The fabrications of Masami Kuramoto (again on MH17 and the suspect Russian MoD pictures)

In January, I posted an analysis of images provided by the Russian MoD during a press conference in July 2014, a few days after the shootdown of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over the Ukraine. These images purport to show Ukrainian BUK installations in a field near Zaroshchens’ke.

In my investigation of these images, I showed that the images are suspect because the satellite-to-ground geometry of the satellite and target area on the moment the images were purportedly taken, do not appear to match.

In short: the satellite could only image these targets with clearly obligue angles with the horizontal at the target location, angles between 45 and 57.5 degrees. The Russian imagery however, appears to show these purported "BUK's" as if taken from a much higher angle,almost from straight above. There also appear to be inconsistencies in the shadow directions.

I noted this in the context of checking which satelite made the purported imagery (the only candidate is the Resurs P-1 satellite). For more details, read my earlier post with the original analysis.

The authenticity of these same Russian satellite images had already come under fire from the side of the Bellingcat collective earlier, based on an analysis with the photoforensic tool FotoForensics. More recently (15 July 2016) the authenticity of the images in question again came under fire, this time by the people from the Arms Control Wonk blog, using another photoforensic package, Tungstène.

Both of these photoforensic analysis are not without criticasters (most notably Neal Krawetz, the author of the FotoForensics photoforensic tools). There are however other reasons as well to be cautious with respect to this Russian imagery.

My own analysis, approached the issue from (pun intended) another angle, and came (predictably) under fire from a number of Twitter trolls, the most persistent of which was and is an anonymous  Twitter known under the nickname 'Masami Kuramoto' (they always are anonymous, and that itself tells you something). I earlier replied to his criticism in a blog post in February.

'Masami Kuramoto' initially seemed to have given up after my rebuttal, but more recently has stepped up his antics again. He has posted an analysis on his brand new blog, called "Facts versus Truthers", in which he purports to show that my model is incorrect, claiming that I published a model that was "misaligned and pointing downhill". He also tried to smear me by suggesting I am a "truther" (really a very odd insult given the positions I take).

The truth is that Masami Kuramoto's own points of view have very little to do with "facts". As I was tired of arguing with trolls I have ignored him for a while (I have better, more useful things to do), but as the antics are stepped up in the debates in the aftermath of the appearance of the Arms Control Wonk study, and Masami publicly purports he has rebutted me and proven my reconstruction "false", I will briefly discuss Masami Kuramoto's fabrications and show the malicious manipulative perversity of it all.

It is as simple as comparing my original image (left) with the reproduction by Masami Kuramoto (right):

click to enlarge

It is immediately clear that he superimposed his block model on a severely distorted version of my reconstruction.

In fact, when we project Masami Kuramoto's block model (red) over my undistorted model, with both being rotated so that the Y-axis is north-south in order to match the North-South oriented Russian satellite image and the north-south alignments of the purported BUK on that image, we get the image below.

click to enlarge

As you can see, the two models actually match very well. There is no significant difference between my model and Masami Kuramoto's model, contra Masami Kuramoto's insistence. In fact, it only appeared that way because Masami Kuaramoto provided a distorted version of my model and compared his model to that, rather than my original.

Hence why I use the word "fabrication" to refer to Masami Kuramoto's attempt to rebut me. Masami Kuramoto's argument that my model is "misaligned and pointing downhill" is simply not true, the argument is fabricated.

Looking at the reconstructions above, it is also very clear that the BUKs in the Russian MoD image do not match both Masami's own model and my model in terms of what is visible of the west sides of the launch vehicles (the slanted look of the models due to the oblique viewing angle).

This of course was the original point of my analysis: the two BUK's seem to be shown too much from directly above these machines, whereas the image should show a clearly oblique angle (as the model reconstructions show)

I want to emphatically point out, that no amount of orthorectifications applied to the Russian image can make the exposed west sides that should have been imaged (but are not), somehow automagically disappear. Nor will it result in incompatible shadow directions.

So, I think my point is clear. And it is also clear that Masami Kuramoto is a malicious, insincere troll of the kind that is abundant in the MH17 debate.

I know enough of troll behaviour by now to have no illusion that this will stop Masami Kuramoto's attempts to discredit my findings by provided fabricated counter-arguments. He will try again, and in that sense, this will be a perpetual discussion. Remember however, the history of this discussion so far, in judging the veracity of any new bollocks he might come up with.

It is interesting to look at how this whole argument developed, as it contains several clues on how to identify a troll. Masami Kuramoto tried from the start to tear my analysis apart by any handle he could perceive. When several of these attempts failed, he went on to the next one, and then yet another one. This is the hallmark of someone with a strong bias, a bias with an origin in ideology. In brief order (see also the summary and discussion in my earlier post):

1) He tried to argue that the orbital elements for the satellite in question I used were incorrect, and hence my geometry reconstruction was incorrect. He argued that the US MoD had post-altered the orbital elements for this satellite, but was taken aback when I informed him that I (and several other satellite trackers) maintain a private archive of elements. I regularly save copies of the latest orbital elements released by JSpOC to a hard drive and have an archive of these going back many years, and that analysis of that archive showed no sign of post-MH17 fiddling with the orbital elements;

2) Then he tried to use a part of the Space-Track User Agreement, taken completely out of context, to (falsely) imply that the elements would not be accurate enough (the matter of fact is that the accuracy of JSpOC elements for the question at hand is not in dispute, see my earlier post);

3) He then tried that argument again by referring to a publication, without (wanting to) realize the inaccuracies pointed out in that paper were very small scale and completely neglicable for the discussion at hand;

4) He then came with the fabricated counter-evidence currently under discussion in this blog post.

In all cases, he insisted on maintaining his position even after being corrected on the matter. It was (and is) very clear he is desperately looking for handles to tackle my analysis because he wants to prove it wrong. Masami Kuramoto is pro-Russian and promotes a worldview where Russia is never wrong, so I must be. As we have seen, he is willing to fabricate arguments to sustain his point. All this, from the comfort of his anonimity.

There are a lot of people out there like Masami Kuramoto (and, to be clear, not just pro-Russian ones). They are annoying, and poisoning the debate. Around last week's 2-year anniversary of the MH17 tragedy, we have seen a lot of it again, both anonymous and not so anonymous, coming out of the woodwork. Most of these people are "useful idiots" blinded by ideology. Some are more sinister, as they deliberately fabricate disinformation on behalf of an involved party.


UPDATE 10 June 2020:

During the MH17 trial yesterday (9 June 2020), the prosecution also tore apart the dodgy Russian 'satellite evidence', presenting an analysis by ESA which shows these images cannot have been taken at the date the Russians claim.

A consolidated answer to "Masami Kuramoto" about Resurs P1

The MH17 discussion has become extremely messy. It is a highly politicized topic, with active disinformation campaigns and trolling from both the Russian and Ukrainian sides. It is sometimes hard to discern who is honestly seeking the truth, who is honestly seeking the truth but very naive with regard to sources, and who is actively involved in peddling propaganda and disinformation.

Ever since my expert participation in the Dutch Parliament committee hearing of Jan 22, and ever since I expressed caution on this blog about certain satellite images and factually clearly incorrect statements on satellite positions released by the Russian dept. of Defense, some of the trolling has been directed at me.

I have learned not to bother too much with trolls, but when they actively and tenaciously disseminate disinformation and seriously flawed counter-arguments around one of my analysis, I reserve myself the right to a rebuttal, just to set the record straight.

In a previous post I showed that a satellite image released by Russia, purported to be a Resurs P1 image from 17 July 2014 which claimed to show Ukrainian BUK's in a field near Zaroshchens’ke, is problematic. The viewing angles of the "BUK's" in the image do not appear to fit the satellite-to-location geometry, which only allows clearly oblique viewing angles between 45 and 57.5 degrees with the horizontal, from directions ranging from northwest via west to southwest (for more details, see my earlier post in question). I therefore urged caution with regard to these images.

My post has drawn fire on twitter, notably from a twitter user nicked "Masami Kuramoto". While the nick sounds Japanese, and the twitter account claims to be located in Germany, I have a strong suspicion that the entity behind it is Russian.

Kuramoto's chosen line of attack is by questioning the accuracy of the Resurs P1 orbital information which I used. That orbital information came straight from JSpOC (formerly known as "NORAD"), argueably this world's most reliable source of orbital elements. Kuramoto basically tries to advance a claim that the JSpOC tle's for Resurs P1 are either highly inaccurate or even deliberately doctored, and that the satellite in reality passed along a somewhat different trajectory (but with a similar pass time, to match the time listed in the images), thus advocating for the existence of an imaginary trajectory that allows to reconcile the imaging angles with the published images. In order for this to be possible, it is necessary to argue that the real orbit amounts to a significantly shifted orbital plane, i.e. a shifted RAAN value, compared to the JSpOC published orbit.

In an attempt to argue this position, Kuramoto suggestively quoted from the Space-Track terms of use, taking text out of context to insinuate that JSpOC tle's were not accurate for the task:

@Marco_Langbroek I found something strange in their user agreement. #MH17 pic.twitter.com/FclyHCQac3

— Masami Kuramoto (@masamikuramoto) 17 februari 2016

Kuramoto kept insisting on his perceived "unreliability"of JSpOC tle's, even after I had set him straight on this:

@masamikuramoto it simply means that for accurate assessment of very close encounters between sats tle's are not accurate enough

— Dr Marco Langbroek (@Marco_Langbroek) 19 februari 2016

@masamikuramoto for such close encounters 0.1 second uncertainty in both elsets already is problematic.

— Dr Marco Langbroek (@Marco_Langbroek) 19 februari 2016

Let me first elaborate on what I pointed out in the tweets above. Kuramoto tried to capitalize on this warning in the Space-Track User agreement:

"A TLE AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC SHOULD NOT BE USED FOR CONJUNCTION ASSESSMENT PREDICTION"

This statement is relevant to close encounters (with the risk of collision) of two objects in space. What this statement simply means is that it is unwise to base decisions on debris avoidance manoeuvres solely on published tle's. In such cases, very small uncertainties matter. If one uses tle's produced for the epoch of today to make a prediction on a future position of two objects (say: 3 days from now), that prediction for a moment days from now will have a small uncertainty. SGP 4 after all is only a model. These uncertainties are negligible for other purposes, but for close encounter mitigation they matter. Satellites in Low Earth Orbit move some 7 km/s, so a 0.1 second uncertainty in the time of passing a particular point in orbit, hardly something to bother about under normal circumstances, amounts to a positional uncertainty along the orbit of 700 meter. This might not seem much and for other purposes 0.1 seconds and 700 meter is negligible, but for collision avoidance it matters: it might be the difference between a miss or a hit, certainly because the other object introduces a similar uncertainty (i.e., if both objects have 0.1 second uncertainty, the uncertainty in relative distance is 2 x 700 meter = 1.4 km. So if your analysis says they will safely pass 1.4 km apart, they might in reality collide instead. Or conversely, if your analysis says they will collide, the reality might be that they pass each other at a km distance rather than colliding).

In other words: the warning by JSpOC is only relevant to a very specific situation, and concerns uncertainties that are completely negligible for the subject at hand: the position of a satellite with respect to the viewing geometry of a location on earth. The more so because the latter assessment actually uses a tle with epoch very close to the the time of interest, unlike a collision avoidance assessment of a moment more removed in future. The uncertainty pointed out, in no way can change the viewing angles to the extend that it would solve the discrepancies I pointed out in my earlier post.

Now, this could have been a simple misunderstanding, based on a lack of knowledge and insight in the matter on Kuramoto's side.

Kuramoto however next took it to a new level and suggested that JSpOC might have deliberately altered the orbital elements for Resurs P1 post-fact:

@Marco_Langbroek I'm wondering what is the incentive for JSpOC to provide the public with accurate TLEs of Russian satellites... #MH17

— Masami Kuramoto (@masamikuramoto) 19 februari 2016

The point is: if JSpOC would have done that, the simple reality is that many people working with these data would notice it. Satellites suddenly would be at different positions than where the JSpOC orbital data would put them. Our tracking network for example, frequently catches Russian satellites as byproduct of our tracking of classified objects. On these occasions we would suddenly note large positional errors in that case, and we would even start to see UNIDS (unidentified satellites, which always have our immediate attention) that next turn out to be Russian satellites in orbits not matching their JSpOC orbit. No way that would go unnoticed.

As for the suggestion that the elements were only retrospectively altered, Kuramoto was a bit shocked to learn next that several of us (including me) actually regularly archive the full JSpOC database of orbital elements. I do so several times each month (for July 2014, I for example have archived elements from July 14 and can compare these with elements for that date retrieved from the JSpOC archive today: they are the same, they have not been restrospectively altered). In a retrospective analysis, altering the elements starting at some given date (or only altering them around a given date) would show up as a sudden change in the elements as well.So no: such a plot is simply not realistic.

After this, Kuramoto nevertheless still wished to cast doubt on the JSpOC tle's:

@Marco_Langbroek If you believe the TLE published by the US DoD to be accurate. #MH17 @MJoyce2244 @MGoedblick @roarbro

Notwithstanding my earlier rebuttal, he at first simply restated his already rebutted argument:

@Marco_Langbroek No doubt TLE is inaccurate. #MH17 @MJoyce2244 @MGoedblick @roarbro @MazzaRay pic.twitter.com/FclyHCQac3

— Masami Kuramoto (@masamikuramoto) 22 februari 2016

That would not do of course, and Kuramoto seems to have realized that. In order to maintain his position, Kuramoto had to grasp the next straw. He next brought up a paper by Kelso et al.:

@Marco_Langbroek Are you aware of this paper? @MJoyce2244 @MGoedblick @roarbro @MazzaRay #MH17 pic.twitter.com/G9k2v7p9Ex

— Masami Kuramoto (@masamikuramoto) 23 februari 2016

This paper discusses what factors might introduce predictions that do deviate considerably from reality (with the focus again on the accuracy of data needed for orbital debris avoidance manoeuvres). One such case is when for example a position is based on a tle issued 4 hours ago, but the satellite in question meanwhile has actively manoeuvered to a new orbit. In that case, the predicted position indeed would be incorrect. Kuramoto (of course) tries to seize on that, but in doing so again shows a lack of insight in the matter. Whether a satellite (Resurs P1 in this case) had just manoeuvered can easily be checked: by looking at a series of tle's issued around the time of interest (17 July 2014, 8:32 UT in this case), a manoeuvre around the time of interest would be visible by a sudden change in elements.

For Resurs P1 around 17 july 2014, I did this check (Kuramoto obviously didn't). There is no such change, i.e. the satellite did not make a significant manoeuvre. This can be seen in the diagrams below which depict the evolution of the orbit (from JSPOC data over July 2014). A manoeuvre would show up as a clear discontinuity (a clear sudden change) in either perigee and/or apogee altitude, argument of perigee, inclination, Mean Motion and /or RAAN (and notably in RAAN for Kuramoto's argument to hold). Tampering with the orbital elements around 17 July by JSpOC would show up similarly, by the way. But none of this happens, as you can see below. So again, Kuramoto's next grasp at a straw, is futile, and by now his attempts to argue my analysis away are bordering the pathetic.

post-edit  24 Feb 2014, 15:05 UT:

Kuramoto is still trying to advance his ill-fated argument:

@Marco_Langbroek Deviations occur even without manoeuvre. #MH17 @MJoyce2244 @MGoedblick @roarbro @MazzaRay pic.twitter.com/99jf9F3q78

— Masami Kuramoto (@masamikuramoto) 24 februari 2016

Again, his argument is largely irrelevant. The kind of deviations pointed out are very minor: a maximum error of 9.3 km in position at a given time really will not significantly change the viewing angles. That would need cross-track errors an order of a magnitude larger.

post-edit 24 Feb 2014, 15:40 UT:

Well now, somebody has seen the light it appears:

@Marco_Langbroek You convinced me. The Russian satellite images of 7/17 appear to be fake. #MH17 @MJoyce2244 @MGoedblick @roarbro @MazzaRay

— Masami Kuramoto (@masamikuramoto) 24 februari 2016

MH17: On the Resurs-P1 image with "BUK's near Zaroshchens’ke" (twice updated)

(Note added 31 Jan 2016: Max van der Werff brought to my attention that he is "kremlintroll" and that the pdf report on the blog was not written by him, but by someone else. That was not clear to me. I have added some comments in the text below to reflect this)

[this post was editted by the addition of a (marked) new section on 17 Feb 2016]

Since my contribution to the January 22 Dutch Parliamen hearing on flight MH17, a number of people have reached out to me with satellite-related questions about MH17.

One of them was Dutch blogger Max van der Werff, who in a tweet from 28 Jan 2016 asked me if I had anything to say about this analysis (pdf) by a blogger named "Kremlintroll" [edit: this turns out to be Max himself: but the pdf analysis on his blog was by someone else]. It concerns a report with purported Russian satellite imagery of what was claimed to be BUK installations in a field near Zaroshchens'ke, on the Ukranian side of the front. It in addition includes claims that a particular US spy satellite overflew the area at the time the missile was fired.

@Marco_Langbroek mocht u tijd hebben, dan ben ik benieuwd hoe u deze studie vanuit uw vakgebied beoordeelt [6Mb] https://t.co/Wl3SzR59Q8

— Max van der Werff (@MaxvanderWerff) 28 januari 2016

I will answer Max' question here, but note that I do so without necessarily condoning Max viewpoints on MH17. There are a lot of bloggers expressing their (often very partisan) views on the case, and I prefer not to take sides with any of them at this moment.

At the same time, when satellite observations are brought up, I would like to see to it that the information presented is correct. So I will provide some of that information below, as it pertains to this case.

My initial intent was to keep it focussed at information about satellite passes. This is factual, objective information. While checking pass data for Resurs-P1 I did however note something that appears off with regard to one of the images. I will discuss that as well, with some reluctance: but given that I mentioned my doubts on twitter, it is fair that I should present the reasons for my doubts.

The imagery comes from a Russian government website and was earlier the target of a "photo forensics" analysis by the Bellingcat collective. The latter analysis has drawn fire from professional photo-forensic analysts, who say the analysis was flawed. This critique comes from knowledgeable people on this matter, so should be taken seriously imho.

click image to enlarge

The image (reproduced above) purports to show Ukranian BUK installations in a field near Zaroshchens'ke in Ukraine, 47 deg 59' 00" N, 38 deg 27' 05" E. Text on the image states it was taken on 17 July 2014 at 11:32 (no timezone given, but presumably standard Moscow Time, UTC +3).

The pdf in the blog by "Kremlintroll" discusses the image as part of a larger narrative. In addition (and this was my initial focus), the author of the pdf claims that a US spy satellite actually overflew the MH17 disaster area at the time the missile was fired:

"According to our data from 17:06 till 17:21 Moscow time on July 17 over the South-Eastern territory of Ukraine flew a US space satellite. This is a special device of the experimental space system designed to detect and track various missiles launches"

[edit: the quote above is purportedly from a Russian officer, Lt-Gen Makushev]

US spy satellite fly-over?

Let us examine the latter claim first, as this is squarely within my field of expertise. As we will see, the claim appears to be false.

The description seems to refer to one of the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) demo satellites in Low Earth Orbit (note the given pass time of 15 minutes in the quote above, indicating a satellite in Low Earth Orbit). They are experimental satellites for tracking missiles, serving a role initially projected for the (cancelled) SBIRS LOW segment.  A pass of one of these satellites indeed takes about 15 minutes.

These particular satellites are tracked by our network. I checked their positions for 17 July 2014, 13:20 UT (the time of the MH17 disaster). They did not have sight of the Ukraine at that moment.

STSS demo 1 and STSS demo 2 (2009-052 A and 2009-052B) move as a pair at a fixed distance of each other: STSS demo 1 passes a given location 10 minutes after STSS demo 2 does, along a similar track.

STSS demo 2 passed over the MH17 crash area around 12:35 UT, and STSS demo 1 did so around 12:45 UT. This is more than half an hour before the MH17 disaster took place. STSS demo 1 lost view of the area around 12:55 UT, still 25 minutes before the disaster. At 13:20 UT, the time of the disaster, the satellites were south of Australia, well away from the Ukraine (map below).

click image to enlarge

STSS-ATRR, a third satellite connected to this program, was just east of Sakhalin at that time, so nowhere near the Ukraine either.

Another US spy satellite, USA 161, did pass over the area near 13:20 UT (see my previous post here). This is however a KH-11 optical reconnaissance satellite, not one designed to track missiles as claimed in the pdf analysis hosted by Kremlintroll. It also did not pass over the south-eastern territory of the Ukraine, but well west of the area in question. See my earlier post for a discussion of what this satellite might, or more likely given amongst others that the area of interest was very periferal in the footprint, might not have imaged.

In other words: the claim about a US missile-tracking satellite in Low Earth Orbit overflying the Ukraine at 17:06-17:21 Moscow daylight saving time (13:06-13:21 UT), is factually incorrect.

Of course, we should realise that three SBIRS satellites for missile detection in higher orbits (HEO and GEO) with (semi-) permanent view of the area did cover the relevant area, as I reported to Dutch Parliament, and in that sense this discussion is slightly academic: early warning satellites for missile launches did potentially observe the Ukraine at that time. This SBIRS high component in HEO and GEO however clearly is not the low orbit (fly-over time listed as 15 minutes) experimental missile tracking satellite system the Russian officer was referring to. So, this specific information is incorrect.


The photograph

So what about the satellite photograph distributed by the Russian government, showing purported BUK systems just south of Zaroshchens'ke and discussed in the pdf hosted by Kremlintroll as evidence for Ukrainian BUK deployment in the area.

I was, and am, reluctant to discuss this photograph.

First, I am knowledgeable about satellite orbits, satellite positions and satellite system specifics (the kind of factual information I provided to the Parliament committee during the hearing of Jan 22): but I am not a photo interpreter.

I want to emphasize this. Analysis of this kind of imagery preferably should be done by a professional photo interpreter.

Second, following my role in the Parliament hearing, I prefer to refrain as much as possible from making any statements that might be misconstrued as 'taking sides'.

Nevertheless, while looking at satellite pass information I noted something about this photograph, that I think is relevant. With some reluctance, I provide these observations here in this blogpost. I want to make clear that this only concerns this particular photograph: I am not saying anything about other evidence presented by various parties, and importantly: I have no desire to analyse more images. Again: that should better be done by professional photo interpreters. In a way, given the way this quickly developed on twitter, I regret mentioning my doubts about the satellite image in public, even though (as discussed below) I stand behind these doubts. Given that I mentioned my doubts on twitter, it is fair that I should present the reasons for my doubts below.


1. the satellite

First, the satellite that took the image. The image lists a time, 11:32 on 17 July 2014. Resurs-P1 (2013-030A), a Russian imaging satellite with 1-meter resolution, passed the area shown in the photograph at 08:32 UT (11:32 Moscow Standard Time, or 12:32 Moscow Daylight Saving Time) - an identification earlier also made on a Russian webforum. Other high-resolution Russian imaging satellites do not match the pass time listed. The assumption that the image was made by Resurs-P1 therefore appears a valid one and will be the starting point of the discussion below.

click image to enlarge

Resurs-P1 culminated at 57.5 degrees elevation at 08:32:46 UT (July 17th 2014 - that is 11:32:46 Standard Moscow Time, 12:32:46 Moscow Daylight Saving Time) as seen from the field imaged in the photograph (which is at 47 deg 59' 00" N, 38 deg 27' 05" E). The satellite subpoint was some 281 km west of the location shown on the photograph at the moment of culmination. The location on the photograph is within the satellites known image swath width of ~950 km (~475 km to each side of the satellite nadir).

It is therefore possible that Resurs-P1 did take an image of this field at the listed time.

That does however not necessarily mean that the image is genuine. Something isn't sitting well with me regarding this image, raising my suspicion. I will discuss this below.


2. the photograph: suspicions

(again, I want to emphasize that I am not a professional photo interpreter. Keep that in mind)

So far, what I have written above is all straightforward factual: where were what satellites at a specified moment? What I am going to write below has a larger factor of interpretation.

As mentioned, Resurs-P1 culminated at a maximum altitude of 57.5 degrees for the location in question (that is a factual observation).

This immediately made me uneasy about the featured satellite photograph. For this image seemed to be a head-on image, taken with an angle to the horizon of near 90 degrees (straight down), rather than under an oblique 57.5 degree angle.

The image should, with a culmination altitude of 57.5 degrees for the satellite, instead show the installations obliquely (i.e. skewed, i.e., not just show the tops but also show parts of lateral sides of the purported BUK installations). It should also show the landscape somewhat obliquely.

Resurs-P1 passed west of the area in question. This is towards the left side of the image. The image should therefore show the BUK installations somewhat skewed with something of the lateral sides visible on the left hand side.

I used sketchup to make a simple block-model with the dimensions of a BUK (roughly 9.9 x 3.3 x 3.8 meter), and then rendered it under a 57.5 degree angle with the horizontal. The image below shows the result as an inset in the original image.

To me, it appears that the photograph indeed should show more of the lateral sides of the purported BUK installations than it does: the installations shown in the image appear to be seen too-much head-on compared to the modelled view under a 57.5 degree angle.

There is also something off in the positions of the shadows. They should be slightly displaced to the left, compared to what the image appears to show (the sun was at azimuth 150.7 degrees, i.e. southeast, and elevation 60.6 degrees at 8:32:46 UT. The shadows should point slightly to the left in the image, even more so if the image is taken from a point to the west of the area under a 57.5 degree or smaller angle).

Taken together, it suggests that the photograph does not show a scene compliant with the geometric situation at 8:32 UT on 17 July 2014 as seen from Resurs-P1.

As a caveat, I should emphasize that we are talking about structure at the edge of the satellite's image resolution here, with objects only a few pixels wide (and again: I warn that I am not a professional photo interpreter). There might also have been done some unknown image processing, including resampling, as part of preparing the photo for publication. Still, I feel there is reason to be very cautious about these images.

[Edit: extra material added Feb 17, 2016, now following:] 

The previous discussion was from the viewpoint of an image taken around culmination of the satellite for the area in question, 08:32:49 UT. In a follow-up discussion about this post on Twitter, it was brought up that the image might have been made before culmination when the satellite was still north of the location. That would better match the listed time, 08:32.

I therefore did a new model simulation, based on the satellite-to-location angles for 08:32:00 UT (azimuth 335 degrees (i.e. N-NW), elevation 45.1 degrees). It is given below. Again, it does not appear to match. It should be noted here that from known specifications, 45 degrees is near the limit of what the satellite needs, in terms of elevation angle, in order to image a location.

click to enlarge

In the other imagery provided by the Russian MOD, there are discrepancies too indicating that the images were not taken at the claimed dates and times. A very clear one is the one below (source), that purports to be an image taken on 14 July 2014 11:40 Moscow time (08:40 UT). The Russian optical reconnaissance satellite Kosmos 2486 (Persona 2, 2013-028A) culminated at 08:40:54 UT at an elevation of 83 degrees for this location.

It is however interesting to compare the configuration of vehicles on a parking lot in that image . These vehicles do not seem to be used much. Using Google Earth imagery from April, May and July 2014, a clear long-lasting change in the configuration happens before July 2nd: one vehicle is lightly replaced, and a new vehicle is parked in what previously was an empty space.

click to enlarge

Comparing this to the vehicle configuration on the Russian MOD image from "14 July 2014", shows the first vehicle still in place and the empty space in reality filled in before July 2nd, still an empty space. So I am in agreement here with the observations made by Bellingcat in June 2015: the Russian MOD image claimed to be from "14 July 2014" in reality is from before July 2nd, 2014.

"But how about the Ukrainians?", some have asked me. Well: the vehicle pattern does positively fit with the "July 12" image (upper right image above) published by the Ukrainians (and later ostensibly 'rebutted' by the Russian MOD here: but we now note it are in fact the Russian MOD images that are doctored).

This latter image appears to be commercial imagery obtained from Digitalglobe, shot by the Worldview 1 satellite (which isn't anything unusual: several governments use the services of Digitalglobe). It made a pass culminating at 55 degrees at 08:11 UT (11:11 local time) on July 12.

Note that the Russian MOD claim here that:

"At the time specified in the images, the American electro-optical reconnaissance satellite of the Key Hole series was flying over the crash site area, so the source of the images for Ukrainian Security Service is obvious"

This Russian MOD statement about the Ukrainian images is factually incorrect (as was their claim for STSS passes around the time of the MH17 shootdown, as we have earlier seen): the dates and times listed for the Ukrainian images do not match with passes of  US KH-11 optical satellites.

But they do all match passes of three Digitalglobe satellites: Worldview 1, Worldview 2 and Geoeye 1. Evidently these satellites made these images, not US military KH-11 satellites.

So the Russians are making a lot of factually incorrect claims in this case.

[end of section added 17 Feb 2016]


A few last words on my position in this

I want to note that this is the first and last time I will, with regard to MH17, foray into the domain of satellite photo interpretation, also given the very strong reactions this has already spawned on media like twitter. Agitprops from all sides have jumped on it.

I prefer to keep my further involvement with MH17 focussed on providing factual data on satellite positions and satellite system specifications, in line with the role I played in this month's Parliament hearing. That is a position only people with an agenda could take issue with.

With all the things that have come up over the past 1.5 year, and with multiple parties involved clearly unwilling to provide pertinent data, I have taken a step back, opinion-wise. In the current situation, my aim is to not point fingers until verifiable evidence is put on the table. The report of the Dutch Safety Board is a first step into that direction, but there are still many aspects of the case that are very unclear. Clarifying these was the main point of the Parliament hearing of January 22.


NOTE ADDED 4 March 2016,  10:30 UT:

- sigh.....deep sigh.... -

I wish it would not be necessary to get into this, but some spin deserves a rebuttal when the spin in question really is too outrageous:

As an example of how some propagandists are trying to spin unwelcome analytical results (such as those of this analysis), I bring you the twitter troll Deus Abscondis.

For reasons only known to him/herself, (s)he tries to (falsely) insist that I initially ignored the Persona 2 satellite. The goal, of course, is to try to suggest that my analysis should be dismissed and my expertise questioned.

Here is the flaw in his/her logic: the fact that I did not mention Persona 2 until Deus Abscondis named that satellite on twitter (and I answered that Persona 2 appeared to have made some of the other images) simply does not mean I didn't consider Persona 2 earlier. I did, matter of fact.

It is important to realize that my blogpost initially (and at the moment Deus Abscondis posted his twitter question) discussed only one image: that with the "BUK's in a field near Zaroshchens’ke".

I wrote about this image, in the original blog-post (emphasis added):

The image lists a time, 11:32 on 17 July 2014. Resurs P1 (2013-030A), a Russian imaging satellite with 1-meter resolution, passed the area shown in the photograph at 08:32 UT (11:32 Moscow Standard Time, or 12:32 Moscow Daylight Saving Time) - an identification earlier also made on a Russian webforum. Other high-resolution Russian imaging satellites do not match the pass time listed.

Take a look at that last sentence.

The sentence highlighted in black makes very clear that I considered other satellites than Resurs P1 as well. The latter category of checked satellites not fitting the pass time for the Zharoshchens'ke image actually included Persona 2.


In addition to Persona 2, the ones I checked but rejected also included Resurs DK1, Kanopus V1 and the Kobalt-M photoreturn mission Kosmos 2495 (still on-orbit at that time).

When Deus Abscondis days later asked about whether I had considered Persona 2,  my answer to him was that Persona 2 could have made some of the other image, i.e. I told him/her that I was well aware that some of the other imagery could be from Persona 2. I also informed him that this other imagery was not unproblematic either (and updated my blogpost next to show why):

Note that nowhere does my answer implicate that I had not considered Persona 2 in my original analysis, of the Zharoshchens'ke image. I simply point out that Persona 2 is of relevance only to some of the other imagery, not to the image discussed at the blog at that moment. Discussion of that other imagery was added later, as an update of the post.

The twist that Deus Abscondis is now trying to give to that conversation, is therefore extremely insincere.

It is a good example of the kind of spin some propagandists are producing when trying to suppress unwelcome analytical facts.


Note added 10 June 2020:

In the MH17 trial yesterday (June 9 2020), the prosecution tore apart the validity of this imagery as well, based on an analysis by ESA.

The Parliament Hearing

Last Friday was the MH17 hearing of the committee for Foreign Affairs of Dutch Parliament in the Dutch Parliament building in the Hague. I had been  invited as an external expert to this hearing (see a previous post), with the task to brief the parliament members on what military satellite systems from what countries might have observed the disaster, and could potentially provide useful information with a view on the criminal prosecution of the case.

An audio record of the block of the hearing that featured my presence can be downloaded here (it is in Dutch of course). Related to this, I also appeared on national television that evening (video here and below) in a long item in EénVandaag, a news background program broadcast nationwide at 6 pm. After the hearing, I also did a 20-minute live interview on national radio (audio here, below the video on that page).

It was quite an experience to be in this role, a role which I never had expected to have to play when I wrote my first blogpost on this all. I spent the better part of January doing research into even the most remotely possible questions I could imagine, digging up information, checking and re-checking facts, and writing the position paper.

The full hearing itself took 8 hours (I myself only attended some two hour of these though), and the block that included me took one hour (from 12:00 to 13:00 CET). I shared this block with Paul Riemens, who is the head of Dutch air traffic control; and prof. Piet van Genderen, who is a radar expert from Delft University.

Letter by the Minister

In the evening before the hearing, the Minister of Justice and Security, Van der Steur, had suddenly dispatched a letter to Parliament in answer to questions by Omtzigt , in which he stated that the prosecutor did receive radar and satellite data, and that in their perception there was "no need" for additional requests of those. He also mentioned that the prosecutor had insight in these data "through the MIVD"  (the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service) by means of "ambtsberichten" (i.e. brief statements on what the data show, not the data itself). The latter suggested to me, that the data are not declassified, and perhaps will not be declassified. Which is odd and unnecessary, as well as unwise, as I will discuss later in this blogpost.

The timing (combined with the fact that similar earlier questions by MP's Omtzigt and Sjoerdsma got unanswered) suggests that the Minister's letter to Parliament was a direct response to the position papers by Van Genderen and me, so it does seem our input into this discussion had some immediate effect.

Parliament members present

Parliament members attending the block of the hearing which I participated in, were Michiel Servaes (Labour party); Harry van Bommel (Socialist Party); Pieter Omtzigt (Christian Democrats); Louis Bontes (list Bontes/Van Klaveren, a right-wing splinter party split off from Wilders' Party for Freedom); Raymond de Roon (Party for Freedom); Sjoerd Sjoerdsma (Democrats '66); and Han ten Broeke (Party for Freedom and Liberty). Chairman of the hearing was MP Fred Teeven (Party for Freedom and Liberty: who incidentally was State Secretary at the Justice and Security department at the time of the MH17 tragedy), who is vice-chairman of the parliament committee in question.

some of the Parliament members during the hearing:
 f.l.t.r. Ten Broeke, Servaes, van Bommel and Omtzigt

Hearing proceedings and questions

Riemens, Van Genderen and me all three got a few minutes to present our information to the MP's. My main message to the committee was that there are a lot of military systems, from several countries including more than one ally of our country, that might provide useful information. I briefly outlined what kind of systems might provide what information, mentioning SBIRS, but also SIGINT and IMINT.

Next, the parliament members in the committee asked us further questions and clarifications. Servaes asked me which indications I had whether the Dutch prosecutor really needed more satellite data (harking back to the suggestions in the Minister's letter of the previous evening). Related to that, Van Bommel asked me whether my plea for an attempt to get these data and get them declassified was in the interest of transparency, or had some other additional goal. He also asked whether these data might help to further restrict the location from where the missile was fired or not. Ten Broeke asked me (and Van Genderen) for my opinion on the current government position in this.

answering questions

I amongst others answered that I was not a lawyer or attorney, but that it seemed to me that declassifying the evidence was crucial in order to be able to use them for a criminal prosecution, as well as indeed in the general interest of transparency and accountability. There are so many questions around this subject, and so many (conspiracy-) theories and different views (not to speak of desinformation floating around), that the final conclusions should be verifiable to all (after the hearing, I pointed out in the radio interview that it is also very important to the families of the victims to be able to judge these results, something also pointed out in the tv item by a father who lost his son in the tragedy).

In this context I also pointed to remarks made a year ago (17 Dec 2014) by Victoria Nuland, assistant secretary of  European and Eurasian affairs in the US government, and read these out loud to the Parliament members. During a Q & A session at the American Enterprise Institute, Nuland answered questions by a Russian reporter and said that the US government had already shared data with the Netherlands, but moreover that she expected that there:

"..will be, I believe, in the context of the Dutch case, when they roll it out – they are likely to ask us to declassify some of that, and I think we will be able to help in that regard"

In other words: she not only expects a request for declassification from the Dutch government: but she also expects that the US Government will answer positively to that request!

During the hearing, and partly in response to some of the questions,  I warned the parliament members that if these satellite data would not be pursued and a request to declassify them not be made, this could possibly stimulate a lingering feeling that the Dutch prosecution left data unchecked or unreveiled. I told them that if things transpired this way (the wording of the letter by the Minister was not so encouraging in this respect) I feared that this would potentially provide handles to those parties with an interest in denying the conclusions of the investigation, to question these results.

Omtzigt asked me if there were earlier precedents of these kinds of data being declassified. There are: in the hearing I provided the examples of infrared data on meteoric fireballs (which these satellites also register) being released to astronomers for analysis; the declassification of satellite imagery in order to argue the necessity of the invasion of Iraq at the start of the second Gulf War; and China providing satellite imagery of potential floating debris in the case of the search for the missing MH370 aircraft.

Sjoerdsma asked me whether, in case the data would be declassified and supplied, our country had the expertise to independently analyse them and verify the claims made from them. For the infrared data I answered that I am not sure, so could answer neither positively nor negatively. For IMINT and SIGINT, our country certainly has that expertise, both within our own military as well as on Dutch universities.

De Roon wanted me to clarify further which countries had what satellite systems. Bontes asked me whether the fact that we were now so reliant on foreign data from foreign systems, might be an argument to start to build, as a country, surveillance satellite capacity ourselves (I think I am really not the person to answer that question).

During my answering all these questions, van Bommel additionally asked me in what phase of the criminal investigation these data should be made public, and whether it was perhaps too early for that in the current phase.

To the latter I can agree, although (again) I am no lawyer or attorney. But I can understand that perhaps, in this phase of the inquiry, the prosecutors do not want to publicly show their hand of cards.

I do have some concern though, about whether at the end of the trajectory these data are going to be made public, in the interest of verifiability. In my opinion, they should. I find the wording of the letter by the Minister of 21 January 2016 however not very promising in that respect.

The  contributions by the other invited experts contained some significant points. Van Genderen for example made very clear that having the secondary radar data is not enough. He also made very clear that Ukrainian claims that all their radar systems were down for maintenance that day, are hard to believe, as that is against what is normal. Riemens made clear that normally, the air traffic controller on duty will be heard in the investigation (which has not happened in this case) and that radar data normally are available within an hour. Later during the hearing, well-known lawyer Knoops made very clear that without the original raw (radar, satellite) data being available, the prosecution would have no leg to stand on.

SIGINT, IMINT and MH17

(this post continues discussions in earlier posts on possible classified space-based observations of the shootdown of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over the Ukraine in 2014)

My position paper written for the Dutch Parliament Foreign Affairs committee hearing of Jan 22 (see my previous post) has a strong focus on infra-red detections of a missile by SBIRS. There are however a few other relevant aspects of Space Based observations in connection to the MH17 disaster that I could not cover in the space available to me for that paper.

In this post, I will provide some brief additional information about:

1) potential roles for IMINT satellites;
2) the positions of SIGINT satellites.


Optical and radar IMINT

1. optical IMINT

Both (unclassified) commercial and (classified) military satellite systems for high-resolution optical imagery (Image Intelligence, IMINT) exist, and both sources will be discussed below.

Optical and radar imagery obtained in the hours before, as well as during the event, might be used to look for missile systems, both on the Ukrainian as well as separatist sides of the front, in a wide circle around the site of the shootdown. It could also be used to verify the reconstruction of the purported movements of a Russian BUK system published by citizen journalist team Bellingcat, a study which is not uncontested. The Bellingcat team places the BUK in certain places at certain times, and if space-based imagery (either military or commercial) for those locations and times exist they could perhaps verify these claims.

The US military has one classified system of optical satellites with a (much-) better-than-1-meter capability: the KH-11 IMPROVED CRYSTAL/Evolved Enhanced CRYSTAL (aka 'Keyhole' or 'KENNAN') which reportedly (and theoretically, from known 2.4 meter mirror size specs) have a resolution in the order of  10-20 cm.

Mid-2014 this system consisted of four satellites: USA 161, USA 186, USA 224 and USA 245. All of these have been discussed on this blog before and are tracked by our amateur network.

We have accurate tracking data on three of these, USA 161, USA 224 and USA 245 for the days around 17 July 2014 and hence can pinpoint when these potentially had the crash area in their sight to better than a minute. For USA 186, which was actively manoeuvering around that time and for which we have a gap in our coverage form June to August 2014, pass times are a bit less certain and constrained to about 20-30 minutes accuracy.

First, we can positively affirm that one of the KH-11, USA 161 (2001-044A) actually had the Ukraine in its potential view during the incident at 13:20 UT:

click images to enlarge

Please note well: this does however NOT mean that USA 161 delivered imagery of the event. A number of factors should be taken into account:

1. the cloud cover at that moment, which might hinder imagery;
2. the crash site is located quite in the perifery of the satellites footprint area;
3. these satellites do likely not make images continuously, but only if commanded to do so, for specific areas of interest;
4. there is the question of whether USA 161 was still operational at that time. It was the oldest of the on-orbit KH-11, being launched 14 years earlier. Only a few months later it was de-orbitted, so it was clearly at the end of its lifetime.

In addition to their KH-11 system, the US military hires space on commercial high resolution optical IMINT satellites from the US commercial firm Digitalglobe (the same firm that supplies Google Earth with satellite imagery).  

Digitalglobe operates a number of satellites with a better-than-1-meter capability: Geoeye-1 (0.4 meter resolution), and Worldview 1, 2 and 3 (0.25-0.50 meter resolution). Most of the satellite imagery that the US Department of Defense supplies to the press (when briefing on the military situation in e.g. North Korea, Syria and Libya) comes from these commercial satellites.

Imagery from these same Digitalglobe satellites is also available commercially, to any interested party with money. And in addition to DigitalGlobe, the European company Airbus Defense and Space also offers commercial high-resolution optical imagery from its SPOT and Pléiades satellites. Pléiades 1A and 1B offer a 0.5 meter resolution. SPOT 5 and 6 offer a 2.5-1.5 meter resolution.

Accurate orbital data from non-classified sources are available for all the commercial imagers for 17 July 2014. The satellites in question made several daylight passes over the area in the morning of July 17, 2014, between 8:00 and 10:00 GMT, i.e. during the 3 to 5 hours before the shootdown, a period when the skies were still less clouded.

This does not mean that they necessarily made imagery of course. Yet any imagery these commercial Digitalglobe and Airbus satellites did make on July 16, 17 and 18 have the advantage that they are not "classified", unlike the US military data, meaning that they could be used and published without diplomatic problems by the Dutch government in the Dutch criminal investigation into the disaster.

I would therefore expect the Dutch OM to either buy or subpoena all potential Digitalglobe and Airbus imagery from these dates. They can be used to reconstruct missile system positions in the area (both on the Ukrainian, the separatist and Russian sides) within range of the shootdown location, and they can be used to hunt for missile transports (see my earlier remarks about the Bellingcat claims). The Dutch Air Force has an imagery analysis unit that is well suited to help with such an analysis. Including imagery from the days before and after the incident as well is useful to look for differences between imagery of these respective dates.


2. Radar IMINT

The US military has two systems for high resolution radar IMINT: the Lacrosse (ONYX) system of which currently only one satellite, Lacrosse 5 (2005-016A) is left on-orbit, and the radar component of the Future Imagery Architecture (known as TOPAZ), consisting of three satellites: FIA Radar 1, 2 and 3 (2010-046A, 2012-014A and 2013-072A). These systems should be capable of providing imagery with sub-meter resolutions, and like optical imagery, they can be used to look for the presence of missile systems in the area. They have the added bonus that they are not hampered by cloud cover, unlike optical imagery.

Apart from the USA, the German military also operates a radar satellite system, the SAR-Lupe satellites. The French military likewise operates its own radar satellite system, the Hélios system. Japan operates the IGS system (which includes both optical and radar satellite versions).

All of these satellites made passes over the Ukraine at one time or another on July 17 2014, so all of them might have provided useful imagery.  FIA Radar 3 made a pass right over the area in question near 11:43 UT for example, some 1.5 hours before the tragedy. FIA Radar 2 made a pass over the area at 18:00 UT, 4.5 hours after the shootdown. These are just a few examples.

Given what was happening in the area around this time, and the strong concern of NATO and the EU about this, it is almost certain that imagery of the area was collected by these US, German and French satellite systems.


SIGINT

My position paper briefly mentions that a number of countries have space-based SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) capacities. This does not only concern capacities for (for example) the NSA to tap into your cellphone and satellite telephone conversations: another important strategic aspect of space-based SIGINT is the capacity to detect radar and telemetry signals from enemy weapons systems. Such detections allow identification of the used weapons system (each system has its own 'signature'). They also allow, according to remarks by the then NRO director Bruce Carlson in a speech from September 2010 at the National Space Symposium, geolocation of the source of this radar signal (in the case of MH17: geolocation of the Target Acquisition Radar of the launch unit).

The US military has a number of SIGINT systems in several types of orbits: Low Earth Orbit (LEO) below 1500 km which allows coverage of a few minutes during a pass over a target; and Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) and geosynchronous orbit (GEO), which allow to monitor targets for many hours (HEO) to continuously (GEO) from distances of 36 000+ km.

France has a number of SIGINT satellites in LEO. China no doubt has SIGINT satellites too, as does Russia. For the moment I will focus on the US systems. I must ad that I did check the French systems as well but none of the French systems (ESSAIM and Elisa, both in LEO) had sight of the Ukraine at that time.

The US systems, under the catch-all codename ORION, include the TRUMPET-FO which move in HEO. One of them is USA 184, mentioned before in the discussion of SBIRS as it has a piggyback SBIRS capacity in addition to its main SIGINT role.

There are also the big MENTOR satellites in GEO, plus two MERCURY satellites also in GEO, and the older VORTEX system. Of these systems, TRUMPET-FO, MENTOR and MERCURY are certainly still active based on their orbital behaviour.

The map below shows the positions of those satellites in this series for which we have enough tracking data to allow a reconstruction of their positions and footprints on 17 July 2014, 13:20 UT and which had the MH17 crash area within potential view:

click map to enlarge

Again: this does NOT necessarily mean that all of these satellites were actively monitoring the Ukraine at that time. Quite a number of them will have been tasked on the Middle East.

Yet, given the strong NATO interest in events in the Ukraine at that time, notably the rising concern about advanced surface-to-air missile systems following the shootdown of a Ukrainian Antonov-26 a few days earlier, I would be surprised if none of them monitored the Ukraine at all.


A clarification note on the position of USA 184 (SIGINT/SBIRS)

In my position paper written for the Dutch Parliament Foreign Affairs committee meeting coming Friday, I included this map with the positions of three SBIRS satellites with view on the Ukraine at that time:

click map to enlarge

I should point out here that there is some leeway in the exact position of USA 184, depending on whether it made a corrective manoeuvre to maintain its Mean Motion of about 2.00615 revolutions/day or not since the day we last observed it.

If it did, its position would be slightly more westward compared to the position depicted above, i.e. in a position just north of Scotland rather than above the Norwegian coast:

Let me be clear: this does NOT influence the conclusions of my position paper: the MH17 crash site in both variants is well within the field of view as seen from USA 184, i.e. the satellite could potentially provide both Infra-red and SIGINT detections. In the interest of accuracy, I thought I should however mention it here.


Acknowledgement -  I thank Mike McCants (USA) and Ted Molczan (Canada) for discussions about satellite positions, notably concerning USA 184.

Parliament hearing MH17, 22 Januari 2016

On 22 January 2016, the permanent committee on Foreign Affairs of Dutch Parliament will hold a full day of hearings/round table talks related to the shootdown of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 on 17 July 2014. The hearings are in preparation for a debate about the Dutch Government's reactions to and actions with regard to the ongoing investigations into the disaster.

On the invitation of MP Pieter Omtzigt, I have been invited as an external expert to this hearing. The committee members want to get informed regarding the possibility of foreign (notably US) Space-Based military observations of the event, i.e. satellite observations by systems such as SBIRS. This is a topic I have covered earlier on this blog.

The agenda of the hearing (in Dutch) is here. On request of the committee, I have written a brief position paper on the topic (again: in Dutch) which can be found here.

Video of the hearing will be live-streamed through this link. My contribution is scheduled for 12:00-13:00 CET (11:00-12:00 GMT).

Flight MH17, satellite data and yesterday's hearing of Dutch Parliament with the Dutch Safety Board

Yesterday I posted (in the context of what appears to refer to SBIRS detections of the recent aircraft crash in the Sinai) on lingering questions with regard to potential US military satellite data on the shootdown of flight MH17 over east Ukraine in July 2014. I blogged about this a year ago too.

Yesterdays recapitulation was timely in many ways, as yesterday afternoon saw a special hearing between Dutch Parliament members and the Dutch Safety Board (DSB), the agency which investigated the tragedy. The latter published its report on their finding in October, leading to yesterday's special Parliament hearing. Several Dutch MP's questioned the DSB representatives about what they perceive as ambiguities and missing information in the report. Among them, potential satellite data.

Dutch MP Pieter Omtzigt especially focussed  on potential US military satellite data (including SBIRS data) in his questions, partially basing his information on this very blog. For those of you who understand Dutch, the most relevant of his questions pertaining to satellite data start at 10:30 in the video snippet at this link.

The answers by the DSB representatives were interesting: they seem to indicate that there are indeed satellite data, although it was not entirely clear what satellite data they were talking about: SBIRS IR detections of the missile launch and ascend trajectory, or KH-11 optical imagery of the relevant parts of the Ukraine before and after the shootdown. Their answers also seem to indicate that DSB members were given access to these data, but cannot publicly report on it because "State Secret"...

For truth finding, these data are extremely important. They are likely much less ambiguous than the reconstructions from the missile impact damage to the aircraft on which the DSB report is basing the reconstructed launch location of the missile. As a Dutch citizen, the country that lost 198 citizens in the tragedy, I sincerely hope that the US government does the right thing and will eventually release enough of these data to confirm where the missile that killed so many innocent men, women and children was launched from. That would be the only ethical and humane thing to do. In a democracy, especially where truth finding is concerned, some things are more important than upholding secrecy, certainly in connection to such a terrible tragedy as this involving the killing of such a large number of citizens of a long time US ally.

Satellite observations and the Russian Metrojet crash in the Sinai [updated]

[updated 3 Nov 2015 14:00 UT]

On 31 October 2015 near 4:13 UTC, Kogalymavia Flight 9268, a Russian commercial flight by airliner Metrojet, crashed in the Egyptian Sinai desert, tragically killing all 224 people on board.

NBC News now reports that according to a US "senior defense official", around the time of this tragedy, a heat signal has been detected over the Sinai by "an American infrared satellite". According to NBC News, the heat signal detection points to an explosion (either mid-air or when the aircraft hit the ground), and the quoted official reportedly said that there is "no indication" that a surface-to-air missile hit the aircraft.

The satellite system in question which detected the heat signal is most likely the classified SBIRS (Space-Based InfraRed System), which I discussed before in the context of the shootdown of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over the eastern Ukraine a year ago.

It is one of two US military systems (there is the older DSP now being replaced by SBIRS) meant for the early detection of (intercontinental) missile launches. These satellites look for the infrared (heat) signature of such launches. For more details see my earlier post on MH17, and this detailed information sheet by US Defense itself available on the web.

After reading NBC's claim of a satellite detection of this latest aircraft tragedy, I checked which of the SBIRS satellites would have had coverage of the area in question at 31 October 2015, 4:13 UT.

click image to enlarge

Two SBIRS satellites had excellent coverage: the geostationary SBIRS GEO 2 (2013-011A) satellite at longitude 20 E, and the piggyback SBIRS package on the TRUMPET-FO satellite USA 184 (2006-027A) in a Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO).

click images to enlarge

The apparent quick confirmation of a SBIRS detection of the Sinai crash reported by NBC News not only shows the capabilities of the SBIRS system, but also begs the question why such information is still lacking with regard to the shootdown of MH17 over the Ukraine a year ago.

In my country, which lost 192 citizens in that tragedy, the downing of MH17 and the question of who is responsible for it are still a hot topic, newly fueled by the recent release of the report by the Dutch Safety Board which shows it was a BUK system that downed the aircraft.

There are tantalizing clues that SBIRS did detect the 2014 shootdown over the Ukraine: the day after the MH17 tragedy unfolded, a "senior US official" reportedly told CNN that a US military system "saw a heat signature at the time the airliner was hit".

This is a very similar statement as the one now reported in connection to the Sinai crash. At the time, I showed that three SBIRS satellites (the same two as indicated above, plus SBIRS GEO 1) had coverage of the Ukraine crash location.

Following that CNN report, this apparent infrared detection has gone into oblivion: there is no mention of it for example in the report of the Dutch Safety Board: the reconstruction of the area where the missile could have been launched is completely based on modelling from the damage pattern to the aircraft's cockpit.

I find it hard to believe, certainly given the anonymous "senior US official" quote to CNN directly after the disaster, that there are no SBIRS detections of the MH17 shootdown.

NATO interest in the area was high at that time, after all this was a quickly escalating conflict right at the border of NATO's and the European Union's influence sphere. The general perception was (and is) that Russia, increasingly seen as the new/old enemy of (east-) European freedom, is trying to expand it's own influence sphere into Europe, and is muscle-flexing towards the east European NATO members. Missiles should have been a natural point of interest to NATO, as a Ukrainian military aircraft had been shot down at high altitude in the days before the disaster with what must have been a state-of-the-art Surface-to-Air system, something which should be of concern to NATO, especially given a US military strategy that heavily relies on Air Supremacy. To me it seems that it would be very odd if US military systems like SBIRS were not watching the area.


UPDATE 3 Nov 2015, 14:00-14:30 UT:

In a Twitter conversation, Rainer Kresken rightfully points at  the weather conditions over the relevant part of the Ukraine during the MH17 tragedy. Cloud cover is detrimental to IR detections. But a SAM would still be detectable once it had cleared the cloud cover. According to the report of the Dutch Safety Board, the cloudbase present in the general area around the time of the crash was scattered and between 1000 and 5000 feet (300 meter to 1.5 km) with occasional peaks of the top of the cloud deck to FL350 (350 000 35 000 feet, 10.7 km). These latter were localized thunderstorms. Airfields in the vicinity report scattered clouds at 3300 feet (1 km) and a broken cloud cover at higher altitude, 10000 to 20000 feet (3 to 6 km). This all suggests that a missile would have been visible once clearing 1 km altitude, unless it was cruising through a cumulus tower from a thunderstorm.
Most relevant to me is still that tantalizing CNN quote of a "senior US official" reporting a heat signal, suggesting that there was a SBIRS detection of the missile above the cloud cover.

SBIRS, SIGINT and the MH17 tragedy (updated)

Yesterday 17 July near 13:15 UT, 298 people including at least 173 189 192 of my countrymen perished when Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 on its way from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur crashed over the eastern Ukraine, reportedly after being hit by a missile.

This is a terrible tragedy. Among the victims are complete families, including children. It is the start of the holidays in the Netherlands, and the flight carried many Dutch families on their way to their holiday destinations in southeast Asia. My thoughts are with these highly stricken families.

For me personally, it is an unnerving fact that I was about to fly the same route from Amsterdam to southeast Asia only a few days later.

In the wake of the incident, accusations fly between the Ukrainians, pro-Russian separatists and Russians, all accusing each other of being responsible for this tragedy. At the moment it is difficult to say which bits of information floating around are true and which are false. I strongly suspect that the current suspicion against Russian-backed separatists will hold though. Some less ambiguous evidence (e.g. the location of the crash, which is close to the locations where separatists earlier downed two other (military) aircraft) certainly seem to suggest this. But we will see: at the moment, nothing is certain.

Of interest to this blog, is that US Intelligence officials have confirmed that the aircraft was hit by a surface-to-air missile, according to several US media. Senior US officials appear to have told CNN that they detected a radar signal from a surface-to-air missile system being turned on right before the crash, and that they also detected a 'heat signature' at the time the aircraft was lost.

If the CNN report is correct, it is highly likely that the 'heat signature' detection was a space-born detection by the SBIRS system of infra-red early warning satellites. I have written about this satellite system before, in the context of that other recent tragedy with a Malaysian Airlines flight, the disappeared flight MH370.

click image to enlarge

Three of the four SBIRS satellites, SBIRS GEO 1 (2011-019A) and SBIRS GEO 2 (2013-011A) in geostationary orbit and USA 184 (2006-027A) in HEO, had coverage of the area where MH17 went down at the time this happened (17 July 14:15 GMT, see image above).

SBIRS and SIGINT platform USA 184, imaged on 20 March 2014

SBIRS GEO 2 imaged on 20 June 2014

It is possible that the quoted detection of a missile radar tracking system activation around the time of the disaster was done by satellites too. Several SIGINT and ELINT satellites cover this area, including various MENTOR (ORION) satellites and one MERCURY satellite in GEO, and USA 184, which is both a TRUMPET-FO SIGINT satellite and a SBIRS platform, in HEO. That these SIGINT satellites amongst others serve to detect and monitor signals from military radar and missile systems, is known. Given the interest of the USA and NATO in closely watching military developments in the Ukraine conflict, it is almost certain that some of these are targetting the area.

The question is, whether these satellites can help pinpoint the location from where the missile was launched, and hence provide an indication of who did it (Ukrainian forces, separatist militia, or the Russians).

I suspect they can. If the SIGINT detections were indeed done by satellites, it is known that the US recently made large progress in geolocating the origin of detected signals. In a speech from September 2010 available on the NRO website, NRO director Bruce Carlson specifically remarked on the NRO's increasing capability to geolocate using SIGINT:

"I will tell you that just in the last 24 months, we’ve improved the accuracy of geo-location by nearly an order of magnitude, and we’re going to continue to do that and bring it down. We’re getting to the point where here very, very shortly, within the very near term, we will be able to target using signals intelligence". 

If they indeed have a SIGINT detection of the missile's radar system (and the CNN quote seems to say that), the character of the signature might yield information on what missile system was used (i.e. if it was indeed an SA-17/BUK).

Likewise, and although as far as I know no exact public information is available on the accuracy of this kind of detections (update: but see the update at the end of this post!) , I suspect that the  'heat signature' detections of the missile launch,  if indeed SBIRS infra-red detections, are also accurate enough to geolocate the launch site (and whether that is in Ukranian held, or separatist held territory).

A SBIRS platform has two sensors: one in staring mode, and one in scanning mode. The staring scanning mode sensor watches for heat signatures over a wide semi-global area. The scanning staring sensor targets specific regions, and when the staring scanning sensor detects a signature, the scanning staring sensor (at least according to some sources) can be employed to further pinpoint and track this event (more sources amongst others here, here and here). The goal of SBIRS reportedly is to be able to track launches, pinpoint launch sites and accurately predict potential target locations from the tracking data. That needs quite accurate tracking.

(note added: a 1-hour timezone conversion error in the original version of this post has been corrected)

Update 19/07/2014: Daniel Fischer managed to dig up this unclassified presentation from 2006, which shows that SBIRS indeed can detect SAM. Pages 2 and 3 mention the capability to pinpoint the launch location. 

Rainer Kresken has raised the legitimate question of the cloud cover present at the time of the shootdown. Water vapour obscures Infra Red, which means the cloud cover might have blocked detection of the initial launch phase of the SAM. The SIGINT detection of the missile system radar does not suffer from this problem.