PAN/NEMESIS 1 is still drifting

 

click image to enlarge

In a blog post in September, I wrote that after almost eight years of being steady at longitude 47.7 E, the classified  SIGINT satellite PAN/NEMESIS 1 (2009-047A) had started to slowly drift eastwards, with the drift starting in February 2021.

Observations on the evening of November 8 show that it is still drifting. Currently it is near longitude 54.8 E, close to Yamal 402 and the grouplet GSAT 8, GSAT16 and GSAT 29, as is visible in the image above.

As it is drifting eastwards, it is getting lower in my sky: currently it is at 14.7 degrees elevation above my northeastern horizon.

The history of PAN's relocations so far (for backgrouds on PAN, its probable role and its frequent relocations during the first five years of its life, see my 2016 article in The Space Review):

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PAN (NEMESIS 1) is on the move again

Pan on August 8/9, 2021, imaged from Leiden. Click image to enlarge

Five years ago, in 2016, I wrote a long article in The Space Review titled "A NEMESIS in the sky: PAN, Mentor 4 and close encounters of the SIGINT kind". The primary subjects of that article were two SIGINT satellites: PAN (Nemesis 1) and Mentor 4.

In the article, I discussed what we had observed and deduced about PAN as amateur trackers, to what had been recently revealed about PAN by leaked documents from the Snowden files.

In the article I documented the frequent movements of PAN (2009-047A): for four years between its launch in September 2009 and mid 2013, PAN, very unusual for a geosynchronous satellite, was roving from location to location, each time being put close to a satellite for commercial satellite telephony.
For information on the "why" of that, and the larger context of it (a new kind of SIGINT information gathering), I refer to the earlier mentioned Space Review paper which goes into details.

Mid-2013, four years after launch, the frequent relocations stopped. For 8 years, the position of PAN remained stable in longitude near 47^o.7 E. It's roving days, snooping around and sniffing other satellites, were over. Until this year.  

Somewhere between 6 February and 7 May 2021, PAN started to move again, eastwards in longitude. Observed longitudes over the period May-August 2021 suggest a drift eastwards at about 0.025 deg/day. 

Assuming a stable drift, the move appears to have been initiated within a few days of 11 February, 2021.The last observation still showing PAN at 47.7 E was on 6 February 2021 (as it happens, our network did not observe it again untill early May 2021 when it had already moved eastwards by two degrees).

The diagram below (an updated version of one that appeared in my 2016 Space Review article) shows the positions in longitude that PAN has been taking up since its launch in 2006. Note the frequent relocations over the period 2009-2013, then the long stabilization at 47.7E, and the start of a new drift episode in 2021:

click diagram to enlarge

The question now is, what this drift since February means:

(1) Has it deliberately been brought into a drift state to move it to an eventual new position? 

(2) Has it reached end-of-life and been manoeuvered into a graveyard orbit?

A 'graveyard orbit' is usually an orbit that is located at least 235 km higher than a geosynchronous orbit. That does not appear to be the case here: if anything, the orbit seems to be a few km lower than it previously was. So it appears to be option (1).

It will be interesting to see whether PAN will stabilize its longitude at some point or not, and where that will be. Unfortunately, as it is drifting eastwards it is getting lower in my sky (currently, it is some 16 degrees above my local horizon), and there do not appear to be many other amateurs covering it currently.

It would be interesting to see whether radio observers can detect radio signals from PAN, which shortly after launch was emitting at frequencies similar to that of the "UFO" (UHF Follow On) constellation.

PAN on 2/3 June, 2021, imaged from Schiermonnikoog Island. Click to enlarge

LUCH (Olymp-K), an eavesdropping SIGINT snooping around commercial comsats

 

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Back in 2016, I published an article in The Space Review (A NEMESIS in the sky: PAN, Mentor 4 and Close Encounters of the SIGINT kind) about the mysterious US classified satellite PAN, and Mentor 4, another classified US satellite.

Both are SIGINT satellites launched in 2009, that are positioned close to commercial telephony communications satellites in GEO in order to eavesdrop on their communications. While Mentor 4 (an ADVANCED ORION) dedicatedly covers Thuraya 2, PAN (NEMESIS 1) moved from satellite to satellite in a 'roving' role every few months during the first 5 years of its operational existence. Its sister ship CLIO (NEMESIS 2) launched in 2014 has done pretty much the same.

But (of course) the USA is not the only country playing this game. In the same year that CLIO (NEMESIS 2) was launched, the Russian Federation launched LUCH (2014-048A), aka OLYMP-K or OLIMP-K. In 2015, in an essay in The Space Review, Brian Weeden pointed out that LUCH was roving from satellite to satellite too, possibly eavesdropping on their communications. This created headlines at the time. By all means, LUCH/OLYMP-K is the Russian equivalent of PAN and CLIO.

The diagram below shows the frequent repositionings of LUCH/OLYMP-K over the years ( a table with major repositionings is at the end of this post):

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LUCH has recently (in the second week of February, 2021) been relocating from longitude 3 W to 8 W and is now positioned near EUTELSAT 8 WEST B (2015-039B). Before the relocation, it had been close to ABS-3A (2015-010A) for several weeks. 

I shot this image below on March 29th, when LUCH and EUTELSAT 8 WEST B were about 90 km apart:

 

click image to enlarge

The image was made with a CANON EOS 80D and Samyang 2.0/135 mm lens (10 seconds at 1000 ISO) and was a by-product of targetting MEV-2 and several classified objects in this stretch of sky.

The table below gives longitudinal positions for LUCH/OLYMP-K. The table focusses on major relocations.

Dates refer to he moments the longitude appears to get stabilized, and have generally been preceeded by a period of drift. Also indicated is what satellite was closest to LUCH/OLYMP-K at the start of each stable period. Note that in several cases, multiple satellites were close by and possibly targetted as well.

TABLE: positions of LUCH/OLYMP-K since late 2014 

DATE          LON      NEAR

17-02-2021    08.1 W   EUTELSAT 8 West B       2015-039B
06-11-2020    03.1 W   ABS-3A                  2015-010A
28-09-2020    04.9 W   Eutelsat 5W B           2019-067A
11-05-2020    01.1 W   Intelsat 10-02          2014-058A
28-03-2020    21.5 E   EUTELSAT 21B            2012-062B
28-11-2019    70.6 E   EUTELSAT 70B            2012-069A
22-10-2019    68.4 E   Intelsat 20             2012-043A
25-08-2019    65.9 E   Intelsat 17             2010-065B
01-07-2019    64.0 E   Intelsat 906            2002-041A
21-02-2019    60.0 E   Intelsat 33E            2016-053B
28-10-2018    57.0 E   NSS 12                  2009-058A
03-07-2018    49.9 E   Turksat 4B              2015-060A
07-06-2018    48.0 E   Eutelsat 28B            2008-065B
27-04-2018    47.5 E   Yahsat 1B               2012-016A
17-01-2018    41.9 E   Turksat 4A              2014-007A
25-10-2017    38.1 E   Paksat 1R               2011-042A
18-08-2017    32.7 E   Intelsat New Dawn       2011-016A
14-09-2016    09.9 E   Eutelsat 10A            2009-016A
11-01-2016    01.1 W   Intelsat 10-02          2004-022A
05-10-2015    24.3 W   Intelsat 905            2002-027A
26-06-2015    18.1 W   Intelsat 901            2001-024A
22-02-2015    96.4 E   Express AM-33           2008-003A

NOSS 3-8 (NROL-79) components now close to operational separation

In a recent blog post I documented the intricate manoeuvering of the two NROL-79 payloads (NOSS 3-8) over the past three weeks. They were manoeuvering to circularize and synchronize their orbits and manoeuvre to a desired mutual distance.

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Much of this manoeuvering is now done, and the two spacecraft are now flying in formation at a mutual distance of ~50.5 km. They now look like a typical NOSS pair, as can be seen in the image above shot in the evening of March 21 (the bright star is Procyon).

Below is an updated diagram, showing the evolution of the separation between the two spacraft over time:

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After an initial rapid post-launch separation with a drift of ~31-32 km/day, reaching a maximum separation of ~202 km on day 6 after launch, the separation distance started to decrease post day 6, and is now, by day 20-21 after launch, clearly flattening out to a stable separation distance of about 50 km.

The Mean Motion/orbital period of the two spacecraft are now very similar too, as is their orbital inclination: all signs that they are now close to the desired configuration. The two orbital planes are currently about 0.2 degree separated in RAAN.

click diagram to enlarge

click diagram to enlarge

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While they are now at their operational distance (which looks to be ~50 km in this case) and close to operational configuration, this does not mean that NOSS 3-8 is now fully operational. Over the coming weeks, they will probably undergo extensive check-out tests. I also expect them to continue to make small manoeuvres for a while (but while maintaining a more or less stable mutual distance at ~50 km).

Several amateur satellite trackers contributed data to this analysis, including Leo Barhorst, Cees Bassa, Russell Eberst, Alain Figer, Paul Camilleri, Dave Waterman, Alberto Rango, Brad Young and me.

SIGINT Galore!

USA 136 (Trumpet 3), a TRUMPET in HEO. 28 Nov 2016
click to enlarge

The evening of 28 November was very clear - no moon and an extremely transparent sky, with temperatures around zero.

I used it to target several objects in GEO and HEO. Due to the favourable sky I could use exposure times twice as long as usual.

All the classified objects imaged were Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) satellites, i.e. eavesdropping satellites. The image above shows you one of the TRUMPET satellites, USA 136 (1997-068A), crossing through Andromeda. This is an object in a 63 degree inclined HEO orbit. The satellite was coming down from apogee at that moment and at an altitude of ~31 500 km.

Below is another object in HEO, USA 184 (2006-027A). This too is a SIGINT satellite, part of the TRUMPET-Follow On program (aka Advanced TRUMPET. It also serves as a SBIRS platform.

USA 184, a TRUMPET-FO in HEO, 28 Nov 2016
click to enlarge

This object was near apogee at this moment, at an altitude of 39 000 km over the Faroër Islands, which is why it looks stellar in this 20-second exposure. The star field is in Cassiopeia.

Both these objects hadn't been observed by our network for a while, hence they were somewhat off their predictions (1.5 degrees in position in the case of USA 136; and 1 degree off position in the case of USA 184).

I also briefly imaged a part of the geosynchronous belt, much lower in the sky. The targetted GEO objects were SIGINT satellites too: both Mercury 1 and Mercury 2 (1994-054A and 1996-026A), The Advanced ORION satellites Mentor 4 and Mentor 6 (2009-001A and 2012-034A) and the NEMESIS satellite PAN (2009-047A).

PAN and Mentor 4 (both shown below) have a story attached to them and were the subject of my recent article in The Space Review, which you can read here.

PAN (USA 207), a NEMESIS in GEO, 28 Nov 2016
click to enlarge

Mentor 4 (USA 202), an Advanced ORION in GEO, 28 Nov 2016
click to enlarge

A NEMESIS in the sky: PAN, Mentor 4 and close encounters of the SIGINT kind

I have published an article with the above title in The Space Review. Click here to read it.

Mentor 7 (NROL-37) stopped drifting at 102.6 E

Mentor 7 on 25 June 2016 
image (c) Paul Camilleri, used with permission
click to enlarge

On June 11, 2016, the National Reconnaisance Office (NRO) launched NROL-37: a new Mentor (Advanced ORION) SIGINT satellite, Mentor 7 (2016-036A). Paul Camilleri in Warners Bay, Australia, located it in orbit three days later, on June 14 (see a previous post).

At that time, it was in a semi-geosynchonous, 7.5 degree inclined drift orbit, and drifting westwards in longitude at a rate of ~0.28 degrees/day (see a previous post), after initial orbit insertion near longitude~105 E.

New observations by Paul Camilleri on June 24 and 25 show that this drift has stopped. The satellite is now geosynchronous in a stable, 7.5 degree inclined position at longitude 102.6 E. It arrived there on June 19th, after a 7-day drift.

click map to enlarge

This is almost certainly a temporary check-out position. In this location the satellite is positioned at 45 degrees elevation (i.e. halfway between zenith and horizon) for the Pine Gap Joint Defense Facility in central Australia, one of the primary ground stations for US SIGINT satellites:

Mentor 7: position as seen from Pine Gap
click to enlarge

It will probably remain here for a few weeks or a few months, and then be moved to an operational location, which I suspect will be near longitude 80 E.

Current elements:

Mentor 7
1 41584U 16036A   16177.93784503 0.00000000  00000-0  00000+0 0    01
2 41584   7.5070 353.7330 0045273  39.1128 322.1888  1.00270000    04

Updated orbit for Mentor 7 (NROL-37 payload)

In my previous post I reported that the geosynchronous payload of June 11th's NROL-37 launch, the SIGINT satellite Mentor 7 (USA 268, 2016-036A) was found on June 14 by Paul Camilleri in Australia.

Paul has communicated new observations from June 15 and 16, extending the observational arc to 2.1 days. I fit the following updated orbit to it:

Mentor 7
1 41584U 16036A   16167.96105997 0.00000000  00000-0  00000+0 0    07
2 41584   7.5055 353.7008 0046333  41.2140 319.1375  1.00195548    05

rms 0.004 deg      from 9 obs June 14.70 - June 16.79  (2.09 day arc)

This orbit results in a drift rate of ~0.28 degrees per day in longitude, westwards. If this drift rate does not change in the future, the satellite will reach longitude 80 E (my guess for its eventual operational position) at the end of the first week of September 2016 [update 27 June: but see follow-on post here].

More on Mentor 7 and its recovery (including one of Paul's recovery images) in my previous post.

UPDATE 27 June 2016: Mentor 7 has stopped drifting and is stable at longitude 102.6 E - more on that in this follow-on post.

Mentor 7, the NROL-37 payload, found

Launch of NROL-37 (photo credit: ULA)

On 11 June 2016 at 17:51 UT, after a one-day postponement, the US National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) launched a classified payload from Cape Canaveral under the launch designation NROL-37. It was a launch into geosynchronous orbit using a Delta IV-Heavy rocket.

The NROL-37 payload  has been catalogued under the generic designation USA 268 (2016-036A, 41584). It is widely believed to be a Mentor (Advanced Orion) SIGINT ('eavesdropping') satellite, Mentor 7.

Initial assessments pre-launch indicated a possible orbit insertion of the payload over Southeast Asia. After launch, Paul Camilleri, a novice satellite observer in Australia, was guided by Ted Molczan and me in an attempt to find the payload by means of a dedicated photographic survey.

In the early morning of June 15 (local time -  June 14 in UT), three days after the launch, Paul indeed successfully located the payload! The image below shows one of Paul's initial images, with the NROL-37 payload visible as a bright dot.

Mentor 7 (NROL-37) imaged June 14 by Paul Camilleri in Australia
click to enlarge - photo (c) Paul Camilleri, used with permission

From imagery on June 14 and 15, the following very preliminary orbit was calculated (for the time being, I have fixed a few parameters towards 'round' values here):

Mentor 7
1 41584U 16036A   16166.96303997 0.00000000  00000-0  00000+0 0    06
2 41584   7.5000 353.7000 0046000  41.4155 318.9349  1.00200000    04

rms 0.006, from 7 obs, 2016 June 14.70 - June 15.48 UTC

This places the satellite near longitude 104 E, over the Strait of Malacca, around the time of discovery, in a ~7.5 degree inclined near-geosynchronous orbit.

[edit 19 June 2016, 20:15 UT: I have posted an updated orbit in a later post here]

click map to enlarge

While the Mean Motion still remains somewhat ill defined from this short an observational arc, the satellite appears to be slowly drifting westwards, towards its eventual operational position.  My guess (and no more than that) is that it will eventually stop drifting near either 80 E (south of Sri Lanka) or perhaps 10 E (over central Africa). The reason for the initial placement near 104 E is likely that in this position it is initially well placed for the Pine Gap Joint Defense Facility ground station in central Australia (one of two facilities dedicated to NRO SIGINT payloads) during the initial check-out phase.

Mentor (Advanced Orion) satellites are SIGINT satellites: satellites that "listen" for radio signals. They are "the largest satellite[s] in the World", according to a statement by the then NRO director Bruce Carlson in 2010 at the time of the Mentor 5 (NROL-32) launch. There has been some speculation (it seems to be not more than that) that these satellites might have a huge fold-out mesh antenna some 100 meters wide.

Our observations suggest that these satellites indeed appear to be extraordinarily large. They are very bright (brighter than other geosynchronous payloads), typically of magnitude +8. They are the easiest geosynchronous satellites to photograph: a standard 50mm lens with a 10-second exposure will do.

The other six Mentor satellites, launched between 1995 and 2012, currently make up this configuration:

click map to enlarge

I thank Paul Camilleri for permission to use one of his photographs and for his willingnes to undertake the hunt for Mentor 7

 [edit 19 June 2016, 20:15 UT: an update here]

Geostationary bonanza

click to enlarge

The images above and below are two small parts of one single image shot on May 2nd 2016, using a SamYang 1.4/85mm lens on a Canon EOS 60D with 30 seconds exposure (ISO 1000) under a very dark sky. These two image excerpts overlap in the corner: the upper right corner of the image excerpt above overlaps with the lower left corner of the image excerpt below.

Although both sub-images are only a few degrees wide, they show a bonanza of objects, including 3 classified objects.

In the image above, 11 objects including the classified SIGINT satellite PAN (2009-047A) are visible. PAN is parked next to the commercial communications satellite Yahsat 1B.

In the image below, 10 objects including two classified objects are visible: the two classified objects are the SIGINT satellite Mercury 1 (1994-054A), and the SIGINT satellite Mentor 4 (2009-001A), the latter parked next to the commercial communications satellite Thuraya 2.

The full 10 x 14 degree image, of which the images featured here are small excerpt parts, shows over 30 objects.

click to enlarge

The Parliament Hearing

Last Friday was the MH17 hearing of the committee for Foreign Affairs of Dutch Parliament in the Dutch Parliament building in the Hague. I had been  invited as an external expert to this hearing (see a previous post), with the task to brief the parliament members on what military satellite systems from what countries might have observed the disaster, and could potentially provide useful information with a view on the criminal prosecution of the case.

An audio record of the block of the hearing that featured my presence can be downloaded here (it is in Dutch of course). Related to this, I also appeared on national television that evening (video here and below) in a long item in EénVandaag, a news background program broadcast nationwide at 6 pm. After the hearing, I also did a 20-minute live interview on national radio (audio here, below the video on that page).

It was quite an experience to be in this role, a role which I never had expected to have to play when I wrote my first blogpost on this all. I spent the better part of January doing research into even the most remotely possible questions I could imagine, digging up information, checking and re-checking facts, and writing the position paper.

The full hearing itself took 8 hours (I myself only attended some two hour of these though), and the block that included me took one hour (from 12:00 to 13:00 CET). I shared this block with Paul Riemens, who is the head of Dutch air traffic control; and prof. Piet van Genderen, who is a radar expert from Delft University.

Letter by the Minister

In the evening before the hearing, the Minister of Justice and Security, Van der Steur, had suddenly dispatched a letter to Parliament in answer to questions by Omtzigt , in which he stated that the prosecutor did receive radar and satellite data, and that in their perception there was "no need" for additional requests of those. He also mentioned that the prosecutor had insight in these data "through the MIVD"  (the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service) by means of "ambtsberichten" (i.e. brief statements on what the data show, not the data itself). The latter suggested to me, that the data are not declassified, and perhaps will not be declassified. Which is odd and unnecessary, as well as unwise, as I will discuss later in this blogpost.

The timing (combined with the fact that similar earlier questions by MP's Omtzigt and Sjoerdsma got unanswered) suggests that the Minister's letter to Parliament was a direct response to the position papers by Van Genderen and me, so it does seem our input into this discussion had some immediate effect.

Parliament members present

Parliament members attending the block of the hearing which I participated in, were Michiel Servaes (Labour party); Harry van Bommel (Socialist Party); Pieter Omtzigt (Christian Democrats); Louis Bontes (list Bontes/Van Klaveren, a right-wing splinter party split off from Wilders' Party for Freedom); Raymond de Roon (Party for Freedom); Sjoerd Sjoerdsma (Democrats '66); and Han ten Broeke (Party for Freedom and Liberty). Chairman of the hearing was MP Fred Teeven (Party for Freedom and Liberty: who incidentally was State Secretary at the Justice and Security department at the time of the MH17 tragedy), who is vice-chairman of the parliament committee in question.

some of the Parliament members during the hearing:
 f.l.t.r. Ten Broeke, Servaes, van Bommel and Omtzigt

Hearing proceedings and questions

Riemens, Van Genderen and me all three got a few minutes to present our information to the MP's. My main message to the committee was that there are a lot of military systems, from several countries including more than one ally of our country, that might provide useful information. I briefly outlined what kind of systems might provide what information, mentioning SBIRS, but also SIGINT and IMINT.

Next, the parliament members in the committee asked us further questions and clarifications. Servaes asked me which indications I had whether the Dutch prosecutor really needed more satellite data (harking back to the suggestions in the Minister's letter of the previous evening). Related to that, Van Bommel asked me whether my plea for an attempt to get these data and get them declassified was in the interest of transparency, or had some other additional goal. He also asked whether these data might help to further restrict the location from where the missile was fired or not. Ten Broeke asked me (and Van Genderen) for my opinion on the current government position in this.

answering questions

I amongst others answered that I was not a lawyer or attorney, but that it seemed to me that declassifying the evidence was crucial in order to be able to use them for a criminal prosecution, as well as indeed in the general interest of transparency and accountability. There are so many questions around this subject, and so many (conspiracy-) theories and different views (not to speak of desinformation floating around), that the final conclusions should be verifiable to all (after the hearing, I pointed out in the radio interview that it is also very important to the families of the victims to be able to judge these results, something also pointed out in the tv item by a father who lost his son in the tragedy).

In this context I also pointed to remarks made a year ago (17 Dec 2014) by Victoria Nuland, assistant secretary of  European and Eurasian affairs in the US government, and read these out loud to the Parliament members. During a Q & A session at the American Enterprise Institute, Nuland answered questions by a Russian reporter and said that the US government had already shared data with the Netherlands, but moreover that she expected that there:

"..will be, I believe, in the context of the Dutch case, when they roll it out – they are likely to ask us to declassify some of that, and I think we will be able to help in that regard"

In other words: she not only expects a request for declassification from the Dutch government: but she also expects that the US Government will answer positively to that request!

During the hearing, and partly in response to some of the questions,  I warned the parliament members that if these satellite data would not be pursued and a request to declassify them not be made, this could possibly stimulate a lingering feeling that the Dutch prosecution left data unchecked or unreveiled. I told them that if things transpired this way (the wording of the letter by the Minister was not so encouraging in this respect) I feared that this would potentially provide handles to those parties with an interest in denying the conclusions of the investigation, to question these results.

Omtzigt asked me if there were earlier precedents of these kinds of data being declassified. There are: in the hearing I provided the examples of infrared data on meteoric fireballs (which these satellites also register) being released to astronomers for analysis; the declassification of satellite imagery in order to argue the necessity of the invasion of Iraq at the start of the second Gulf War; and China providing satellite imagery of potential floating debris in the case of the search for the missing MH370 aircraft.

Sjoerdsma asked me whether, in case the data would be declassified and supplied, our country had the expertise to independently analyse them and verify the claims made from them. For the infrared data I answered that I am not sure, so could answer neither positively nor negatively. For IMINT and SIGINT, our country certainly has that expertise, both within our own military as well as on Dutch universities.

De Roon wanted me to clarify further which countries had what satellite systems. Bontes asked me whether the fact that we were now so reliant on foreign data from foreign systems, might be an argument to start to build, as a country, surveillance satellite capacity ourselves (I think I am really not the person to answer that question).

During my answering all these questions, van Bommel additionally asked me in what phase of the criminal investigation these data should be made public, and whether it was perhaps too early for that in the current phase.

To the latter I can agree, although (again) I am no lawyer or attorney. But I can understand that perhaps, in this phase of the inquiry, the prosecutors do not want to publicly show their hand of cards.

I do have some concern though, about whether at the end of the trajectory these data are going to be made public, in the interest of verifiability. In my opinion, they should. I find the wording of the letter by the Minister of 21 January 2016 however not very promising in that respect.

The  contributions by the other invited experts contained some significant points. Van Genderen for example made very clear that having the secondary radar data is not enough. He also made very clear that Ukrainian claims that all their radar systems were down for maintenance that day, are hard to believe, as that is against what is normal. Riemens made clear that normally, the air traffic controller on duty will be heard in the investigation (which has not happened in this case) and that radar data normally are available within an hour. Later during the hearing, well-known lawyer Knoops made very clear that without the original raw (radar, satellite) data being available, the prosecution would have no leg to stand on.

SIGINT, IMINT and MH17

(this post continues discussions in earlier posts on possible classified space-based observations of the shootdown of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over the Ukraine in 2014)

My position paper written for the Dutch Parliament Foreign Affairs committee hearing of Jan 22 (see my previous post) has a strong focus on infra-red detections of a missile by SBIRS. There are however a few other relevant aspects of Space Based observations in connection to the MH17 disaster that I could not cover in the space available to me for that paper.

In this post, I will provide some brief additional information about:

1) potential roles for IMINT satellites;
2) the positions of SIGINT satellites.


Optical and radar IMINT

1. optical IMINT

Both (unclassified) commercial and (classified) military satellite systems for high-resolution optical imagery (Image Intelligence, IMINT) exist, and both sources will be discussed below.

Optical and radar imagery obtained in the hours before, as well as during the event, might be used to look for missile systems, both on the Ukrainian as well as separatist sides of the front, in a wide circle around the site of the shootdown. It could also be used to verify the reconstruction of the purported movements of a Russian BUK system published by citizen journalist team Bellingcat, a study which is not uncontested. The Bellingcat team places the BUK in certain places at certain times, and if space-based imagery (either military or commercial) for those locations and times exist they could perhaps verify these claims.

The US military has one classified system of optical satellites with a (much-) better-than-1-meter capability: the KH-11 IMPROVED CRYSTAL/Evolved Enhanced CRYSTAL (aka 'Keyhole' or 'KENNAN') which reportedly (and theoretically, from known 2.4 meter mirror size specs) have a resolution in the order of  10-20 cm.

Mid-2014 this system consisted of four satellites: USA 161, USA 186, USA 224 and USA 245. All of these have been discussed on this blog before and are tracked by our amateur network.

We have accurate tracking data on three of these, USA 161, USA 224 and USA 245 for the days around 17 July 2014 and hence can pinpoint when these potentially had the crash area in their sight to better than a minute. For USA 186, which was actively manoeuvering around that time and for which we have a gap in our coverage form June to August 2014, pass times are a bit less certain and constrained to about 20-30 minutes accuracy.

First, we can positively affirm that one of the KH-11, USA 161 (2001-044A) actually had the Ukraine in its potential view during the incident at 13:20 UT:

click images to enlarge

Please note well: this does however NOT mean that USA 161 delivered imagery of the event. A number of factors should be taken into account:

1. the cloud cover at that moment, which might hinder imagery;
2. the crash site is located quite in the perifery of the satellites footprint area;
3. these satellites do likely not make images continuously, but only if commanded to do so, for specific areas of interest;
4. there is the question of whether USA 161 was still operational at that time. It was the oldest of the on-orbit KH-11, being launched 14 years earlier. Only a few months later it was de-orbitted, so it was clearly at the end of its lifetime.

In addition to their KH-11 system, the US military hires space on commercial high resolution optical IMINT satellites from the US commercial firm Digitalglobe (the same firm that supplies Google Earth with satellite imagery).  

Digitalglobe operates a number of satellites with a better-than-1-meter capability: Geoeye-1 (0.4 meter resolution), and Worldview 1, 2 and 3 (0.25-0.50 meter resolution). Most of the satellite imagery that the US Department of Defense supplies to the press (when briefing on the military situation in e.g. North Korea, Syria and Libya) comes from these commercial satellites.

Imagery from these same Digitalglobe satellites is also available commercially, to any interested party with money. And in addition to DigitalGlobe, the European company Airbus Defense and Space also offers commercial high-resolution optical imagery from its SPOT and Pléiades satellites. Pléiades 1A and 1B offer a 0.5 meter resolution. SPOT 5 and 6 offer a 2.5-1.5 meter resolution.

Accurate orbital data from non-classified sources are available for all the commercial imagers for 17 July 2014. The satellites in question made several daylight passes over the area in the morning of July 17, 2014, between 8:00 and 10:00 GMT, i.e. during the 3 to 5 hours before the shootdown, a period when the skies were still less clouded.

This does not mean that they necessarily made imagery of course. Yet any imagery these commercial Digitalglobe and Airbus satellites did make on July 16, 17 and 18 have the advantage that they are not "classified", unlike the US military data, meaning that they could be used and published without diplomatic problems by the Dutch government in the Dutch criminal investigation into the disaster.

I would therefore expect the Dutch OM to either buy or subpoena all potential Digitalglobe and Airbus imagery from these dates. They can be used to reconstruct missile system positions in the area (both on the Ukrainian, the separatist and Russian sides) within range of the shootdown location, and they can be used to hunt for missile transports (see my earlier remarks about the Bellingcat claims). The Dutch Air Force has an imagery analysis unit that is well suited to help with such an analysis. Including imagery from the days before and after the incident as well is useful to look for differences between imagery of these respective dates.


2. Radar IMINT

The US military has two systems for high resolution radar IMINT: the Lacrosse (ONYX) system of which currently only one satellite, Lacrosse 5 (2005-016A) is left on-orbit, and the radar component of the Future Imagery Architecture (known as TOPAZ), consisting of three satellites: FIA Radar 1, 2 and 3 (2010-046A, 2012-014A and 2013-072A). These systems should be capable of providing imagery with sub-meter resolutions, and like optical imagery, they can be used to look for the presence of missile systems in the area. They have the added bonus that they are not hampered by cloud cover, unlike optical imagery.

Apart from the USA, the German military also operates a radar satellite system, the SAR-Lupe satellites. The French military likewise operates its own radar satellite system, the Hélios system. Japan operates the IGS system (which includes both optical and radar satellite versions).

All of these satellites made passes over the Ukraine at one time or another on July 17 2014, so all of them might have provided useful imagery.  FIA Radar 3 made a pass right over the area in question near 11:43 UT for example, some 1.5 hours before the tragedy. FIA Radar 2 made a pass over the area at 18:00 UT, 4.5 hours after the shootdown. These are just a few examples.

Given what was happening in the area around this time, and the strong concern of NATO and the EU about this, it is almost certain that imagery of the area was collected by these US, German and French satellite systems.


SIGINT

My position paper briefly mentions that a number of countries have space-based SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) capacities. This does not only concern capacities for (for example) the NSA to tap into your cellphone and satellite telephone conversations: another important strategic aspect of space-based SIGINT is the capacity to detect radar and telemetry signals from enemy weapons systems. Such detections allow identification of the used weapons system (each system has its own 'signature'). They also allow, according to remarks by the then NRO director Bruce Carlson in a speech from September 2010 at the National Space Symposium, geolocation of the source of this radar signal (in the case of MH17: geolocation of the Target Acquisition Radar of the launch unit).

The US military has a number of SIGINT systems in several types of orbits: Low Earth Orbit (LEO) below 1500 km which allows coverage of a few minutes during a pass over a target; and Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) and geosynchronous orbit (GEO), which allow to monitor targets for many hours (HEO) to continuously (GEO) from distances of 36 000+ km.

France has a number of SIGINT satellites in LEO. China no doubt has SIGINT satellites too, as does Russia. For the moment I will focus on the US systems. I must ad that I did check the French systems as well but none of the French systems (ESSAIM and Elisa, both in LEO) had sight of the Ukraine at that time.

The US systems, under the catch-all codename ORION, include the TRUMPET-FO which move in HEO. One of them is USA 184, mentioned before in the discussion of SBIRS as it has a piggyback SBIRS capacity in addition to its main SIGINT role.

There are also the big MENTOR satellites in GEO, plus two MERCURY satellites also in GEO, and the older VORTEX system. Of these systems, TRUMPET-FO, MENTOR and MERCURY are certainly still active based on their orbital behaviour.

The map below shows the positions of those satellites in this series for which we have enough tracking data to allow a reconstruction of their positions and footprints on 17 July 2014, 13:20 UT and which had the MH17 crash area within potential view:

click map to enlarge

Again: this does NOT necessarily mean that all of these satellites were actively monitoring the Ukraine at that time. Quite a number of them will have been tasked on the Middle East.

Yet, given the strong NATO interest in events in the Ukraine at that time, notably the rising concern about advanced surface-to-air missile systems following the shootdown of a Ukrainian Antonov-26 a few days earlier, I would be surprised if none of them monitored the Ukraine at all.


A clarification note on the position of USA 184 (SIGINT/SBIRS)

In my position paper written for the Dutch Parliament Foreign Affairs committee meeting coming Friday, I included this map with the positions of three SBIRS satellites with view on the Ukraine at that time:

click map to enlarge

I should point out here that there is some leeway in the exact position of USA 184, depending on whether it made a corrective manoeuvre to maintain its Mean Motion of about 2.00615 revolutions/day or not since the day we last observed it.

If it did, its position would be slightly more westward compared to the position depicted above, i.e. in a position just north of Scotland rather than above the Norwegian coast:

Let me be clear: this does NOT influence the conclusions of my position paper: the MH17 crash site in both variants is well within the field of view as seen from USA 184, i.e. the satellite could potentially provide both Infra-red and SIGINT detections. In the interest of accuracy, I thought I should however mention it here.


Acknowledgement -  I thank Mike McCants (USA) and Ted Molczan (Canada) for discussions about satellite positions, notably concerning USA 184.

CLIO

On 16 September 2014, the US military launched an enigmatic satellite (2014-055A) from Cape Canaveral into a geostationary orbit. It was not disclosed for which agency the object was launched (this is information that usually is disclosed). Nor what its function would be (this is information sometimes but not always disclosed). All we know is the rather uninformative name, CLIO, that it was built by Lockheed Martin and based on their commercial A-2100 bus.

CLIO imaged on May 13, 2015 (click image to enlarge)

CLIO is currently located at longitude 108.0 E, over Indonesia, where I imaged it yesterday using the 0.51-m telescope of Warrumbungle (MPC Q65) in Australia. The image can be seen above: CLIO is positioned just north of Telkom 1 (1999 042A), an Indonesian satellite for satellite telephony. (since Telkom 1 is also built on a Lockheed A2100 bus, the brightness difference in the image above is interesting, and probably due to different attitudes (orientations) of the satellites, although it potentially could also indicate custom components on CLIO, e.g. something like a large dish antenna).

click to enlarge

In many ways CLIO appears similar to another enigmatic satellite,  PAN (USA 207, 2009-047A), launched in September 2009 and infamous among our amateur tracking network for its frequent repositioning.

PAN was also built by Lockheed Martin and like CLIO based on the A-2100 bus. As with CLIO, the government agency behind it was not disclosed, and no indications of its role provided. What was known, is that PAN was developed and built rapidly (in less than 3 years time) using off-the-shelf commercial parts, apparently in response to an urgent need of some undisclosed government agency (which I suspect is either the CIA or NSA). Much speculation has occurred about the role of the spacecraft. The frequent relocations (which stopped at the end of 2013) make clear it is not a simple communications or early warning platform. PAN is currently located at longitude 47.9 E over east Africa.

Because of the similarities, several analysts believe that CLIO, five years after PAN, is a follow-on to the PAN program. The two satellites are currently 60 degrees separated in longitude.

Observing HEO objects

In wintertime at latitude 51 degrees North, satellites in Low Earth Orbit are mostly invisible except for twilight, as all their passes are completely within the Earth shadow.

This season is therefore the season that I focus on HEO and GEO objects. HEO stands for Highly Elliptical Orbit and is almost synonymous with the more informal name 'Molniya orbit', after a class of Russian communication satellites employed in such orbits.

Military SDS COMSAT USA 198 (SDS 3F5), imaged in Cassiopeia on 4 Jan 2014

Satellites in a Molniya orbit have an orbital period of about 2 revolutions per day, an orbital inclination near 63.4 degrees, perigee at a few hundred kilometers altitude over the southern hemisphere and apogee at altitudes near 36000 km over the Arctic. They spend most of their orbital time near their apogee.The 63.4 degree orbital inclination ensures that perigee keeps at a stable position over the southern hemisphere.

US military payloads and 'unknowns' in Molniya orbit

The advantage of a Molniya orbit is that it allows a good, long duration view of high northern latitudes, including the Arctic region, which are not well visible from a geostationary orbit. This is ideal for communications satellites serving these regions, for SIGINT satellites, and other applications (such as infrared ICBM early warning systems, e.g. SBIRS) that benefit from a long 'stare' and good view of high Northern latitudes.

The US military has several systems in a Molniya orbit (see image above): communication satellites (e.g. two components of the SDS system), several SIGINT satellites (TRUMPET and TRUMPET-FO), and components of the SBIRS system (piggybacked on three TRUMPET-FO SIGINT satellites). Identifiable payloads include:

- TRUMPET 1, 2 and 3 (SIGINT);
- TRUMPET-FO and SBIRS USA 184, 200 and 259 (SIGINT and SBIRS);
- SDS COM satellites USA 179 and 198

There are a couple more which we cannot (yet) tie to a specific launch and function (see note at end of post).

Near their apogee, satellites in Molniya orbit are located high in the sky for my location, and because of their high northern position, they are sun-illuminated and hence visible (typically at magnitudes near +9 to +12) even at midnight and in winter. They move very slowly when near apogee, creating tiny trails on the images.

On December 13, the NRO launched (as NROL-35) a new SIGINT and SBIRS platform into a Molniya orbit: USA 259 (see a previous post). It is currently still actively manoeuvering to attain its final orbit, which makes it an interesting object to track. The image below was taken in late twilight of Jan 4, when the satellite was past its apogee and on its way to perigee. It was 4 minutes early against orbital elements based on observations of only a few days old.

SIGINT/SBIRS satellite USA 259 (NROL-35) imaged in Andromeda in the evening of Jan 4

I image these objects with an old but good Zeiss Sonnar MC f2.8/180 mm telelens (made in the former DDR and sturdy -and heavy- as a tank). This lens has a 67 mm aperture at f 2.8, which means it shows faint objects. As these objects move very slowly, the relatively small FOV is no problem. My observational data from January 4th can be found here and here.

Note: the 'unknowns' in the orbital plot above are objects we track that are not in public orbital catalogues and which we cannot tie to a specific launch. Although some of them certainly are, not all of these need to be payloads: some might be spent rocket stages from launches into HEO.

Observing USA 259 (NROL-35)

On December 13th, 2014, the NRO launched NROL-35 out of Vandenberg AFB into a Molniya orbit. The payload, USA 259 (2014-081A) is most likely a SIGINT, and possibly piggybacks a SBIRS sensor, according to analysts.

USA 259 (NROL-35) imaged by me on 28 December 2014

Our tracking network quite quickly picked up the payload. Peter Wakelin first picked it up from Britain on December 13, followed by Scott Tilley in Canada and Cees Bassa in the Netherlands a few hours later. In the two weeks since, the payload has been observed to be manoeuvering in order to get into its intended orbit.

My own first observations of the payload were done in the evening of December 28 (see image above, taken with the F2.8/180mm Zeiss Sonnar) during short clearings. It had been a clear day, but clouds rolled in around nightfall. The satellite was located high over the Northern Atlantic near aphelion at this time at an altitude of 34500 km, and situated high in the sky in Cepheus as seen from Leiden.

orbital position at time of the photograph

view from the satellite

SBIRS, SIGINT and the MH17 tragedy (updated)

Yesterday 17 July near 13:15 UT, 298 people including at least 173 189 192 of my countrymen perished when Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 on its way from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur crashed over the eastern Ukraine, reportedly after being hit by a missile.

This is a terrible tragedy. Among the victims are complete families, including children. It is the start of the holidays in the Netherlands, and the flight carried many Dutch families on their way to their holiday destinations in southeast Asia. My thoughts are with these highly stricken families.

For me personally, it is an unnerving fact that I was about to fly the same route from Amsterdam to southeast Asia only a few days later.

In the wake of the incident, accusations fly between the Ukrainians, pro-Russian separatists and Russians, all accusing each other of being responsible for this tragedy. At the moment it is difficult to say which bits of information floating around are true and which are false. I strongly suspect that the current suspicion against Russian-backed separatists will hold though. Some less ambiguous evidence (e.g. the location of the crash, which is close to the locations where separatists earlier downed two other (military) aircraft) certainly seem to suggest this. But we will see: at the moment, nothing is certain.

Of interest to this blog, is that US Intelligence officials have confirmed that the aircraft was hit by a surface-to-air missile, according to several US media. Senior US officials appear to have told CNN that they detected a radar signal from a surface-to-air missile system being turned on right before the crash, and that they also detected a 'heat signature' at the time the aircraft was lost.

If the CNN report is correct, it is highly likely that the 'heat signature' detection was a space-born detection by the SBIRS system of infra-red early warning satellites. I have written about this satellite system before, in the context of that other recent tragedy with a Malaysian Airlines flight, the disappeared flight MH370.

click image to enlarge

Three of the four SBIRS satellites, SBIRS GEO 1 (2011-019A) and SBIRS GEO 2 (2013-011A) in geostationary orbit and USA 184 (2006-027A) in HEO, had coverage of the area where MH17 went down at the time this happened (17 July 14:15 GMT, see image above).

SBIRS and SIGINT platform USA 184, imaged on 20 March 2014

SBIRS GEO 2 imaged on 20 June 2014

It is possible that the quoted detection of a missile radar tracking system activation around the time of the disaster was done by satellites too. Several SIGINT and ELINT satellites cover this area, including various MENTOR (ORION) satellites and one MERCURY satellite in GEO, and USA 184, which is both a TRUMPET-FO SIGINT satellite and a SBIRS platform, in HEO. That these SIGINT satellites amongst others serve to detect and monitor signals from military radar and missile systems, is known. Given the interest of the USA and NATO in closely watching military developments in the Ukraine conflict, it is almost certain that some of these are targetting the area.

The question is, whether these satellites can help pinpoint the location from where the missile was launched, and hence provide an indication of who did it (Ukrainian forces, separatist militia, or the Russians).

I suspect they can. If the SIGINT detections were indeed done by satellites, it is known that the US recently made large progress in geolocating the origin of detected signals. In a speech from September 2010 available on the NRO website, NRO director Bruce Carlson specifically remarked on the NRO's increasing capability to geolocate using SIGINT:

"I will tell you that just in the last 24 months, we’ve improved the accuracy of geo-location by nearly an order of magnitude, and we’re going to continue to do that and bring it down. We’re getting to the point where here very, very shortly, within the very near term, we will be able to target using signals intelligence". 

If they indeed have a SIGINT detection of the missile's radar system (and the CNN quote seems to say that), the character of the signature might yield information on what missile system was used (i.e. if it was indeed an SA-17/BUK).

Likewise, and although as far as I know no exact public information is available on the accuracy of this kind of detections (update: but see the update at the end of this post!) , I suspect that the  'heat signature' detections of the missile launch,  if indeed SBIRS infra-red detections, are also accurate enough to geolocate the launch site (and whether that is in Ukranian held, or separatist held territory).

A SBIRS platform has two sensors: one in staring mode, and one in scanning mode. The staring scanning mode sensor watches for heat signatures over a wide semi-global area. The scanning staring sensor targets specific regions, and when the staring scanning sensor detects a signature, the scanning staring sensor (at least according to some sources) can be employed to further pinpoint and track this event (more sources amongst others here, here and here). The goal of SBIRS reportedly is to be able to track launches, pinpoint launch sites and accurately predict potential target locations from the tracking data. That needs quite accurate tracking.

(note added: a 1-hour timezone conversion error in the original version of this post has been corrected)

Update 19/07/2014: Daniel Fischer managed to dig up this unclassified presentation from 2006, which shows that SBIRS indeed can detect SAM. Pages 2 and 3 mention the capability to pinpoint the launch location. 

Rainer Kresken has raised the legitimate question of the cloud cover present at the time of the shootdown. Water vapour obscures Infra Red, which means the cloud cover might have blocked detection of the initial launch phase of the SAM. The SIGINT detection of the missile system radar does not suffer from this problem.

Observing USA 184 (TRUMPET-FO/SBIRS-HEO)

It had been a while since I last observed objects in HEO (Highly Elliptical Orbit). Most of my recent focus has been on the KH-11 in Low Earth Orbit and on geosynchronous objects.

USA 184, 29 March 2014, 21:34 UTC
click image to enlarge

Last Saturday evening I however targetted USA 184 (2006-027A), a classified US military satellite in HEO which hovered almost in the zenith for my locality during the observation. It is the tiny trail indicated by the arrow in the image above, taken with my Canon EOS 60D and a 2.8/180mm Zeiss Sonnar MC. Stars in the image belong to Ursa maior.

A Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) is an orbit which is highly eccentric ("elliptical") with a low perigee at only a few hundred kilometers altitude (usually in the southern hemisphere) and a high apogee, often in the 20 000 to 39 000 km altitude range. The orbit is typically inclined by about 63 degrees.  USA 184 is in a 63.58 degrees inclined, 1590 x 38 760 km orbit.

USA 184, orbital position 29 March 2014 21:34 UTC

click image to enlarge

Satellites in such an orbit spend a long time near the apogee of the orbit. As a result, they hover high above the northern hemisphere for many hours a day. Just like a geosynchronous orbit, this allows long duration coverage of a (large) area. The difference with a geosynchronous orbit is that a HEO orbit is well suited to cover high polar latitudes, while a geosynchronous orbit has a poor coverage of such high latitudes. HEO orbits are therefore typically used for applications that demand long-duration coverage of high Northern latitudes. It concerns communications satellites (notably by the Russians), SIGINT satellites and Infrared Early Warning satellites.

USA 184 falls in the latter two categories. It is a TRUMPET-FO (the FO stands for "follow-on", i.e. it is an improved version of the older TRUMPET) SIGINT satellite. In addition, it has a piggyback SBIRS (Space Based Infrared System) package, which is dedicated to the detection of ICBM launches by their Infrared signatures. It is one of two HEO sensors in the SBIRS system (the other one is on USA 200, 2008-010A), in addition to the two dedicated SBIRS satellites in geostationary orbit (SBIRS-GEO 1 and SBIRS-GEO 2, 2011-019A and 2013-011A).

At the time of the observation, USA 184 was at an altitude of  38 355 km over the Northern Atlantic at 62.74 N, 4.84 W. It was almost in its apogee, and hovered at 76 degrees elevation in the sky. This is the approximate view from the satellite at that time:

view from USA 184, 29 March 21:34 UTC

click image to enlarge 

The images below are uniform patches related to the launch of USA 184 (as NROL-22 on 27 June 2006), and the SBIRS program:

note: the orbital diagrams were made with JSatTrak software and amateur orbital elements calculated by Mike McCants.