post).

As to why area A is tapered and area B isn't, I am not sure, except that the launch location for these tests could perhaps be more defined, restrained by the audience that needs a good, predefined and safe spot to view it.

Click map to enlarge

Not only are there two different launch locations near Florida, but likewise there are at least three different MIRV target areas near Africa.

Four tests, including the 10 September 2013 test imaged by Hattenbach, target the same general area, some 1000 km out of the coast of Angola (indicated as 'impact area 1' in the map below). Two of the tests however target a slightly different location.


click map to enlarge

One of these two deviating tests is the earlier mentioned infamous Trident-II test by the British Royal Navy from June 2016.

This test has become notorious because the Trident missile, fired from the submarine HMS Vengeance, never made it to the target area. Instead it took a wrong course after launch, towards Florida (!)  and had to be destroyed. That test had a planned target area (dark green in the map above) somewat shortrange from the other tests, closer to Ascension island. This is the shortest ground range test of all the tests discussed here, approximately 8900 km, some 1000 km short of most other tests. Incidently, the choice of launch area indicates this failed test had a launch audience, so I reckon some top brass was not amused that day.

The other is the recent 9 May 2019 test. This US Navy test had a target area (red in the map above) some 400 km out of the African coast, further downrange from previous tests. This is the longest range test of all the tests discussed here, with a ground range of approximately 10 700 km, about 700 km longer than the other tests. From the choice of launch area, this test too might have had a launch audience.

The other tests had a range of 9600 to 9900 km. The different ranges could point to different payload masses (e.g. number or type of RV's), different missile configurations, or different test constraints.

There have certainly been many more Trident-II tests than the six I could identify in Broadcast Warnings (e.g. see the list here). Why these didn't have Broadcast Warnings issued, or why I was not able to identify those if they were issued, I do not know.

The Trident-II is a 3-staged Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile with nuclear warheads. The missile is an important part of US and British nuclear deterrance strategies. The missiles are caried by both US and British Ballistic Missile submarines.

click to enlarge

Edit 23 Oct 2019:
Considering the Trident-II D5 range, the US Navy clearly needs to update it's own 'fact file' here (which at the time of writing lists a maximum range of 7360 km, well short of the distances found in this analysis)

Tuesday, 19 December 2017

[UPDATED] Where to hide your nuclear missile submarine? (but be quick)

(Updated 20 Dec 2017 23:25 UT with a new plot that includes DSP)

Say, you are the leader of a nefarious country that is in posession of submarines equiped with long range nuclear missiles. You want to launch a stealth missile attack codenamed "Operation Orange Squeeze" on a northern hemisphere Super Power.

Where would you direct your submarine, and where would you best fire you missiles, from the perspective of an as-late-as-possible space-based detection of your missile launches?

The answer came to me today when, after a question by someone (in the context of a war crime investigation), I looked into the current global coverage of the Space Based Infra Red System (SBIRS), the US system of Early Warning satellites that looks for missile launches:

click map to enlarge

The red areas in the map above have an almost continuous coverage by SBIRS satellites (and often by multiple SBIRS satellites at the same time). The dark blue and black areas in the map by contrast have only a few minutes of SBIRS coverage each day, or even none at all.

As you can see, there is a clear gap in coverage in the southeastern Pacific, with lowest coverage in the area near the Galapagos islands. That is where I would park my nuclear missile submarine.

You might have to be quick to pull off your nefarious plan though. A new SBIRS satellite, the fourth satellite in the geostationary component, will launch in January. It wouldn't surprise me if it stops the gap, once operational.

Of course, this map is in fact somewhat deceptive anyway. It only shows the coverage by SBIRS. But there is also the legacy early warning satellite system called DSP (Defense Support System), which still has active satellites, and which is not taken into account here [UPDATE: but see the plot at the end of this post!]. It is less sensitive than SBIRS, but likely will detect your ICBM SLBM launch.

Back to SBIRS. SBIRS is made up of two components, each currently consisting of three satellites (so six in total): three geosynchronous SBIRS-GEO satellites at geostationary altitude, and three SBIRS-HEO satellites (TRUMPET-FO SIGINT satellites with a piggy-back SBIRS package) in 64-degree inclined Highly Elliptical Orbits with two revolutions a day.

click map to enlarge

The map above shows the coverage of the three geosynchronous SBIRS satellites (a fourth will be launched in January). Eurasia, Africa and the western Pacific Ocean has a continuous coverage by these satellites, with central Asia, Pakistan and India (the latter two known nuclear powers) particularly well covered.

The SBIRS-HEO coverage is more variable and depends on the date and time of day, but the system is designed such that at least one of the HEO satellites will have much of the Northern hemisphere in view at any time. Here are a few examples, for various times of the day: note how coverage of the Northern hemisphere is near-continuous (the HEO component also particularly covers the Arctic region well, which is at the edge of the GEO component's coverage).




click maps to enlarge
A SBIRS satellite typically has two modes: there is the scanning mode, which scans the whole visible hemisphere of the earth (as seen from the satellite) for infra-red heat signatures in less than 10 seconds. And there is the staring mode, a more sensitive sensor which can be used to observe a specific region or just detected infra-red event.

In the case of a missile launch, the sensors pick up the heat signal of the missile engine. Because of the large degree of worldwide coverage which the system now provides, an undetected stealth launch of a nuclear missile has become almost impossible.

SBIRS is probably an important source of  Early Warning capacity and information on the recent North Korean missile tests.


UPDATE 20 Dec 2017  23:25 UT:

I now also included the four DSP satellites that are still operational according to the database of the Union of Concerned Scientists. That leads to the following map:

click map to enlarge
As you can see, the gap has become smaller, but a gap is still there. Red October might be lurking in front of the South American west coast.

Thursday, 14 May 2015

[UPDATED] Why the Emergency Asteroid Defense Project (EADP) will not fly, imho

[editted and expanded May 15, 2015, to reflect on the content of the legal report commissioned by EADP. Edits and expansions are in italics between square parenthesis, to differentiate them from the original first version published]

The danger of an Asteroid impact is a real threat. To that, everybody agrees. It is however also (and I am not alone in stating this) a threat that has been, and is, overhyped by some.

Lately, a number of publicly very vocal groups have jumped on the bandwagon of  'asteroid defense'. Within the community of asteroid researchers (of which I am very modestly a member -  I search for and have actually discovered Near Earth Asteroids), some of these groups raise eyebrows and generate a somewhat uneasy feeling. Several people in our small community feel that some of these groups, often consisting of people considered outsiders, hijack the issue and overhype a threat in a way that is detrimental to the real issues and complexities involved.

One of the newest initiatives in this game is the Emergency Asteroid Defense Project (EADP). EADP wants to rescue us from a potential asteroid on a collision course with Earth. Note: there isn't such an asteroid in the picture yet.

On their website, EADP presents itself as a Denmark-based NGO that wants to develop and build an asteroid defense system for this purpose. The defense system EADP wants to build consists of two parts:

(1) a kinetic impactor, that will create an impact crater on the target asteroid;

(2) a small nuclear bomb that will next be steered into this crater and detonated, shattering the asteroid into smaller pieces.

Sounds feasible right?

EADP has just created a lot of publicity by starting a crowd funding initiative on Indie-gogo to jump-start their plans. They aim to raise money for a feasibility study and then launch their first test mission as early as 2017.

Mind you: to succinctly make clear what they propose, they propose to launch a nuclear bomb and detonate it on another celestial body. Or at least: develop the technology for it.

Now, IANASL (I Am Not A Space Lawyer). But apart from the worry that it is a private enterprise rather than a (consortium of) Nation States or the UN undertaking this: in my humble opinion, this plan runs foul of at least two international treaties, in a way that will not be easy to resolve and should not be glossed over.

EADP so far appears to do however . You should realize this before you toss your money to EADP.

[note added 15 May 2015: there is actual a legal report on their website - not their Indiegogo page - which is a bit buried, addressing these issues. From the contents of this report and its major recommendations - especially the first one -, it is clear that the issues raised should not be neglected. This is important for a crowd funding campaign, as this is information about the feasibility of the project and attached problems that potential backers need to know in order to decide whether to back the initiative. This report should have been a primary part of their Indiegogo appeal page]

For the plans of EADP to become reality, they need to:

(1) have c.q. develop a nuclear explosion device (i.e. a nuclear weapon);

(2) develop a kinetic impact weapon;

(3) find someone willing to launch these.

With regard to point (3), on their website EADP mentions the US commercial launch corporation SpaceX as an option. I have my doubts about their time-plan however: 2017 seems very soon to commission a launch. Building and launching rockets takes time [let alone tackling the political and licensing issues]. There are moreover other problems to employing SpaceX, discussed below.

Kinetic impact missions are not new. The technology for this already exists. Witness for example NASA's Deep Impact mission and LCROSS mission.

The problematic aspect is the nuclear payload that is employed next. And again, the technology is not what is most problematic here. The real problems are geopolitical.

EADP is Denmark-based, and they are an NGO (Non-Governmental Organization, i.e. a private enterprise of citizens). Denmark as a country itself has no nuclear weapon capability - and it is very doubtful that a sane government would put that capability at the hands of an NGO anyway, would they have it. Denmark also currently doesn't have their own space launch capability (but they do take part in ESA, which has). So they would be dependent on foreign countries for a launch capability (e.g. the US SpaceX, or ESA as a European organization, or Roskosmos in Russia, JAXA in Japan or perhaps the Chinese), and EADP would either have to develop/build the nuclear device themselves (but: see below), or obtain it from a country that does have a nuclear capability.

Here, they face their first problem: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The nuclear powers US, UK, France, Russia and China all signed this treaty. They would violate this treaty would they help EADP to a nuclear explosive device. They would also violate it by simply providing the technological aid for it (i.e. helping to develop it).

Likewise, given that Denmark - although not possessing a nuclear capability on its own -  is a signatory to the treaty as well, the Danish government can not allow EADP to develop a nuclear explosive device themselves, as that again would breach the treaty they signed. 

[note added 15 May 2015: while the legal report commissioned by EADP discusses the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTB), not a word is being said about the NPT).

Israel, Pakistan, India and North Korea also possess The Bomb and did not sign the treaty. Yet, it is highly doubtful they will openly share their technology with EADP. And if they would, they would get in severe trouble with the other nuclear powers. Handing your nuclear technology to private organizations in another country is the kind of thing that starts a war, as it might lead to nuclear technology falling into the wrong hands. The USA has invaded and bombed countries for less.

Moreover, EADP would still get in trouble with the fact that Denmark, the country in which they are based, has signed the treaty. Note that EADP need not actually build the actual device, for this to be problematic.

So there you have one problem with the plans of EADP.

But as if that is not enough, there is a second problem: the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of the United Nations (also known as the 'Outer Space Treaty').

This treaty has been signed by many countries, including Denmark and the United States. It regulates what can and can't be done in Outer Space and on celestial bodies other than Earth.You can find the full text of this treaty here. Important to realize, given that Denmark signed the treaty and EADP is a Danish-based NGO, is that the treaty unequivocally states that:

"States bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, whether carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities"

In other words: EADP, as a Denmark-based NGO, cannot do as they wish: they are bound by the treaty signed by the Danish government. Even if EADP would outsource the nuclear device and/or the launch to another country, Denmark (plus the other countries involved in the launch) is responsible. Basically, this means that under the Outer Space Treaty, they can't allow it (just like they can't allow it under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).

Of relevance are also provisions 2 and 3 of article III of the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies that is part of the Outer Space Treaty. These state that (and note that while the texts below talks about the Moon, the preamble to these clauses makes clear it concerns not only the Moon but all other celestial bodies other than Earth, i.e. including asteroids):

States Parties shall not place in orbit around or other trajectory to or around the Moon objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or place or use such weapons on or in the Moon.
and:
The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on the Moon shall be forbidden

In other words: launching, let alone detonating, a nuclear explosive device to and on another celestial body (like an asteroid) is simply forbidden. In fact, I think Space Lawyers could get into a real heated argument whether testing with a dummy payload already breaches this clause of the Outer Space Treaty, as a test with a dummy load is still a test, i.e. it relates to the 'testing of any type of weapon' in the clause above. [Von der Dunk, legal advisor to EADP, thinks it is not].

These are questions that, in an international diplomatic environment, therefore should not be taken lightly (and on which different countries and different lawyers might take different viewpoints).

[Von der Dunk basically says the same in his report: at various points in the report it is stressed that "in view of the geopolitical sensitivities" the EADP initiative requires a firm open discussion on these points from a  very early stage onwards. i.e.: that these geopolitical sensitivities should not be underestimated (which is exactly the main point which I argue here!). This is also the first of the main conclusions at the end of the report (p. 32): "It would be recommended for the EADP to:  * Address from an early stage onwards and in a continuing fashion the risk of ‘political fall-out’ outside the United States which EADP missions might give rise to"]

Point is: while it would be possible that countries united in the United Nations would, in the context of the United Nations Assembly, perhaps lift these provisions in the case of a real, imminent asteroid impact danger (but: don't put up your hopes high, folks!), there is imho no way a private enterprise like EADP would get this off without such a real, imminent danger. [again, Von der Dunk appears to actually  agree on this in his report: lifting of certain treaties is seen as feasible by him in case of an "emergency situation", i.e. a real imminent threath]. It is highly, highly unlikely that they would get any country to cooperate with a test mission for this purpose (which is what they are fundraising for) as, even with a dummy load, this basically still is a weapons test in Space (or at least could be seen as this by third parties) and hence diplomatically a very sensitive issue.

Now, if you pose this case to space lawyers, they will tell you that the wording of the Outer Space Treaty is ambiguous. There is also the question, whether a nuclear explosive device to blow up an asteroid should be regarded as a weapon. There is discussion possible about that [e.g. Von der Dunk thinks it isn't necessarily so. ]. But that is not the point. Or rather: it is.

Countries tend to be suspicious of each other's intentions when doing outlandish things like this. Some countries might see it as a covert military space weapons test. Remember, for example, how the shootdown of the USA 193 satellite (an imminent [artificial] impact threath from earth orbit according to the US government) was and is widely regarded and criticized as a covert ASAT test by other countries. The USA itself has expressed significant worries about recent Chinese activities in both near and deep space (including experiments the Chinese themselves present as being purely "scientific") which it considers as covert Space Weapon tests. The same is true for US and other countries' concerns about the true intentions behind the North Korean and Iranian space programs.

This gives you an idea about how sensitive this all is. Strapping a nuclear load (even if it is a dummy) onto a rocket capable of reaching and leaving Earth orbit, basically makes it an ICBM test. EADP is therefore seeking to develop technology that by all means could be considered ICBM technology by some countries. It is clear, that international arms treaties and the NPT get relevant here. Thinking they do not, is irrealistic.

EADP mentions SpaceX. Note that SpaceX, as a US company, is bound by the treaties the USA signed. They cannot launch a nuclear device (or even a dummy test load of such a device) for EADP without the US Government's approval, and the US Government in principle cannot do this without approval of the international community (represented by the United Nations) as they would otherwise breach the Outer Space Treaty. I also doubt that the US government would be okay with a private US company launching a technology test that ultimately includes a nuclear explosive device developed by a private entity in another country. This is stuff where ITAR (the International Traffic in Arms Regulations) is potentially relevant, and the US Government has been a pain in the neck with respect to ITAR issues even to organizations like NASA.

These are things that, in the face of international geopolitic realities, should not be glossed over lightly. You should not think you can just happily build and test technology for a kinetic and nuclear impact device, expect another country to launch it for you, and think other countries will be okay with that and believe Denmark is out to Save the World. It just doesn't work that way. Not even for Denmark, as much as I love that country myself.

Note that the point also isn't whether you actually build and design the nuclear device. EADP is now (on twitter, after critical questions) stressing that they don't want to test the nuclear device but leave that to "specialists"They emphasize that they "must stress that handling nukes is not our job but the government's" (they don't say which government, by the way). They also said that "we will not be the decision makers but merely the providers and the fundraisers for the technology".

But, besides that it is odd to simply waive away testing the most crucial part of the proposed mission and technology, it is besides the point that they say they only develop, not actually build a nuclear device. Developing the technology meant to bring a nuclear explosive device into space, already is something that is (or should be) reason for concern.

This brings us to the real issue at hand. This issue is not whether some treaties are outdated and are at odds with reality and a hindrance to legitimate activities in space (they are). This is not about whether we should or should not try to do something in case we detect an asteroid on a collision course, either.

The real issue is that EADP is fundraising for a project, without having done the necessary diplomatic groundwork.

And that is where the real issue is. This is not an issue of technology. It is not an issue of money. It is a diplomatic issue, and the EADP initiative currently does not solve this. Even though it is the first thing they have to overcome for their plans to become reality.

[added 15 May 2015: Indeed, this also seems to be the explicit view of Von der Dunk in his legal report for EADP. The very first point of his final recommendations (p 32) reads:


"Address from an early stage onwards and in a continuing fashion the risk of ‘political fall-out’ outside the United States which EADP missions might give riseto, in particular as regards the use of NEDs in actual threat mitigation missions, byway of information of and appropriate consultation with the other states of the world, the United Nations and the global scientific community and by stressing the clear benefits for and interests of all mankind and all states in the EADP mission"
He also clearly warns (top of page 32) that not everybody might share his assessment that the EADP plans are not necessarily running counter to treaties like the NTB and OST:

"This is not to say, however, that in the present geo-political reality such a legal analysis would be globally shared, and efforts should be undertaken at the international level to minimise the potential for any ‘political fall-out’ that might result from the intended use of NEDs in outer space in such emergency scenarios, preferably by way of open and transparent information of, and as necessary consultation with, the other states of the world, the United Nations and the global scientific community"

i.e., on these points, the EADP commissioned Von der Dunk report actually confirms what I argue here: that geopolitically, this is a very sensitive issue. He also specifically mentions that circumnavigating these sensitivities takes a lot of time and diplomatic effort. I observe that this in turn is something which is nowhere reflected in the time-line put forward by EADP in their Indie-gogo appeal]

Their crowd-funding initiative hence seems extremely premature, and their timeplan is overtly ambitious given the realities of the diplomatic (apart from the technological and logistic) trouble they'll have to face.

What worries me, is that in their crowd-funding pitch to the public, they nowhere mention these fundamental issues. There for example isn't any statement that the Danish government is positively supporting all this (I have put out this question to EADP by twitter but received no answer yet). Nor on how they see their plans in the context of the various international treaties. [a legal report is included on their company webpage, but nothing of this is raised in their Indie-gogo appeal]

One of the EADP partners, Remco Timmermans, in answer to my question, simply claims on twitter that "This is a private enterprise. No government approval needed to do a technical design study".

Again, IANAL, but I highly doubt this is true. Private enterprises are not exempt of complying to the international treaties which their Governments sign, and the ramifications of such treaties are usually signed into the law of the signing country.

[Von der Dunk in his report does not discuss how this pertains to a technical design study, but makes very clear that government oversight indeed pertains to an actual space mission: "First, states are going to be held internationally responsible for any potential violation of international law resulting from space activities also if conducted by private entities. Further to such international responsibility, the ‘appropriate state’ would then be actually required to ensure “authorisation and continuing supervision" of such activities"].

So yes: government approval will be needed, given that Denmark signed treaties that (a) stipulate that Denmark does not acquire nuclear weapons technology on its own, nor acquires it from other countries; and (b) stipulate not to test weapons in space.

As pointed out,  the Outer Space Treaty explicitly states that Governments are responsible for what non-governmental organisations based in their country do in Space. I also doubt the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty would allow loopholes of the kind expressed by Timmermans. Just have your nuclear weapons developed by a private enterprise rather than the State and all is okay? That Kim never thought of this!

So I would expect the Danish government to take a keen interest in this. Here is a group of private citizens developing technology for a nuclear space mission, and indicating they will hand this technology to a third, foreign party for the operational part. That should raise alarm bells.

In another twitter answer to me EADP does say that the "legal raport [sic] and groundwork has been done" but here is the point:

To their audience of potential crowdfunders they do not say a thing about all these international legal and diplomatic issues involved.

And with whatever they may say on Twitter, I see no indication that these issues have been solved yet [added May 15, 2015: also not after reading Von der Dunk's commissioned report, which makes very clear that these geopolitical sensitivities should not be underestimated and demand action and openness from a very early stage onwards].

Again: IANASL (and I would like to see some independent Space Lawyers chime in here!). But you don't have to be a Space Lawyer to see the trouble ahead.

The whole crazy idea has elements in common with the much discussed Mars One project: a bold, even downright crazy plan that however speaks to the imagination (the project had immediate staunch supporters), and which National governments so far didn't dare to tackle yet. Ad to this a lot of publicity, an easy glossing over very real political problems involved, and presenting an unlikely timetable. And of course, having it all in the end primarily revolve around solliciting money from the public.

If EADP doesn't want to become the next Mars One and wants to be taken serious, they will have to explicitly and honestly address these issues first: their plans in the context of national and international agreements, laws, and geopolitical reality.

And yes, it sucks that the survival of humanity is held in suspension by such geopolitical realities. But what is new under the sun here? Look at how we (not) handle global warming.

[final notes added May 15, 2015: 

- EADP on twitter berates me for focussing on the nuclear part of the project. That is their good right of course: but I find it disingenious how they try to separate the issues around a nuclear explosive device (NED) from the rest of their project, given that a NED is an integral part of the eventual deflection technology they want to develop and test. In my opinion, you can't seperate the issue of launching a NED from the current discussion.

- I want to stress again that my main point is the apparent easy way with which EADP, in their Indie-gogo appeal towards potential financial backers, glosses over the geopolitical realities pertinent to their plan. It is my firm position that this is not correct: in order to make a fair judgement on whether this plan is backable, potential donors need to be honestly provided with information on the potential difficulties to be encountered as part of the endeavour.]

(I thank Brian Weeden for some comments on a draft of this post. All opinions expressed are however solely mine)