The North Korean satellite Malligyong-1 manoeuvered again, and this time it is different

click diagram to enlarge

In two contributions to The Space Review (part 1 here and part 2 here) for the first instance, as well as two follow-up blog posts for later manoeuvers (here, and here), I analyzed three periodic orbit raising manoeuvers by the North Korean military reconnaissance satellite Malligyong-1 (2023-179A) done in February, June and September 2024. They followed a similar pattern: an orbit raise (orbit maintenance manoeuver) in five daily increments, all taking place on late evening passes (13 - 14h UTC = 22 - 23h local time) passes over North Korea.

Now Malligyong-1 has manoeuvered for a fourth time. And while there are some similarities, this time the followed pattern was different.

The orbit raising manoeuver was done between 2025 January 16 and 18, a month later than I had anticipated. However, as can be seen in the diagram above, it was this time done in three daily increments, not five as was the case in previous orbit raising events. 

Compared to the previous orbit raises, the raise during each daily increment was larger, some 2.5 km per increment rather than 1.2 km as in the previous cases, for a total orbital altitude raise of about 7.5 km, which is also somewhat larger than the previous orbit raises (which was 4 km in February 2024 and 6 km in June and September 2024). As during the previous orbital altitude maintenance raises, it brought back the orbital altitude to the initial value from November 2023, when the satellite was launched. See the diagrams below:

click diagram to enlarge

click diagram to enlarge

The three sequential manoeuvers between January 16 and 18 raised both apogee and perigee. The daily rate of RAAN precession is still very close to the ideal sun-synchronous value.

click diagram to enlarge

As was the case for all previous orbit raises, the times I reconstruct for the three incremental orbit raises correspond to the orbital plane of Malligyong-1 passing over or near North Korea (for the method used, see here);

#   DATE       UTC    LAT     LON      ORBITS USED FOR ANALYSIS          RAISE
M1  16-01-2025 13:14  28.6 N  53.4 W   25016.48110101  25017.33556354    2.50 km
M2  17-01-2025 12:52  19.4 N  46.3 W   25017.33556354  25018.12465384    2.51 km
M3  18-01-2025 12:33  20.5 N  41.7 W   25018.45348685  25019.24307946    2.52 km

However, there is a clear difference: all nominal positions do not plot near North Korea this time, but over the mid-Atlantic. Nominal manoeuver times were about half an hour before passing over/near North Korea.

The map below plots the nominal manoeuver positions I reconstruct, as well as a part of the ground trajectory from 10 minutes before to ten minutes after the nominal reconstructed manoeuver time.

click map to enlarge

The red circle in the map is the area where the satellite would be above the horizon as seen from Pyongyang. Clearly - and unlike previous occasions - the manoeuver points do not coincide with this area, although the satellite would pass through the area about 30 minutes after the reconstructed manoeuver moments (for one of the manoeuver moments, I depicted a longer part of the ground trajectory as well with markers each 5 minutes of flight time).

The manoeuvers not conciding with the satellite being over the horizon as seen from the Pyongyang General Satellite Control Center (PGSC), is something new and intriguing. The nominal manoeuver points being over the mid-Atlantic is interesting. 

So how where these manoeuvers initiated? Assuming my reconstruction of the manoeuver points is correct, here are three options, all having their own implications:

(1) use of a pre-programmed, automated orbit raising burn;

(2) an orbit raising burn command sent through a (Russian? Chinese?) relay satellite in GEO;

(3) an orbit raising burn command sent from a groundstation or ship near/around the mid-Atlantic.

The white area depicted in the map is from where a command from a ground station or ship should have been sent in the case of option (3), possibly a location in Brazil or the mid-Atlantic. 

It might be interesting if someone better versed in that than me, could check the presence of North Korean vessels (and Russian and Chinese space tracking vessels) in the mid-Atlantic between January 16 and 18, 2025.

All three nominal positions correspond to a manoeuver just after passing through the Ascending Node, which is often a standard practise with orbit raising manoeuvers when smaller or larger alterations to the orbital inclination are required. However, no such alterations to the orbital inclination are apparent:

click diagram to enlarge

This was the fourth orbit rasing manoeuver episode since Malligyong-1 was launched on 21 November 2023. Here are they all in a table:

#  period           incr    raise    before  after    interval
1  2024 19-23 Feb    5x     4.0 km   498 km  502 km   90  days
2  2024 03-07 Jun    5x     5.7 km   497 km  503 km   105 days
3  2024 06-10 Sep    5x     5.9 km   498 km  504 km   95  days
4  2025 16-18 Jan    3x     7.5 km   496 km  504 km   132 days

A next raise might occur in the period April to June 2025. It will be interesting to see where those manoeuver locations will end up geographically and whether at some point the orbital inclination is adjusted or not.

The North Korean satellite Malligyong-1 has manoeuvered again

click map to enlarge

At the end of the first week of September, the North Korean military reconnaissance satellite Malligyong-1 (2023-179A) made an orbit raising manoeuver again, as I predicted in June.

The raise can be seen as sudden altitude jumps at the righthand side in the diagrams below, that plot the change in the satelllite's apogee and perigee altitude over time. The first diagram shows Malligyong's orbital evolution since launch in 2023, with three orbit raising events, one in February 2024, one in June 2024 and now one in September 2024 (the gradual sinusoid trends are due to natural orbit decay and periodical evolution of the orbital eccentricity: the sudden stepped "jumps" are manoeuvers). The second diagram is a detail and shows the current September orbit raise, in five distinch daily steps:

click diagram to enlarge

click diagram to enlarge

As was the case for the orbit raising manoeuvers in February and June 2024, the raise was performed in five incremental steps, one per day. The first manoever was on September 6, the last on September 10. It raised the average orbit by 5.9 km, similar to the altitude raise in June, to 504 km (see diagram below), slightly above the initial orbit insertion altitude from the launch in November 2023. While the June manoeuvers raised both perigee (slightly) and apogee, this time only the apogee was raised, from 499 km to 511 km, a raise of 12 km (see diagrams above).

click diagram to enlarge

As a result of the manoeuver, the value for the daily RAAN precession is now slightly under, but still very close to, the ideal sun-synchronous value, with the match improving over time (se diagram above)

From the pre- and post-manoeuver orbital data, I reconstruct these five sequential nominal manoeuver times (for an explanation of how these times were determined, see my earlier analysis of the February manoevres in The Space Review of 8 April 2024):

 

#  DATE         UTC     LAT     LON       ORBITS USED FOR ANALYSIS          RAISE
M1 06 Sep 2024  13:12   36.9 N  137.4 E   24250.58978379  24251.57588172    1.17 km
M2 07 Sep 2024  14:24   48.6 N  122.4 E   24251.57588172  24252.49645891    1.18 km
M3 08 Sep 2024  14:01   60.6 N  133.0 E   24252.49645891  24253.21993764    1.19 km
M4 09 Sep 2024  13:43   55.0 N  134.8 E   24253.54879868  24254.20668986    1.20 km
M5 10 sep 2024  13:32   26.0 N  130.6 E   24254.20668986  24254.93046907    1.19 km

 

These nominal positions correspond to the crosses in the map below, with the lines showing the trajectory from 10 minutes before to 10 minutes after the nominal manoeuver time:

click map to enlarge

As can be seen, and as was the case in February and June, all manoeuver times correspond to passes within direct line-of-sight range of the Pyongyang General Satellite Control Center (PGSC) in North Korea (the red oval in the map is the geographical area where the satellite will be above the horizon as seen from Pyongyang). And as was the case in February and June, all manoevers were done on late evening passes, between roughly 13 -14 UTC (10-11 pm local time in Pyongyang).

The manoeuvers started three days earlier than I had predicted. In June, I had predicted the next manoeuver to start either Sept 9, Sept 16 or Sept 23. That was based on the time between previous manoeuvers, and the fact that these were initiated on Mondays. This time however, the series of manoeuvers started on a Friday.

We can expect the next orbit raising manoeuver to happen mid-December 2024, most likely somewhere around December 13-16, on local late evening passes (13-14 UTC) within direct range of  Pyongyang.

The North Korean satellite Malligyong-1 raised its orbit again early June

 

click diagram to enlarge

Early February 2024, the North Korean satellite Malligyong-1 (2023-179A) made a series of orbital raising manoeuvers, the first we have ever seen a North Korean satellite do. I wrote about the character and significance of it at the time in two brief articles in The Space Review, which you can read here (part 1) and here (part II).

And now Maligyong-1 has raised its orbit again, in early June, slightly over 3 months after the February orbit raise. As was the case for the February orbit raise, it was done in five increments, one on each successive day, the first incremental raise in this series happening on June 3 and the last on June 7, 2024. The fifth and last of the June incremental raises also raised the apogee, by 1.6 km, something that did not happen during the previous orbit raise in February.

click diagram to enlarge

 

Each incremental raise raised the average orbital altitude by about 1.15 kilometer, for a total orbit raise of 5.8 kilometer. Perigee was raised by 10 km in total, apogee by 1.6 km. The series of incremental raises lifted the orbit to 504 x 502 km. The average orbital altitude was lifted to 503 km, half a kilometer higher than the initial insertion orbit from November 2023 (see diagram below). The new manoeuvers also further circularized the orbit (see diagrams above).

As was the case for the February manoeuvers, the orbit raise effectively compensates for the loss in orbital altitude due to natural orbital decay since February (and since launch in November 2023), maintaining the orbit within the preferred operational altitude limits.

In addition to raising the orbit back to its initial altitude, and further circularization of the orbit, the current series of orbit raises also served to bring the rate of RAAN precession even closer to the ideal sun-synchronous value than it was before. The orbit has a repeating ground track after 76.007 revolutions, i.e. each 5 days.

click diagram to enlarge

 

From what we have observed so far, we now likely can expect periodic orbit maintenance raises to happen about each three months, The first orbit maintenance raise in February 2024 was three months after launch, and the current second orbit maintenance raise three months after the previous. 

The next orbit raise therefore probably will happen near mid-September 2024.  

Both in February and June, the first sequential raise was on a Monday and the last on a Friday. We might therefore likely see the next orbit raise initiate on Monday 9, Monday 16 or Monday 23 September, 2024.

Like I did for the sequential orbit raises in February, I tried to reconstruct the approximate moment and location for each sequential burn between June 3 and 7. 

For the February series of orbit raises, I found that all incremental raises appeared to correspond to late local evening passes within direct line-of-sight of the Satellite Control Center in Pyongyang (see this article in The Space Review). 

The tracking data available for this series are a bit more sparse than for those in February (especially around the third incremental raise), yet when doing a similar analysis for this series a very similar pattern emerges again: all manoeuvers occurred around 13h-14h UTC (22h-23h local time), one of two moments in the day when the orbital plane of the satellite is passing over North Korea.

click map to enlarge

Nominal calculated manoeuver locations (for the method, see here) are all either in the area where the satellite is above the horizon as seen from North Korea, or close enough to it that they in reality very likely were too, taking uncertainties into account. The third incremental manoeuver (green) does not, but tracking coverage around that specific manoeuver is sparse, so that determination is a bit suspect.

Each line on the map above depicts the satellite's ground track from 10 minutes before, to 10 minutes after the nominal calculated manoeuver moment. The red circle is the boundary of the range where the satellite is above the horizon as seen from Pyongyang. Two out of the five nominal calculated manoeuver positions are within this circle, three are not. But even though for these three the calculated nominal manoeuver point is not within this circle, the satellite would have passed within the circle within minutes of the calculated manoeuver time on two of the three occasions, as can be seen from the mapped T-10m to T+10m ground tracks.

New North Korean launch (Malligyong-2) upcoming [UPDATED]

click map to enlarge

Navigational Warnings (HYDROPAC 1800/24) have appeared for a new North Korean satellite launch, the launch of their second military reconnaissance satellite Malligyong-2, from Sohae. North Korea also informed the Government of Japan of the upcoming launch.

The three hazard areas A to C  from the Navigational Warning are the same as those for the Malligyong-1 launch half a year ago (21 November 2023 - see this earlier blogpost). Quite likely therefore, the launch will go into a similar 97.4 degree inclined, 512 x 493 km Sun-synchronous orbit. Stage 2 and stage 3 will do a double dogleg.The launch window runs to June 3.

It will be interesting to see what the RAAN of the orbital plane will be in relation to that of Malligyong-1.

This is the text of the Navigational Warning:

261806Z MAY 24
HYDROPAC 1800/24(GEN).
PHILIPPINE SEA.
YELLOW SEA.
CHINA.
DNC 11, DNC 23.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS, ROCKET LAUNCHING
   IN PROGRESS UNTIL 031500Z JUN
   IN AREAS BOUND BY:
   A. 36-06.93N 123-33.12E, 35-24.52N 123-22.78E,
      35-20.02N 123-48.62E, 36-02.43N 123-59.18E.
   B. 34-05.90N 123-01.98E, 33-23.47N 122-51.88E,
      33-16.53N 123-29.67E, 33-58.97N 123-40.07E.
   C. 14-54.17N 128-40.10E, 11-19.30N 129-10.83E,
      11-26.82N 129-54.13E, 15-01.70N 129-24.05E.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 030600Z JUN 24.

UPDATE: further speculation as to what could be the launch time in a follow-up post here.

UPDATE 2:  launch was near 13:50 UTC (May 27, 2024) and failed due to in-flight explosion of the first stage.

UPDATE 3: The North Korean State Press Agency KCNA calls the satellite in the failed launch "Malligyong-1-1" and indicates first stage failure caused the mishap, related to the "reliability" of a new LOX + petroleum engine. The wording is somewhat ambiguous on whether it concerns a new kind of rocket or a Chollima-1 stage: they do not name the rocket type, but mention a "new-type satellite carrier rocket" . 

It should be noted that during the previous Malligyong-1 launch, the Chollima-1 first stage also blew up, somewhat after separation of the second stage (so it did no harm to the payload at the time). Here is footage of that occasion.

Imaging North Korea's new satellite Malligyong-1

stack of 100 frames

 

Last week I finally got my first views of Malligyong-1 (2023-179A), the new reconnaissance satellite which North Korea launched on 21 November 2023 (see this earlier blogpost on the launch, and these and these  Space Review articles  regarding the satellites manoeuvering). As it makes passes in the late evening, it so far had remained hidden in the Earth Shadow, but now summer is approaching it is rappidly becoming visible.

My first detection was on 22 April, when it stayed faint due to unfavourable phase angles, and my second detection was yesterday 28 April, when it was brighter (between mag +7.5 and +6 before disappearing in the Earth shadow), during a 30 degree elevation pass in the east at a range of ~900 km. My impression is that it is a bit fainter than the KMS satellites were (part of this is due to the orbital altitude).

Here is video from April 22, shot with the WATEC 902H2 Supreme and a Samyang 1.2/85 mm lens at 25 fps:

 

Brightness curve:

click diagram to enlarge

The object was steady over the half minute that I could track it (the drop at the end of the curve is because it was entering earth shadow)

Manoeuver moments of the North Korean reconnaissance satellite Malligyong-1

click image to enlarge

Earlier this year, I blogged about the detection of a series of small orbit raising manoeuvers performed by the new North Korean military optical reconnaissance satellite Malligyong-1 (2023-179A). I also wrote a small piece on it for The Space Review published on 4 March 2024.

I have now completed a follow-up analysis, which appeard in The Space Review last week (8 April 2024). You can read it here.

In that follow-up analysis, I reconstructed the times and locations of each of the five small manoeuvers. And found that they match evening passes over North Korea. Read more details in the Space Review article here.

A perigee-raising manoeuvre by the North Korean satellite Malligyong-1

Kim Jong Un inspecting a Malligyong satellite under construction in 2023. image: KCNA

On 21 November 2023 (see this earlier blogpost), after two failed earlier attempts, North Korea launched its first military reconnaissance satellite, Malligyong-1 (2023-179A), using its new Chollima-1 rocket. 

Like two civilian predecessors (KMS 3-2 in 2012 and KMS-4 in 2016), it did indeed reach orbit - an initialy 512 x 493 km, 97.43 degree inclined Sun-Synchonous orbit. But: although North Korea in the days and weeks after launch claimed the satellite took images of various US and South Korean Naval bases and  other important locations (such as the White House), it was not clear whether the satellite was really functional. 

North Korea never made any purported imagery taken by the satellite public, and independent radio trackers never detected any signals from the satellite.

But now we can definitely say the satellite is alive, On February 19, 2024, it initiated the first of a number of successive perigee raising manoeuvers that stepwise brought perigee (the lowest point in its orbit) up from 488 km to 497 km. It can be seen as the stepped "jump" in the red line in the diagram below, which maps the evolution of the apogee and perigee height of the orbit since launch:

click diagram to enlarge

 

The orbit raise appears to have been performed stepwise, in five increments, starting on February 19/20 and completed by February 24. The net effect was not only a perigee raise, but also a more circular orbit (currently 508 x 497 km).

click diagram to enlarge

 

The manoeuvre proves that Malligyong-1 is not dead, and that North-Korea has control over the satellite - something that was disputed.

South Korea's Defense Minister Shin Won-sik, commenting on the North Korean satellite, just this week remarked that it: "is currently in orbit. But it is not showing any signs of performing tasks or engaging in reconnaissance activities". Thus suggesting the satellite is not working.

That remark didn't age well: while we indeed currently can not be sure whether the satellite does successfully take imagery, it at least performs orbital manoeuvres, so in that sense it is functional. And to do such manoeuvers, you need to have the satellite under control, including attitude control.

The orbit raising manoeuver comes a bit as a surprise, as the presence of an onboard propulsion system is unexpected. The previous two North Korean satellites never manoeuvered. That Malligyong-1 has means of propulsion, was not something I and many other analysts expected.

Having the capacity to raise the satellite's orbit is a big deal. It means that North Korea, as long as there is fuel left in the satellite, can prolong the satellite's orbital lifetime, by raising its orbit when it gets too low due to natural orbital decay: thus delaying reentry into the atmosphere.

The orbit raise comes at a moment that some western observers expect that North Korea will launch another satellite soon.

North Korea's Malligyong-1 satellite and imaging Guam [UPDATED]

image: KCNA

 

Colin Zwirko of North Korea News brought the image above to my attention. It accompanies a KCNA news bulletin about a visit of Kim Jong Un to the NADA Control Center in Pyongyang, on November 22, about half a day after launch of the Malligyong-1 satellite.

Colin pointed out that you can just make out what appears to be a satellite ground-track on the blurred map on display in the control center.

In the KCNA bulletin, it is claimed that KJU, during his visit to the center:

"watched the aerospace photos of Anderson Air Force Base, Apra Harbor and other major military bases of the U.S. forces taken in the sky above Guam in the Pacific, which were received at 9:21 a.m. on Nov. 22."

At 9:21 am local time in Pyongyang (00:21 UTC) on November 22, Malligyong-1 was indeed just appearing over the horizon at, and coming in radio reach of, NADA Control Center, having passed over Guam seven minutes earlier, near 9:18 local time in Pyongyang (00:18 UTC). At 9:25:27 local time (00:25:27 UTC), the satellite was closest in range to the NADA Control Center (I mention this as it becomes relevant later).

These three images below show the ground-track and position of Malligyong-1 and its footprint (the area that has the satellite above the local horizon) for the moment it passed over Guam (00:18 UTC); for the claimed moment North Korea received images (00:21 UTC); and for the moment of closest range to the NADA Control Center (00:25:27 UTC):

So theoretically, it is indeed possible that Malligyong-1 made images of Guam near 00:18 UTC, and relayed these to the NADA Control Center a few minutes later, starting around 00:21 UTC when it came into radio reach of the latter.

(note added 3-12-2023: this could perhaps indicate it only broadcasts a signal when in range of Pyongyang. This would explain why people like Scott Tilley and me have not been able to find it active in radio frequencies: it is imperative that radio operators in Japan and South Korea try if they can find it active. First try the lower reaches of UHF, i.e. 400-500 MHz, as that is where for example the Iranian Nour satellites broadcast and we know there are connections between the N-Korean and Iranian rocketry programs).

The line on the map on display in the NADA Control Center in the KCNA image conforms to the Malligyong-1 pass in question. A bright dot on the track over the Sea of Japan seems to closely conform to the point of closest range to NADA CC, around 00:25:27 UTC (see also the animated GIF further down in this blogpost):

click to enlarge

Compare to this map I made of the Malligyong-1 ground-track around that time:

click map to enlarge

In this animated GIF, I have superposed both maps, showing the match:

This however does not necessarily mean that North Korea indeed obtained imagery of Guam on this pass, as is claimed in the KCNA bulletin.

Usually, a satellite goes through a checkout-phase first before becoming fully operational. Solar panels and antenna's have to be unfurled, systems started up and checked, attitude and pointing brought under control, camera's calibrated. This check-out phase usually takes days to weeks. Having imagery within hours, would be quite fast.

So unless North Korea publishes the imagery, it remains conjecture whether the claim is true or just propaganda.

One final thing to remark: if the image in the NADA Control Center was indeed taken during KJU's visit around 10 am local Pyongyang time (according to KCNA) on November 22, this means it was taken before orbits of Malligyong-1 became publicly available. The first public available, US released orbit is of epoch 00:14 UTC on the 22nd, but was not released untill 3:26 UTC, some 2.5 hours after KJU's visit and, it appears, some two hours after the image in the NADA Control Center was taken.. 

click to enlarge

Two clocks are visible in the photograph that would indicate it was indeed taken during KJU's visit, around 1:17 UTC, and therefore before public release of orbital elements: one partial clock can be seen on the right, marking "10:.." in likely local time, the other on the left can be seen in full and is marking "01:17" in what is likely UTC (maybe someone fluent in Korean could confirm what the Korean text above the clock says?).

The image would then date to about 1 hour after any imagery of Guam was obtained.

The orbit on the map in the NADA Control Center conforms to the real orbit in detail, suggesting (if we take face value that the photograph was taken at 01:17 UTC) that North Korea did have either their own tracking data or a telemetry-derived orbit already before the US tracking network published the first public orbits. (while some might say this is perhaps not surprising, and I agree, I mention it because there are still those who question any indigenous capacity North Korea might have when it comes to their missile and space program)

It is of course possible that the image in reality was shot at a later moment, after the orbital elements were publicly released, and the clocks doctored (I mention this as North Korea has a history of doing this kind of stuff).

UPDATE 27 Nov 2023:

On November 25, a new KCNA bulletin mentions a second visit of Kim Jong Un to the NADA Control Center that day where he "watched the photos of major target areas in the enemy region, including Jinhae, Pusan, Ulsan, Phohang, Taegu and Kangrung, taken by the reconnaissance satellite from 09:59:40 to 10:02:10 a.m.".

Specifically are mentioned, photographs: 

"taken by the reconnaissance satellite at 10:01:10 shows the U.S. Navy nuclear carrier Carl Vinson, which is anchored at the military port in Ryongho-dong, Nam-gu of Pusan City"

...and photographs of the: 

"naval base in the Pearl Harbor, the Hickam air-force base in Honolulu and other objects, taken by the reconnaissance satellite while passing over Hawaii of the U.S. at 05:13:22 a.m. on Nov. 25 in Pyongyang time"

Again, the quoted times match the closest approach points on actual passes over/near these targets, as can be seen in the maps below. And the USSN Carl Vinson is in Busan (Pusan) harbor, as Jeffrey Lewis pointed out on Twitter (this does not necessarily mean they have this info of satellite imagery of course).

(in the maps below, quoted times and dates are in UTC. To get Pyongyang local time, add 9 hours).

click map to enlarge

click map to enlarge

North Korea successfully launches the Malligyong-1 reconnaissance satellite

image: KCNA

 

On 21 November 2023 at 13:42:28 UTC, according to the State News Agency KCNA, North Korea succesfully launched its new Malligyong-1 military reconnaissance satellite to orbit. The launch was from Sohae platform 2 using a (also new) Chollima-1 rocket. 

This was the third launch attempt. Two earlier attempts, on May 31 (see this blogpost) and August 23 (see this blogpost) failed to reach orbit due to malfunctions of respectively the second and third Chollima stages.

Yesterday's sucessful launch happened 1h 18m before the window from the published Navigational Warning HYDROPAC 3667/23 (see earlier blogpost here) opened, hence taking everybody by surprise.

KCNA reports that orbit insertion was at 13:54:13 UTC.

The US Military Space Tracking network CSpOC has published orbits for two objects resulting from this launch, confirming the North Korean claim of a successful orbit insertion. 

Object A (nr 58400, 2023-179A) is likely the payload, Malligyong-1, and is in a 97.43 degree inclined, 512 x 493 km sun-synchronous orbit. 

Object B (nr 58401, 2023-179B) is likely the Chollima-1 upper stage and is in a 97.41 degree inclined, 512 x 467 km orbit.

The orbit of the payload is a Sun-synchronous orbit with a repeating ground track. It results in daily transits over Pyongyang around 10:00 and 22:00 local time, with a ground track that repeats itself each five days. This is consistent with a function as an optical reconnaissance satellite.

 

I analysed the orbital trajectory in relation to the positions of the hazard zones from Navigational Warning HYDROPAC 3667/23. 

Earlier this year, in connection to the first launch attempt, there was a discussion whether: 

(1) a multiple dogleg was involved, or;

(2) a direct orbit insertion with post-separation restart and dogleg manoeuvering of the second stage, or;

(3) a dogleg manoeuvre of the second stage pre-separation with insertion into a 78-degree inclined non-SSO orbit. 

The reason for the discussion, was that the splashdown area for stage 2 east of the Philippines, was out of line with the splashdown areas for stage one and the fairings. The direction marked by the splashdown areas for the first stage and fairings would actually match a direct SSO insertion. A detailed discussion of the issue is in this previous blogpost on the May launch attempt.

We now have an answer, based on the position of the orbit at orbit insertion: a double dogleg by both the second and third stages was involved, as illustrated below:

click map to enlarge

After separation from the first stage, stage two made a dogleg eastward. After separation from the second stage, stage three then made another dogleg westward, and next brought the payload to the orbit insertion point, the stage itself also attaining orbit in that process (where it is now space debris).

(note: the manoeuvers were likely a bit less 'sharp' than in the illustration above)

The resulting orbit is basically what would have been achieved with a direct insertion along the original launch azimuth, but with the RAAN shifted by 4.2 degrees. The double dog-leg was probably chosen to avoid the second stage falling too close to the Philippines or (in case it underperformed) on China or Taiwan.

[update] Some interesting footage has appeared on the internet from a South Korean all-sky meteor camera operated by Yonsei University. It shows the first and second stage, with the first stage blowing up after separation of the second stage. This could well have been deliberate (to avoid intact hardware recovery by South Korea: or because of range safety), but can also have been accidental (see for example how the Starship stage 1 accidentally blew up just a few days earlier). [end]

Here are a few photo's of the launch, from the North Korean State News Agency KCNA:

"Thar She Goes! No Kablooih this time!"

North Korea to try a third time to launch its Chollima-1 rocket and Malligyong-1 satellite coming days [UPDATED]

click map to enlarge

UPDATE 21 Nov 2023:  

North Korea launched the satellite on 21 Nov 13:42 GMT (1h 18m before opening of the window from the Navigational Warnings!) and claims the launch was successful.

A Navigational Warning, HYDROPAC 3667/23, has appeared today that suggests that North Korea will do a third attempt to launch their new military reconnaisance satellite Malligyong-1 on their new Chollima-1 space launch vehicle the coming days, perhaps as early as to morrow 21 November.

They tried twice before: on May 31 (see this blogpost) and on August 23 (see this blogpost). During the first attempt on May 31 the second stage failed; during the second attempt on August 23, the third stage self-destructed. Maybe they will get it right this time.

The launch window runs from November 21 15:00 UTC to November 30 15:00 UTC, based on the Navigational Warning.

The locations of the three hazard areas from the Navigational Warning are similar to those for the May and August launch attempts: Areas A and B (fairings and first stage splashdown) are southwest of Sohae in the direction towards China and Taiwan, and Area C, the second stage splash-down area, is east of the Philippines. See the map above. 

As discussed before in the context of the May launch, the location of Area C suggests that a dog-leg by the second stage is involved: either before third stage release, or after.

This is the text of the Navigational Warning:

201932Z NOV 23
HYDROPAC 3667/23(91,92,94).
EAST CHINA SEA.
PHILIPPINE SEA.
YELLOW SEA.
CHINA.
DNC 11, DNC 23.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS, ROCKET LAUNCHING 
   211500Z TO 301500Z NOV IN AREAS BOUND BY:
   A. 36-02.44N 123-59.18E, 36-06.94N 123-33.11E,
      35-24.52N 123-22.78E, 35-20.02N 123-48.62E.
   B. 33-58.97N 123-40.07E, 34-05.90N 123-01.99E,
      33-23.47N 122-51.88E, 33-16.54N 123-29.66E.
   C. 15-01.70N 129-24.05E, 14-54.17N 128-40.10E,
      11-19.30N 129-10.84E, 11-26.81N 129-54.13E.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 301600Z NOV 23.

During the previous two launches, Japan and South Korea acted ridiculously panicky, sounding sirens and telling civilians to take shelter. This is however a pre-announced space launch, not an unannounced ballistic missile launch, on a trajectory that avoids flying over significant pieces of land surface. Sounding sirens and telling people  to take shelter, is an over-reaction. Hopefully they will act less panicky this time, as this kind of panic serves no purpose.