The Russian SIGINT satellite LUCH (OLYMP-K) 2 has moved again

LUCH (OLYMP) 2 position change. Click image to enlarge

 

Luch (OLYMP) 2 (2023-031A), the second Russian OLYMP-K/LUCH 5X SIGINT satellite in geosynchronous orbit, has changed position several times since its launch in 2023. Each time, it was placed near a commercial communications satellite. I have written about it before on this blog (e.g. here), and two (here and here) 2023 Space Review article by Bart Hendrickx provides more background on the OLYMP-K program.

And now LUCH (OLYMP) 2 has moved again. From its previous position stalking THOR 7 (2015-022A) at longitude 0.54 W, where it arrived on July 1 2024, it has now made a small hop to the other side of the THOR + INTELSAT grouplet, to 0.92 W, taking a position inbetween THOR 6 (2009-058B) and INTELSAT 1002 (2004-022A).  

The move started on 16 September 2024 near 22 UTC and was completed on September 18.

LUCH 2 positions over time. Click diagram to enlarge

 

detail of the lastest move (top). Click diagram to enlarge

The photographs in top of this blogpost shows the change in position by LUCH (OLYMP) 2 over the past week: basically moving from one end of the grouplet to the other.

(as soon as the moon is less of a nuisance, I will attempt to get a better picture of LUCH (OLYMP) 2 at its new position, with a larger phase angle).

This is not the first "small hop" of LUCH (OLYMP) 2 to the other side of a visited satellite grouplet. In December 2023, it also made a small hop, from 3.2 E to 2.6 E, moving from EUTELSAT 3B to EUTELSAT KONNECT VHTS.

Meanwhile, it is not the first time either that a LUCH (OLYMP-K) satellite is checking out INTELSAT 1002. The latter has been visited by an earlier LUCH (OLYMP) satellite, LUCH (OLYMP) 1 (2014-058A) twice before.

The relocations of LUCH (OLYMP) 2 so far come at intervals of roughly 3 months.

It is still a bit mysterious why exactly these LUCH (OLYMP) satellites are stalking commercial satellites. The roles of their victims are somewhat diverse, although most of the stalking targets in one way or another have to do with data transmissions and TV broadcasts (but there appear to be no relations to recent Russian satellite TV hacks). They could perhaps be mapping contact networks, tapping data streams, analysing frequency hopping patterns, or even analyse weak energy field transmissions within their target satellites. Or they are just there to feed paranoia and provoke counterspace methods.