Some first analytical results on the debris from the Russian ASAT test of 15 November 2021

 

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In my previous post I discussed the November 15 Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test on the defunct Kosmos 1408 satellite by Russia. On December 1, CSpOC released the first sets of orbital elements for debris fragments created by the test. As of yesterday 2 December, when I made the preliminary analysis presented below, orbits for 207 fragments were published (many more will probably be added in the coming days and weeks). 

They allowed to construct the Gabbard-diagram below, which for each debris fragment plots the apogee altitude (blue) and the perigee altitude (red) against orbital period. They also allowed a preliminary analysis on the delta V's (ejection velocities) imparted on the debris fragments by the intercept.

 

click diagram to enlarge

 

Let's first discuss the Gabbard diagram. Gabbard diagrams show you at a glance what the altitude distribution of the created debris fragments is. As can be seen, most of the debris has a perigee (lowest point in the elliptical orbit) near the original orbital altitude of the Kosmos 1408 satellite (490 x 465 km: the intercept happened at an altitude of ~480 km): but a part of the generated debris evidently has been expelled into orbits with perigees (well) below that altitude too. The apogee altitudes (highest point in the elliptical orbit) are mostly scattered to (much) higher altitudes. In all, debris moves in orbits that can bring some debris as low as 185 km and as high as 1290 km. As can be seen, the debris stream extends downwards into the orbital altitudes of the ISS and the Chinese Space Station. About 35% (one third) of the currently catalogued debris has a perigee altitude at or below the orbit of the ISS: about 18% at or below the orbit of the Chinese Space Station. Upwards, the distribution extends well into the altitudes were many satellites in the lower part of Low Earth Orbit are operating, with the bulk of the debris reaching apogee altitudes of 500 to 700 km.

The plots below show the altitude distributions for apogee and perigee of fragments as a bar diagram:

Distribution of perigee altitudes. Click diagram to enlarge

Distribution of apogee altitudes. Click diagram to enlarge

From the change in apogee and perigee altitudes and change in orbital inclination of the debris fragments in comparison to the original orbit of Kosmos 1508, we can calculate the ejection velocities (delta V) involved. It is interesting to do this and compare it to similar data from two other ASAT tests: the Indian ASAT test of 27 March 2019 and the destruction by an SM-3 missile of the malfunctioned US spy satellite USA 193 on 20 February 2008.

In the plot below, I have plotted the density of debris against ejection velocity (in meter/second) for the Nov 15 Russian ASAT tests as a bar diagram (with bins of 5 m/s: the blue line is the kernel density):

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In the diagram below, where I have removed the bars and only plotted the kernel density curves, a comparison is made between ejection velocities from the Russian ASAT test and the Indian and US ASAT tests of 2019 and 2008:

 

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The two diagrams below do the same, in combined bar-graph form, for both the earlier ASAT tests. The first diagram compares the delta V distribution from the Russian ASAT test (blue) to that of the 2008 USA 193 destruction (red); the second diagram does the same but compared to the 2019 Indian ASAT test:

delta V of Russian ASAT fragments vs USA 193. Click diagram to enlarge

delta V of Russian ASAT fragments vs Indian ASAT. Click diagram to enlarge

The diagrams clearly show two things: the distribution of ejection velocities from the Russian ASAT test peaks at lower delta V's than that of the debris from the USA and Indian ASAT tests. In addition, the distribution is more restricted, lacking the tail of higher ejection velocities above 200 meter/s present in the distribution from the other two ASAT tests (we should note here however that this is all still based on early data, and addition of new data over the coming weeks might alter this picture somewhat).

This tallies with what we know about the Russian ASAT test: rather than a head-on encounter with the interceptor moving opposite to the movement of the target, such as in the 2008 American and 2019 Indian ASAT tests, the Russian ASAT intercept was performed by launching the interceptor in the same direction of movement as the target (as shown by NOTAM's related to the launch of the interceptor, see map below), letting the target "rear-end" the interceptor. This results in lower kinetic energies involved, explaining the more compact fragment ejection velocity distribution emphasizing lower ejection velocities. In addition, the possible use of an explosive warhead on the interceptor rather than a kinetic kill vehicle might have some influence.

click map to enlarge

So the Russian test seems to have been designed to limit the extend of ejection velocities and from that limit the extend of the orbital altitude range of the resulting fragments. That is in itself commendable, but it doesn't make this test less reckless or irresponsible. 

The Gabbard diagram near the top of this post, and the bar graphs below it, show that debris was nevertheless ejected into a wide range of orbital altitudes, from as low as 200 km to as high as 1200 km, with a peak concentration between 400 and 700 km altitude. The orbital altitude range of the debris includes the orbital altitudes of crewed space stations (ISS and the Chinese Space Station), thereby potentially endangering the crews of these Space Stations, as well as the busiest operational part of Low Earth Orbit. The diagram below gives the perigee altitude distribution of objects (including "space debris") in Low Earth Orbit, for comparison (note, as an aside, the prominent peak caused by the Starlink constellation at 550 km).

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First debris pieces from the Indian ASAT test of 27 March catalogued

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Today the first 57 orbital element sets for Microsat-r debris, debris from the Indian ASAT test on March 27, appeared on CSpOC's data-portal Space-Track (I have posted on aspects of this Indian ASAT test earlier: here, here and here). They have catalogue numbers 44117 - 44173. The analysis below is based on these orbital element sets.The elements confirm what we already knew: that Microsat-r (2019-006A) was the target of the ASAT test.

The image above plots the orbit of the 57 debris fragments, in red. The white orbit is the orbit of the International Space Station ISS, as a reference. Below is a Gabbard diagram of the debris pieces, plotting their perigee and apogee values against their obital period. The grey dashed line gives the orbital altitude of the ISS, as a reference:

click diagram to enlarge

Again, it is well visible that a large number of the 57 fragments (80% actually) have apogee altitudes above the orbit of the ISS, well into the altitude range of operational satellites. This again shows (see an earlier post) that even low-altitude ASAT tests on orbiting objects, creates debris that reaches (much) higher altitudes. The highest apogee amongst the 57 debris pieces is that of 2019-006AR at 2248 km.

Below is the apogee altitude distribution as a bargraph (including a kernel density curve), again showing how pieces do reach the altitudes of operational satellites:

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Most of the created debris in the current sample of tracked larger debris has apogee altitudes between 400 and 700 km. It is interesting to compare this to a similar diagram for debris from the 2008 US ASAT demonstration on USA 193, "Operation Burnt Frost":

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The Operation Burnt Frost debris distribution peaked at a somewhat lower apogee altitude, ~250 km (the same orbital altitude as the target, USA 193) while the peak of the Indian ASAT debris apogee distribution is higher, ~400-500 km (there could however be detector bias involved here).

It is interesting to note that both distributions appear to be double-peaked, both having a secondary peak near 700-800 km. I remain cautious however, as that could be due to detector bias.

Overall, the two distributions are similar, as I already expected.

The question now is, how long this debris will survive. To gain some insight into the expected lifetimes, I used Alan Pickup's SatEvo software to make a reentry forecast for the debris fragments. It suggests that most of the debris will stay on orbit for several weeks to months: by half a year from now, most of it should be gone however, except for a few lingering pieces. Note that this forecast should be taken with some caution: it assumes a constant solar activity at the current level, and takes the NDOT values of the element sets face value.

The following bar diagram charts the forecast number of debris objects reentering per week (the x-axis being the number of weeks after the ASAT test) resulting from the SatEvo analysis:

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Again, the result is quite similar to the actual lifetimes displayed by the USA 193 debris fragments after Operation Burnt Frost in 2008 (see an earlier post, with the same diagram), as expected:

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Why even low altitude ASAT intercepts are a threat to operational satellites in higher orbits

Click diagram to enlarge. Orbital data from CSpOC

So how big a threat is this Indian Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test of 27 March to operational satellites at higher altitudes, given that it was performed at relatively low altitude (283 km, see an earlier post)?

In an earlier post, I noted that the US ASAT demo on USA 193 ("Operation Burnt Frost") in February 2008 was a good analogue (read here why). Like the March 27 Indian ASAT test on Microsat-r, the USA 193 ASAT demonstration happened at relatively low altitude, even lower than the Indian test: 247 km. So where did debris from that test end up, altitude-wise?

The diagram above is a so-called "Gabbard Diagram" which plots apogee and perigee altitudes of individual debris fragments from the 2008 USA 193 intercept against their orbital period. (apogee is the highest point in its elliptical orbit, perigee the lowest point). The diagram can be of help to show insight into how high fragments are ejected in an ASAT test. Please do note that it concerns a subset of well-tracked larger fragments: most of the smaller fraction of debris, difficult or impossible to track, is absent from this sample.

As is visible in the diagram, many fragments ended up being ejected into highly eccentric ("elliptical") orbits with apogee, the highest point in their orbit, well above the intercept altitude. Many ended up with apogee altitudes well into the range of operational satellites (typically 400+ km).

I have indicated the International Space Station (ISS) orbital altitude (its current perigee altitude at ~407 km, not that of 2008) as a reference. Some 64% of the larger fragments in the pictured sample ended up with perigees apogees (well) above that of the ISS. Quite a number of them even breached 1000 km altitude.

This makes clear that even low altitude ASAT tests generate quite some debris fragments that can endanger satellites at higher altitudes. True, most of it reenters within hours to a few days of the test, but still plenty remain that do not. In my earlier post I showed the orbital lifetime of these same fragments from the USA 193 ASAT demonstration. Many survived on orbit for several weeks to months, occasionally even up to almost two years after the test:

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So it is clear that a "harmless" low altitude ASAT test on an orbital object does not exist (note that I say orbital and not sub-orbital). Every test generates a threat to satellites at operational altitudes. Hence NASA administrator Bridenstine was quite right in his recent condemnation of the test. It is indeed very likely that debris fragments ended up in orbits with apogee at or above the orbital altitude of the ISS and other operational satellites in Low Earth Orbit.

Debris from India's ASAT test: how long until it is gone?

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After India's ASAT test on 27 March 2019, on which I wrote in detail in my previous post, many people asked the obvious question related to the debris threat from this test: how long would debris pieces stay on-orbit?

At the moment of writing (late 31 March 2019), no orbits for debris pieces have been published yet, although CSpOC has said they are tracking some 250 pieces of debris currently.

Some insight into the possible lifetimes of debris fragments can however be gleaned from the debris generated by "Operation Burnt Frost", the destruction with an SM-3 missile of the malfunctioned USA 193 satellite by the United States of America on 21 February 2008.

The USA 193 ASAT demonstration in 2008 provides a reasonably good analogue for the Indian ASAT test on Microsat-r on March 27. The orbital altitudes are somewhat comparable: USA 193 moved in a ~245 x 255 km orbit and was intercepted at ~247 km altitude. Microsat-r moved in a ~260 x 285 km orbit and was intercepted at 283 km altitude, i.e. a difference of ~36 km in altitude compared to USA 193. Both intercepts happened in years with low solar activity, i.e. similar upper atmospheric conditions. There are some differences too: USA 193 was intercepted near perigee of its orbit, Microsat-r near apogee. There is a difference in orbital inclination as well: 58.5 degrees for USA 193, and a 96.6 degree inclined polar orbit for Microsat-r. Nevertheless, the USA 193 intercept is a good analogue: much more so than the Chinese Fengyun-1C ASAT in 2007, which was at a much higher altitude and yielded much longer lived debris fragments as a result.

CSpOC has orbital data available for 174 debris fragments from USA 193. I mapped the decay dates of these fragments and constructed this diagram. The x-axis of the diagram shows you the number of weeks after the destruction of USA 193, and the bars show you how many fragments reentered that week:

click diagram to enlarge

The distribution of reentry dates shows that most fragments reentered within two months, with a peak about 3 weeks after the destruction of USA 193. Almost all of it was gone within half a year. Yet, a few fragments ejected into higher orbits had much longer orbital lifetimes, up to almost two years. This shows that even low altitude ASAT tests on objects in Earth orbit do create at least a few fragments with longer orbital lifetimes.

The 174 debris fragments in question constitute a subset of larger, well-tracked particles within the USA 193 debris population. There were thousands more fragments, most very small, that were not (well) detected. Most of these likely reentered within hours to a few days after the destruction of  USA 193, given that small fragments have a large area-to-mass ratio (meaning their orbits decay faster, as they are more sensitive to drag).

Given the similarities, we can expect a similar pattern as the diagram above for debris fragments from the Indian ASAT test. As the Indian intercept occured slightly (about 35 km) higher, fragments might perhaps last a little bit - but probably not that much - longer.


UPDATE (2 April 2019):
A follow-on post with an analysis or orbital altitudes of generated debris can be read here.

More on the USA 193 shootdown

The online Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has published an essay by Harvard astrophysicist Yousaf Butt with a very critical view of the official reasons given for the USA 193 shootdown.

Butt filled a request through the Freedom of Information Act and obtained the report featuring the re-entry model and analysis that was used. And found it to be flawed and on closer look not quite supportive of the alledged 'danger' of the re-entry of USA 193's hydrazine fuel tank.

The report is very cautious and it's authors already note that some of the model assumptions are not realistic. Importantly, it shows that even with these assumptions maintained, much of the tank's titanium outer layer will ablate according to the model (remember how Oberg denied this in his essay?!), leaving only a very thin outer shell 1/5th or less of the original thickness. This assumes uniform ablation (which is not realistic).

Butt argues that when more realistic assumptions are made, this suggests the tank would likely have been destroyed upon reentry.

You can read the essay here, and it includes a link to the report pdf.

The essay highlights:

• A NASA study on the survivability of USA-193's hydrazine fuel tank used an oversimplified model, leading to an overly optimistic assessment of the tank's survival.
• But even this study showed how the tank would have burned up when reentering the atmosphere.
• Therefore, Washington's contention that the tank would have hit the ground intact, posing a health hazard, seems questionable.

Another thing to note is that the tank was not completely filled with fuel, but 76% filled. This turns out to be of importance in assessing the fate of the tank.


(with thanks to John Locker for te 'heads up')

Oberg on the USA 193 shootdown

The renowned veteran space journalist and former mission control engineer James Oberg has published another article about the reasons for the USA 193 shootdown in february (see my detailed coverage of the USA 193 saga here).

Like in an earlier article, Oberg is strongly opposing suggestions that there is more to this all than the official reason given for the shootdown - the danger of the tank with Hydrazine reaching earth intact. He argues that that reason given was the true and sole reason.

As much as I respect Oberg, I am still not convinced (but then, I am merely only what Oberg calls an "amateur specialist". I observe satellites and determine their orbits. I do not launch them).

First, about disintegration of the satellite. Oberg makes an argument from a comparison with meteorite falls. That argument, at least in the way he presents it, is flawed.

Oberg argues - and he is correct in this!- that it is a widespread misunderstanding that meteorites arrive on earth surface 'red hot'. He points out that in fact they are cool when reaching earth surface, and then tries to argue that they do not heat up during their fall:

Though a thin outer layer is briefly exposed to very hot air, for most of the descent that air is thinner than the purest vacuum inside thermal-shielding thermos bottles.

Now he is correct in this: small meteorites indeed arrive cold on earth surface, and of the object which does reach earth surface, only a thin outer layer has been heated.

But this is only part of the story, and as such the meteorite analogy is a very poor one.

There are two reasons why meteorites arrive cold on Earth. One is that from 25 km altitude, after being slowed down by the atmosphere to subsonic speeds, they stop ablating and enter a free fall that takes minutes to complete. During this phase they cool, much like the air the ventilator in your pc blows over your computer CPU cools your CPU.

A more important factor however is that heat generated during the incandescent phase of a meteorite fall, the result of atmospheric friction when the object still has cosmic speeds, is carried away immediately with the ablating material. It is for this reason that heat generated does not transfer much into the meteorite. This is basically what Oberg points out, but he neglects to tell something which is quite relevant:

that in this process of meteorite ablation, at least 70% (and usually more) of the meteorite ablates and hence vanishes. What reaches earth surface is at best 20-30% of the original mass.

The implications for the USA 193 tank, if we properly use the meteorite analogy, is therefore this. Either one of these two things will happen:

1) over 70% of the tank mass ablates and at best 20-30% and probably less of the original tank mass will reach earth surface;

Oberg however argues specifically against the notion of the tank being destroyed by ablation. The alternative option which remains then is:

2) the tank, due to it's special construction, does not ablate. In that case however, the heat dissipation mechanism Oberg brings up in his meteorite fall comparison will be absent too. In other words: the tank will heat up in its interior, unlike a meteorite.

In this case, Oberg's analogy is flawed.

Now, if I understand Oberg's article correctly, modelling (and who am I to question this) of the USA 193 tank entry would have nevertheless suggested the frozen hydrazine to remain intact.

In that case, you can actually question what the real danger is of a solid chunk of hydrazine ice contained in a metal casing reaching earth surface. It will only be dangerous when someone directly handles it (but even then).

Here, we should realize that tanks with -unfrozen!- hydrazine fly through our airspace daily. Most fighter jets contain a tank with hydrazine as an emergency fuel backup. The effects of this falling down on you will not much differ from those of the USA 193 tank falling down on you. Such crashes are not rare. For example, our relatively modest Dutch airforce lost 32 of its F16 fighters, which carry a hydrazine tank, through flight crashes. Some of these aircraft came down in populated areas (one actually hit a house).

All commercial aircraft carry tanks with fuel too - not hydrazine, but still not pleasant stuff. Chances that one of these tanks will descend on your head - and this happens from time to time- are much larger than that the tank of USA 193 would have. And we don't quite bother about that. So why bother about the USA 193 tank then?

USA 193 was not the first failed fuel-carrying satellite to fall back to earth in an uncontrolled way. Nor will it be the last. In fact, launch failures where final rocket stages fail to fire are common. It will be interesting to see whether future cases will get a similar treatment.

In my opinion, the USA 193 shootdown was done for multiple reasons, and the "danger" of the hydrazine tank is only one of these. It is a convenient one to defend the exercise to outsiders, but not the only reason.

I am quite convinced that other reasons were of equal or even paramount importance in making the decision:
- that USA 193 presented a very convenient target for a practical test of ASAT capabilities (thus also making the money spent on the satellite at least partly pay off);
- that it would prevent new experimental technology falling (literally) into wrong hands;
- and that it was a timely moment to remind China, the US Senate and Congress and the US public that the USA has ASAT capabilities too and that the technology in a wider sense (missile defense) was worth further funding. Note that in April 2008, barely two montsh after the USA 193 intercept, the US Congress re-examined the status of missile defense of which the used Aegis system is part.


Note: considering the USA 193 shootdown, John Locker's summary and the links he provide are worthwhile reading

USA 129, and an unknown object

Friday evening was clear, albeit with occasional wisps of cirrus traversing the sky. Back home from my new job in which I started last week, I could do some observing again.

First I tried to observe two predicted zenith passes of USA 193 debris, but didn't spot anything.

Next target was Lacrosse 3 (97-064A). I selected a star field close to beta Umi near RA 15:00, dec +76 45', through which Lacrosse 3 would pass at 19:46:30 UTC (March 7).

Just before the expected appearance of Lacrosse 3 in the FOV, suddenly a very fast object of about mag. +7.5 crossed through the lower part of the (4 degree) FOV. It moved west-east and roughly parallel to the predicted Lacrosse track. It was very fast, maybe even moving as fast as 1.5 degree/second. It caught me completely by surprise, so it took me some time to realize what happened and try to fix an approxiate time. With a plus-minus of say 20 seconds in time, the resulting position (in IOD format) is about:

99999 08 999A 4353 G 20080307194600000 17 75 1511063+756260 36 S

Given the fast speed and general direction of movement, my thought was immediately that this could be a piece of USA 193 debris. It doesn't match any of the published catalogued debris pieces though. And according to Ted, it would be somewhat too far from the expected plane of these fragments. So the object remains unidentified.

Some 30 seconds later Lacrosse 3 sailed into the FOV.

Other objects tracked that evening were all of the NOSS 3-4 objects (07-027A, B and C) including the Centaur rocket, the NOSS 2-3 objects (96-029C, D and E). I also observed two of the KeyHole photo-reconnaissance satellites: USA 129 (96-072A) which initially was bright, and USA 186 (05-042A). They were all early, especially USA 129.

I catched the latter on photograph too, while it crossed close to Castor and Pollux in Gemini, being about mag. +0.5:

(click image to enlarge)

All in all, 16 positions were logged on 10 objects this evening, two of which were camera positions, the rest was visual. The visual position obtained for USA 129 and the two camera positions agree well.

NOTAM warns aircraft of decaying USA 193 debris (updated again 02/03)

John Locker brought a new chapter to the attention in the ongoing USA 193 soap story, by pointing to a NOTAM released by the US FAA here on the Satobs list. The text of this NOTAM:

8/5536 - SPECIAL NOTICE .. THIS NOTAM REPLACES FDC 8/5501 DUE TO ADDITION OF CONTACT NUMBER. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY UNTIL 0803092300 UTC. AIRCRAFT ARE ADVISED THAT A POTENTIAL HAZARD MAY OCCUR DUE TO REENTRY OF SATELLITE USA-193 DEBRIS INTO THE EARTHS ATMOSPHERE. FURTHER NOTAMS WILL BE ISSUED IF MORE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE. IN THE INTEREST OF FLIGHT SAFETY, IT IS CRITICAL THAT ALL PILOTS/FLIGHT CREW MEMBERS REPORT ANY OBSERVED FALLING SPACE DEBRIS TO THE APPROPRIATE ATC FACILITY TO INCLUDE POSITION, ALTITUDE, TIME, AND DIRECTION OF DEBRIS OBSERVED. FAA HEADQUARTERS, AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEMS OPERATIONS SECURITY, 202-493-5107, IS THE FAA COORDINATION FACILITY. WIE UNTIL UFN

This is weird. I cannot think of any real danger to aircraft by the decay of small fragments of USA 193 debris. Most will burn up well above the flight altitude of aircraft. Those that don't, will be rare and not a real concern in my humble opinion. Moreover, hadn't "they" told us the danger was gone after they successfully shot it to bits?

The Public Relations behind this whole operation is bizarre, from start to end. I am at a loss to understand what is going on behind the scenes here. It is becoming a soap story.

Reading the NOTAM carefully, it seems actually to be more about trying to get information about where something might have come down, then that it really concerns the "danger" to aircraft. The latter merely appears to be the "vehicle", just as the hydrazine "danger" was in the argument to shoot USA 193. Perhaps some component wasn't that destroyed after all and they are after it. And no, that will not be the hydrazine tank.

UPDATE: Strike that last remark. One of the commenters to the topic on the Bad Astronomy blog here has managed to dig up the actual date of issue of this NOTAM. That appears to be Feb 20th, so before the ASAT strike. Which means it is clearly not the result of a debris-analysis made after the ASAT strike.

Still the issueing of this NOTAM remains weird. It does indicate that for some reason, they want to keep track of where debris comes down. Something among it has their interest.

Oh dear: that "they" sounds awfully conspiratory, isn't it? I apologize....and assure you I don't wear tinfoil hats... ;-)

Debris of shot spysat USA 193 endangers and delays new spysat launch

An interesting article has appeared on space.com. NROL-28, the launch of a new spy satellite by the NRO, has been delayed because the NRO doesn't want to risk it being hit by debris fragments of the destroyed spy satellite USA 193.

Meanwhile, 12 more orbits have been released for additional fragments of USA 193 besides those released earlier.

In my post here on the latter issue, I mentioned I could not provide graphics of the orbits. Since then, such graphics have appeared on a number of other websites, so I feel I do no harm in doing so too as it already has become public domain. The following pictures show the orbit distribution of the created ring of USA 193 debris around the Earth in 3D, plus a ground map for this afternoon which shows how the fragments have spread along the full orbital extend by now.

(click images to enlarge)

Fragments of destroyed spysat USA 193 still in orbit

In a surprise move, Space-Track, the on-line orbital database of USSTRATCOM (formerly the NORAD database), has released orbital elements for 17 fragments of USA 193 still in orbit.

This is surprising, as normally they don't publish anything connected to a classified satellite launch: for example, they do not publish elements for things like spent rocket booster stages or fairings connected to classified launches. I guess they want to show the world that USA 193 is now indeed reduced to fragments, and that they keep track of them.

On February 24, Norwegian observer Christian Kjaernet observed one of these fragments visually through his telescope. His observation remained uncorroborated for some time (notably because of bad weather experienced by several active amateur trackers), but it is clear now that it was indeed a USA 193 debris fragment.

The 17 fragments for which orbital elements have now been released, have spread over almost the full former orbit of USA 193 in the days between the ASAT intercept and the moment of writing this post. Unfortunately, Space-Track restrictive rules of data dissemination do not allow me to provide a map of the spread of fragments.

Most of the 17 fragments now catalogued will decay over the coming month.