Imaging North Korea's new Kwangmyŏngsŏng-4 satellite, and the flash period of its UNHA-3 rb

Kwangmyŏngsŏng-4 on 28 Feb 2016
(click image to enlarge)

North Korea's recently launched new satellite (see a  previous post), Kwangmyŏngsŏng-4 (KMS-4: 2016-009A), is finally starting to make visible evening passes here at Leiden.

Yesterday evening, 28 Feb 2016 near 19:45 UT (20:45 local time), I shot the image above, one of two images showing the satellite passing near the Celestial pole. It is a short exposure of 2 seconds with the 2.8/180 mm Zeiss Sonnar lens on my Canon EOS 60D.

Below is the same image, but in black-and-white negative, showing the trail a bit better:

Kwangmyŏngsŏng-4 on 28 Feb 2016
(click image to enlarge)

The object is very faint (probably near mag +7). It needs a rather big lens (the Zeiss 2.8/180 mm has a lens diameter of 6.4 cm), which unfortunately also means a small FOV. Over the two images, a total imaging arc of ~6 seconds, it however appeared to be stable in brightness with no sign of a periodicity due to tumble. So either it is not tumbling, or if it is tumbling at all it must be a very slow tumble.

Some 16 minutes earlier, near 19:28 UT, I also imaged the upper stage of the Kwangmyŏngsŏng/UNHA-3 rocket (2016-009B) that was used to launch the satellite. This object is brighter and shows a nice tumble resulting in periodic flashes. Below are crops from three images spanning 19:28:32 - 19:28:44 UT. The brightness variation is well visible (the bright star it passes in the first image is beta Umi):

brightness variation of UNHA-3 r/b 2016-009B on 28 Feb 2016
(click image to enlarge)

A fit to the measured brightness variation over these three images shows several specular peaks at regular intervals, with a slightly asymetric profile:

click diagram to enlarge

The fit shown in red is the result of two combined sinusoids: a major period of 2.39 seconds with a minor period of 1.195 seconds superimposed (resulting in the slight asymmetry). Pixel brightness over the trails was measured with IRIS. The data were fitted using PAST.


UPDATE 1 March 2016:

I imaged both the UNHA-3 r/b and Kwangmyŏngsŏng-4 again in the evening of 29 Feb 2016. The sky conditions wer less good, and the pass was much lower in the sky. I used the 1.4/85 mm SamYang lens this time, to get a larger FOV in order to try to capture a larger arc.

KMS-4 was captured on four images (2 second exposures) between 19:19:17 - 19:19:34 UT. It was barely visible on the images, but again the brightness appeared to be stable over this 17 second time span.

The UNHA-3 r/b was also captured, and 3 images (5 second exposures) between 18:58:42 - 18:59:07 UT again showed a very nice flash pattern, fitting (like the observations of Feb 28) a flash period of 2.39 seconds:

click diagram to enlarge

The image below is a stack of these three images. The rocket stage moves from upper right to lower left in the image.

A consolidated answer to "Masami Kuramoto" about Resurs P1

The MH17 discussion has become extremely messy. It is a highly politicized topic, with active disinformation campaigns and trolling from both the Russian and Ukrainian sides. It is sometimes hard to discern who is honestly seeking the truth, who is honestly seeking the truth but very naive with regard to sources, and who is actively involved in peddling propaganda and disinformation.

Ever since my expert participation in the Dutch Parliament committee hearing of Jan 22, and ever since I expressed caution on this blog about certain satellite images and factually clearly incorrect statements on satellite positions released by the Russian dept. of Defense, some of the trolling has been directed at me.

I have learned not to bother too much with trolls, but when they actively and tenaciously disseminate disinformation and seriously flawed counter-arguments around one of my analysis, I reserve myself the right to a rebuttal, just to set the record straight.

In a previous post I showed that a satellite image released by Russia, purported to be a Resurs P1 image from 17 July 2014 which claimed to show Ukrainian BUK's in a field near Zaroshchens’ke, is problematic. The viewing angles of the "BUK's" in the image do not appear to fit the satellite-to-location geometry, which only allows clearly oblique viewing angles between 45 and 57.5 degrees with the horizontal, from directions ranging from northwest via west to southwest (for more details, see my earlier post in question). I therefore urged caution with regard to these images.

My post has drawn fire on twitter, notably from a twitter user nicked "Masami Kuramoto". While the nick sounds Japanese, and the twitter account claims to be located in Germany, I have a strong suspicion that the entity behind it is Russian.

Kuramoto's chosen line of attack is by questioning the accuracy of the Resurs P1 orbital information which I used. That orbital information came straight from JSpOC (formerly known as "NORAD"), argueably this world's most reliable source of orbital elements. Kuramoto basically tries to advance a claim that the JSpOC tle's for Resurs P1 are either highly inaccurate or even deliberately doctored, and that the satellite in reality passed along a somewhat different trajectory (but with a similar pass time, to match the time listed in the images), thus advocating for the existence of an imaginary trajectory that allows to reconcile the imaging angles with the published images. In order for this to be possible, it is necessary to argue that the real orbit amounts to a significantly shifted orbital plane, i.e. a shifted RAAN value, compared to the JSpOC published orbit.

In an attempt to argue this position, Kuramoto suggestively quoted from the Space-Track terms of use, taking text out of context to insinuate that JSpOC tle's were not accurate for the task:

@Marco_Langbroek I found something strange in their user agreement. #MH17 pic.twitter.com/FclyHCQac3

— Masami Kuramoto (@masamikuramoto) 17 februari 2016

Kuramoto kept insisting on his perceived "unreliability"of JSpOC tle's, even after I had set him straight on this:

@masamikuramoto it simply means that for accurate assessment of very close encounters between sats tle's are not accurate enough

— Dr Marco Langbroek (@Marco_Langbroek) 19 februari 2016

@masamikuramoto for such close encounters 0.1 second uncertainty in both elsets already is problematic.

— Dr Marco Langbroek (@Marco_Langbroek) 19 februari 2016

Let me first elaborate on what I pointed out in the tweets above. Kuramoto tried to capitalize on this warning in the Space-Track User agreement:

"A TLE AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC SHOULD NOT BE USED FOR CONJUNCTION ASSESSMENT PREDICTION"

This statement is relevant to close encounters (with the risk of collision) of two objects in space. What this statement simply means is that it is unwise to base decisions on debris avoidance manoeuvres solely on published tle's. In such cases, very small uncertainties matter. If one uses tle's produced for the epoch of today to make a prediction on a future position of two objects (say: 3 days from now), that prediction for a moment days from now will have a small uncertainty. SGP 4 after all is only a model. These uncertainties are negligible for other purposes, but for close encounter mitigation they matter. Satellites in Low Earth Orbit move some 7 km/s, so a 0.1 second uncertainty in the time of passing a particular point in orbit, hardly something to bother about under normal circumstances, amounts to a positional uncertainty along the orbit of 700 meter. This might not seem much and for other purposes 0.1 seconds and 700 meter is negligible, but for collision avoidance it matters: it might be the difference between a miss or a hit, certainly because the other object introduces a similar uncertainty (i.e., if both objects have 0.1 second uncertainty, the uncertainty in relative distance is 2 x 700 meter = 1.4 km. So if your analysis says they will safely pass 1.4 km apart, they might in reality collide instead. Or conversely, if your analysis says they will collide, the reality might be that they pass each other at a km distance rather than colliding).

In other words: the warning by JSpOC is only relevant to a very specific situation, and concerns uncertainties that are completely negligible for the subject at hand: the position of a satellite with respect to the viewing geometry of a location on earth. The more so because the latter assessment actually uses a tle with epoch very close to the the time of interest, unlike a collision avoidance assessment of a moment more removed in future. The uncertainty pointed out, in no way can change the viewing angles to the extend that it would solve the discrepancies I pointed out in my earlier post.

Now, this could have been a simple misunderstanding, based on a lack of knowledge and insight in the matter on Kuramoto's side.

Kuramoto however next took it to a new level and suggested that JSpOC might have deliberately altered the orbital elements for Resurs P1 post-fact:

@Marco_Langbroek I'm wondering what is the incentive for JSpOC to provide the public with accurate TLEs of Russian satellites... #MH17

— Masami Kuramoto (@masamikuramoto) 19 februari 2016

The point is: if JSpOC would have done that, the simple reality is that many people working with these data would notice it. Satellites suddenly would be at different positions than where the JSpOC orbital data would put them. Our tracking network for example, frequently catches Russian satellites as byproduct of our tracking of classified objects. On these occasions we would suddenly note large positional errors in that case, and we would even start to see UNIDS (unidentified satellites, which always have our immediate attention) that next turn out to be Russian satellites in orbits not matching their JSpOC orbit. No way that would go unnoticed.

As for the suggestion that the elements were only retrospectively altered, Kuramoto was a bit shocked to learn next that several of us (including me) actually regularly archive the full JSpOC database of orbital elements. I do so several times each month (for July 2014, I for example have archived elements from July 14 and can compare these with elements for that date retrieved from the JSpOC archive today: they are the same, they have not been restrospectively altered). In a retrospective analysis, altering the elements starting at some given date (or only altering them around a given date) would show up as a sudden change in the elements as well.So no: such a plot is simply not realistic.

After this, Kuramoto nevertheless still wished to cast doubt on the JSpOC tle's:

@Marco_Langbroek If you believe the TLE published by the US DoD to be accurate. #MH17 @MJoyce2244 @MGoedblick @roarbro

Notwithstanding my earlier rebuttal, he at first simply restated his already rebutted argument:

@Marco_Langbroek No doubt TLE is inaccurate. #MH17 @MJoyce2244 @MGoedblick @roarbro @MazzaRay pic.twitter.com/FclyHCQac3

— Masami Kuramoto (@masamikuramoto) 22 februari 2016

That would not do of course, and Kuramoto seems to have realized that. In order to maintain his position, Kuramoto had to grasp the next straw. He next brought up a paper by Kelso et al.:

@Marco_Langbroek Are you aware of this paper? @MJoyce2244 @MGoedblick @roarbro @MazzaRay #MH17 pic.twitter.com/G9k2v7p9Ex

— Masami Kuramoto (@masamikuramoto) 23 februari 2016

This paper discusses what factors might introduce predictions that do deviate considerably from reality (with the focus again on the accuracy of data needed for orbital debris avoidance manoeuvres). One such case is when for example a position is based on a tle issued 4 hours ago, but the satellite in question meanwhile has actively manoeuvered to a new orbit. In that case, the predicted position indeed would be incorrect. Kuramoto (of course) tries to seize on that, but in doing so again shows a lack of insight in the matter. Whether a satellite (Resurs P1 in this case) had just manoeuvered can easily be checked: by looking at a series of tle's issued around the time of interest (17 July 2014, 8:32 UT in this case), a manoeuvre around the time of interest would be visible by a sudden change in elements.

For Resurs P1 around 17 july 2014, I did this check (Kuramoto obviously didn't). There is no such change, i.e. the satellite did not make a significant manoeuvre. This can be seen in the diagrams below which depict the evolution of the orbit (from JSPOC data over July 2014). A manoeuvre would show up as a clear discontinuity (a clear sudden change) in either perigee and/or apogee altitude, argument of perigee, inclination, Mean Motion and /or RAAN (and notably in RAAN for Kuramoto's argument to hold). Tampering with the orbital elements around 17 July by JSpOC would show up similarly, by the way. But none of this happens, as you can see below. So again, Kuramoto's next grasp at a straw, is futile, and by now his attempts to argue my analysis away are bordering the pathetic.

post-edit  24 Feb 2014, 15:05 UT:

Kuramoto is still trying to advance his ill-fated argument:

@Marco_Langbroek Deviations occur even without manoeuvre. #MH17 @MJoyce2244 @MGoedblick @roarbro @MazzaRay pic.twitter.com/99jf9F3q78

— Masami Kuramoto (@masamikuramoto) 24 februari 2016

Again, his argument is largely irrelevant. The kind of deviations pointed out are very minor: a maximum error of 9.3 km in position at a given time really will not significantly change the viewing angles. That would need cross-track errors an order of a magnitude larger.

post-edit 24 Feb 2014, 15:40 UT:

Well now, somebody has seen the light it appears:

@Marco_Langbroek You convinced me. The Russian satellite images of 7/17 appear to be fake. #MH17 @MJoyce2244 @MGoedblick @roarbro @MazzaRay

— Masami Kuramoto (@masamikuramoto) 24 februari 2016

Continuing to track NROL-45 (FIA Radar 4)

(click image to enlarge)

The image above shows FIA Radar 4 (2016-010A), the payload of the NROL-45 launch of 10 Feb 2016, crossing through Corona Borealis around 6:26 am local time  (5:26 UT) this morning (Feb 13) 3 days after launch.

It was about 6.5 seconds late on our very preliminary orbit. A new (hopefully) improved estimate of the orbit is here.

The SAR panels of the satellite do not seem to have deployed yet: the object is still relatively faint. This is normal: the panels are deployed a few days after the launch, based on patterns of earlier FIA Radar launches.

Observing NROL-45 (FIA Radar 4/TOPAZ 4) 18 hours after launch

NROL-45, imaged 18 hours after launch
(click to enlarge)

Yesterday (10 Feb 2016) at 11:40:32 UT, the NRO launched a new classified satellite from Vandenberg AFB, using a Delta-IV M rocket, under the launch designation NROL-45. The payload is the fourth FIA Radar (also known under the codename TOPAZ) and has the alternative designation USA 167 USA 267.

As with previous launches, our network of observers picked the payload up quite quickly. The first optical observations were made near 03:39 UT (11 Feb 2016), 16 hours after launch, by Cees Bassa in the Netherlands. Some two hours later, on the next pass, Leo Barhorst and me (both also in the Netherlands) observed NROL-45 as well, 18 hours after launch.

orbit of NROL-45, and position at time of photo
(click to enlarge)

A first preliminary orbit is given here and here. The satellite moves in a 122.98 degree inclined, retrograde orbit with perigee near 1086 km and apogee near 1087 km. The retrograde orbit is a clear indication that this satellite is a SAR (radar) satellite.

I did my observations under a very clear early morning sky, near 6:20 am local time. The NROL-45 payload was faint and could not be seen by the naked eye: this is normal during the first few days after launch. It will become brighter in a few days, likely because the SAR panel has then been unfolded.

With the launch of FIA Radar 4, there are now four FIA radars on orbit. Launch of a 5th one is expected in 2017. Of the current four satellites, the orbital configuration is such that the RAAN are 90 degree separated (see discussion by Ted Molczan here).

current FIA Radar constellation. NROL-45 in yellow.
(click to enlarge)

Inconsistent DPRK versus JSPoC orbit claims for Kwangmyŏngsŏng 4

This post is a brief update to my more elaborate post of earlier today here.

As I wrote in that post, western military tracking of the N-Korean satellite places it in an orbit with perigee at 465 km, apogee at 502 km and an orbital inclination of 97.5 degree.

It is interesting to compare this with the (English) radio announcement of the DPRK itself, which you can hear here.

In that bulletin, the orbit is given as having perigee at "494.6 km", apogee at "500 km", and an orbital inclination of "97.4" degrees.

Compare this to JSpOc data: 465 km, 502 km, 97.5 degrees.

The DPRK apogee perigee altitude does not match the JSpoC data, which gives a clearly lower apogee perigee at 465 km. This could in theory be due to initial errors in the JSpOC tracking data (the first few orbit determinations are always less accurate). But the magnitude of the difference is such, that I doubt that.

Assuming that the numbers in the DPRK radio bulletin are not based on actual North-Korean tracking data, but instead based on a pre-launch desired orbit, then maybe this could indicate that the satellite did end up in a slightly lower orbit than intended.

We'll see if the difference keeps standing with more western tracking data added...

[update: Jonathan McDowell suggested that perhaps the Koreans used another spheroid (earth shape) to refer to. I doubt that: not only would I expect similar discrepancies in the apogee altitude as well in this case (the apogee altitudes given by JSpOC and N-Korea are close), but moreover, 30 km is a large difference. I know of no ellipsoid that differs by as much as 30 km from the WGS84 ellipsoid]

[update 2:  Bob Christy makes some very interesting remarks on his webpage, which also support the idea that orbit insertion did not go as intended].

North Korea has launched Kwangmyŏngsŏng 4

Launch of KMS-4 (still from N-Korean tv announcement)

My previous blogpost of Feb 4 (with an update on Feb 5) discussed the announced launch of a new North Korean satellite, Kwangmyŏngsŏng-4 (KMS-4), from Sohae satellite Launch center in the northwest of North Korea.

Yesterday (Feb 6), North Korea suddenly shifted the start of the launch window one day forward, from February 8 to February 7 (local date). No reason was given for this date shift.

The actual launch happened this morning at 00:29 UT (February 7, 2016), according to USSTRATCOM.

It appears to have been successful, to the extend that  they did successfully put an object into orbit, as the US military tracking network confirms. As the history with KMS 3-2 shows, whether the payload is really operational is another question and as for yet unanswered.

North Korean television announced the successful launch a few hours ago, in a bulletin in characteristic fashion, including images of the launch and of Kim Jong-Un watching the launch from Sohae:

Launch time

The launch time prediction of my previous post (and in this seesat list post) turns out to have been correct.

I indicated a launch between 00:24 and 00:41 UT (a 17 minute period out of a 5 hour window indicated by the North Koreans). The start of this window at 00:24 UT was based on the assumption of a launch at a similar solar elevation at Pyongyang as during the 2012 launch of KMS 3-2 (the end at 00:41 UT was based assuming a launch exactly 5 2 hours after Pyongyang sunrise rather than at a similar solar elevation to 2012).

The actual launch occurred at 00:29 UT, only a few minutes from the start of the window which I indicated. It corresponds to a solar elevation of 18.0 degrees at Pyongyang (the 2012 launch happened at a solar elevation of 17.5 degrees).


Orbit

The first orbital elements from JSpOC show two objects in orbit as a result of the launch: an A-object (catalogue number 41332, 2016-009A) and a B-object (catalogue number 41333, 2016-009B). The A-object is likely the satellite.

The A-object moves in  a 97.5 degree inclined, 465 x 502 km sun-synchronous polar orbit with an orbital period of 94.3 minutes. The satellite makes daily morning passes around ~9h am. It has a repeating ground-track every 4th day. This is consistent with a remote-sensing role.

The orbit is somewhat lower and  more circular than that of North Korea's previous satellite, KMS 3-2, which was initially placed in a 495 x 588 km orbit. Like the 2012 launch, North Korea had to perform a dogleg manoeuvre to attain an orbital inclination of 97.5 degrees after launching due south from Sohae (see discussion in my previous post).

The second, B object is the spent upper stage of the rocket, and is moving in a 433 x 502 km orbit.

The map below shows the satellite's ground-track during the first 5 orbits after launch:

North Korea's ruler Kim Jong-Un watched the launch from the grounds of the Sohae Satellite Launch Center. In the image below, he is observing the rocket ascend from a viewing platform which appears to be in front of the oval building that was erected at Sohae between March and July 2014 (see this satellite photo analysis on the 38 North blog).

A few more stills of the launch, taken from the North Korean tv broadcast:

The launch of Kwangmyŏngsŏng 4 is the second time that the North Korean rocket program was successful in placing an object in orbit. North Korea itself claims a number more successful launches, but these failed according to western sources as no objects were tracked in orbit.

Current spatial separation of the orbital planes of KMS 3-2 and KMS 4

Note added 18:00 UT, 7 Feb: a brief update noting inconsistencies between early western tracking data and a DPRK announcement is here.

[UPDATED] North Korea's upcoming satellite launch

North Korea's previous satellite, Kwangmyŏngsŏng 3-2, imaged in 2015
(click image to enlarge)

On February 8th, 2016, it will be the 70th anniversary of the formation of the Provisional People's Committee for North Korea by Kim Il-Sung, effectively marking the birth of the nation. And 16 February 2016 will be the 74th (actually 75th) birthday of the late Kim Jong-Il, while in addition February 14th is a day that commemorates Kim Jong-Il assuming the role of "Grand General of the DPRK". Such dates often see some significant national posturing of North Korea.

Following a nuclear test on January 6th (claimed to be a small H-bomb by the North Koreans, although western observers doubt this), North Korea has announced the launch of a satellite, with issued Broadcast Warnings pointing to a launch between February 8 and 25. The launch period starts at the date of the 70th anniversary of the Provisional People's Committee.  

Satellite image analysts at the 38 North website had already been documenting preparations for a launch at the launch site in Sohae in January. Over the past 3 year, North Korea had been making several improvements to its launch installations, building various new structures on the site.

Meanwhile, the upcoming launch has western nations and neighbouring states concerned. Especially Japan has expressed very strong concerns about the launch. Like they did in 2012, they have threathened to shoot the rocket down if it seems to be headed for Japan. That is unlikely to happen though.

The Broadcast Navigational Warnings issued delineate three splash-down areas of rocket debris:

HYDROPAC 294/16
WESTERN NORTH PACIFIC.
YELLOW SEA.
EAST CHINA SEA.
PHILIPPINE SEA.
ROCKETS.
DNC 23.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 2230Z TO 0330Z COMMENCING
   DAILY 07 THRU 24 FEB IN AREAS:
   A. BETWEEN 35-19N 36-04N AND 124-30E 124-54E.
   B. BOUND BY
      33-16N 124-11E, 32-22N 124-11E,
      32-21N 125-08E, 33-16N 125-09E.
   C. BOUND BY
      19-44N 123-53E, 17-01N 123-52E,
      17-00N 124-48E, 19-43N 124-51E.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 250430Z FEB 16.

[added note: the original letter of North Korea to the Int. Maritime Organization on which this navigational warning is based, is here].

Area A is the splash-down area for the first stage, area B for the fairings, and area C for the second stage (the third stage will remain on-orbit after launch). Plotting these on a map (red boxes in map below) reveals them to be on a north-south line with azimuth ~180 degrees (yellow line), avoiding the main islands of Japan:

(click map to enlarge)

The ~180 degree launch azimuth points to a satellite launch into Polar orbit, very similar to the launch direction of North Korea's previous satellite, Kwangmyŏngsŏng (KMS) 3-2 (2012-072A) three years ago (a nice background piece on that launch by Brian Weeden discussing "satellite launch or missile test?" can be found here). Compare my map above to the map constructed from the NOTAM's for the KMS 3-2 launch in 2012 on Bob Christy's website, [edit: and see also the comparison of 2012 to 2016 in this blogpost by Melissa Hanham on the Arms Control Wonk blog].

As was the case with their previous KMS 3-2 launch, the intended satellite orbit is, given the launch direction, likely a sun-synchronous orbit with an orbital inclination of 97 degrees. The launch direction due south rather than directly into a ~97 degree inclined orbit has been chosen to avoid overflying (and debris landing on) the territories of China and Taiwan during the ascend phase. In order to reach a true sun-synchronous orbit with inclination ~97 degrees, it necessitates a dog-leg manoeuvre of the third stage with payload during the final phase of the ascend to orbit (blue line in map above, approximate only). Orbit insertion of the payload will be about ten minutes after launch, just before reaching the Phillipines.

Assuming the resulting orbit of the satellite will be similar to that of KMS 3-2 in 2012 (perigee ~495 km, apogee ~588 km, inclination 97.4 degrees), the trajectory of its first revolution around earth will look something like this (yellow dot shows satellite position one hour after orbit insertion):

(click map to enlarge)

The launch window is 17 days long, and runs daily from 22:30 to 03:30 UT, according to the Broadcast Warning. The daily 22:30-03:30 UT window is similar to that of the KMS 3-2 launch in 2012. It runs from local daybreak to just short of local noon, indicating a desire for an orbital plane resulting in morning passes.

[edit: the paragraph below was slightly editted on 5 Feb 2016, expanding the discussion of possible launch times]

In 2012, KMS 3-2 was launched at 00:49:49 UT, almost exactly two hours after Pyongyang sunrise (22:50 UT). This suggests (if a similar orbital plane with overfly times at ~9h am local time is aimed for) that the current launch might happen somewhere between 00:24-00:41 UT, depending on whether the aim is for launch at a similar solar elevation (then it will be close to 00:24 UT) or merely two hours after Pyongyang sunrise (then it will be close to 00:41 UT). However (see the next paragraph), the timing of the 2012 launch also seems to have been (at least partially) dictated by a suitable window lacking overflights by western reconnaissance satellites. As for the date, I hesitate to prophecy on this, but I wouldn't be surprised if they go - weather permitting- for February 8, the first day in the 17-day window.

It appears that the North Koreans carefully chose their launch moment in 2012. US military sources already had claimed shortly after the launch that North Korea had played a ruse on them and evidently knew when western optical imaging satellites had (and had not had) view of the launch installations. This seems to be confirmed by my independent analysis of that launch from December 2012, which showed that the North Koreans used the very end of a longer-than-usual one-hour gap in IMINT coverage of the launch site to launch. And as I wrote in that blog post, a North Korean IP address had been looking for orbital elements of  US optical and radar satellites on this very blog just days before the launch.

The ruse was apparently designed to keep the USA, Japan and South Korea in the dark about the launch moment until the actual moment of launch itself (which would be registered by SBIRS and DSP satellites), as a counter-measure to give potential intercepts of the rocket as little advance preparation time as possible.

It would be difficult for North Korea to repeat such a ruse these days, as the number of western optical and radar reconnaissance satellites has grown ubiquitously in the past three years. Assuming launch near 00:40 UT (two hours after sunrise), the most promising dates (from the perspective of relative lack of western IMINT coverage) are three dates in the first week of the launch window:  February 8, 10 and 14. But maybe North Korea is confident enough this time, following the experience with KMS 3-2, to not bother with western IMINT coverage at all.

Back to basics: AEHF 2 and SBIRS GEO 2 imaged

click to enlarge

Time to go back to basics. The photo above is part of an image I shot in the evening of January 20-21, 2016. It shows a number of commercial geosynchronous satellites and two classified satellites: AEHF 2 and SBIRS-GEO 2.

This image was shot from Leiden center using a Canon EOS 60D and a Zeiss Sonnar 2.8/180 mm lens and 15 seconds exposure (ISO 1000). It shows an approximately 2.5 degree wide field in Hydra, just east of alpha Hydra. The sky was extremely transparent, and to my surprise a waxing moon in the sky was no real hindrance: conditions I do not encounter often!

Most prominent on the image (a crop out of a larger image) is the commercial Astra 1 group, a group of four satellites well known to European owners of satellite tv dishes. Just north of the group is AMOS 5, an Israeli commercial communications satellite. It suffered a malfunction on 21 November 2015, as a result of which all contact was lost.

Also visible in the image are the commercial satellite Arabsat 5C and the Chinese satellite Tianlian 1-03. The latter satellite is a Tracking- and Data Relay satellite that plays a similar role to the US TDRS satellites. The Tianlian satellites are specifically meant to relay data to and from Chinese crewed Shenzou spacecraft.

Two classified US satellites are visible in the image.

On the right is AEHF 2 (2012-019A), the second Advanced Extremely High Frequency military communications satellite. The AEHF system is a replacement for the older Milstar system, and use of this US system is shared by the military of a number of  countries, at this moment the UK, Canada, and my own country, the Netherlands. It is eventually to consist of 6 satellites, of which 3 have been launched as of early 2016. The satellites have been designed to be resilient to jamming and intercept efforts.

On the left is SBIRS GEO 2 (2013-011A), the second geostationary satellite in the Space Based Infra Red System, a series of US infra-red Early Warning satellites meant to detect missile launches. I discussed this system in detail in several recent blogposts, as this system might have played a role in potentially detecting the missile that shot down Malaysian Airlines flight MH17. Indeed, the satellite imaged here, SBIRS GEO 2, is one of the SBIRS satellites that had sight on the Ukraine at that time.

MH17: On the Resurs-P1 image with "BUK's near Zaroshchens’ke" (twice updated)

(Note added 31 Jan 2016: Max van der Werff brought to my attention that he is "kremlintroll" and that the pdf report on the blog was not written by him, but by someone else. That was not clear to me. I have added some comments in the text below to reflect this)

[this post was editted by the addition of a (marked) new section on 17 Feb 2016]

Since my contribution to the January 22 Dutch Parliamen hearing on flight MH17, a number of people have reached out to me with satellite-related questions about MH17.

One of them was Dutch blogger Max van der Werff, who in a tweet from 28 Jan 2016 asked me if I had anything to say about this analysis (pdf) by a blogger named "Kremlintroll" [edit: this turns out to be Max himself: but the pdf analysis on his blog was by someone else]. It concerns a report with purported Russian satellite imagery of what was claimed to be BUK installations in a field near Zaroshchens'ke, on the Ukranian side of the front. It in addition includes claims that a particular US spy satellite overflew the area at the time the missile was fired.

@Marco_Langbroek mocht u tijd hebben, dan ben ik benieuwd hoe u deze studie vanuit uw vakgebied beoordeelt [6Mb] https://t.co/Wl3SzR59Q8

— Max van der Werff (@MaxvanderWerff) 28 januari 2016

I will answer Max' question here, but note that I do so without necessarily condoning Max viewpoints on MH17. There are a lot of bloggers expressing their (often very partisan) views on the case, and I prefer not to take sides with any of them at this moment.

At the same time, when satellite observations are brought up, I would like to see to it that the information presented is correct. So I will provide some of that information below, as it pertains to this case.

My initial intent was to keep it focussed at information about satellite passes. This is factual, objective information. While checking pass data for Resurs-P1 I did however note something that appears off with regard to one of the images. I will discuss that as well, with some reluctance: but given that I mentioned my doubts on twitter, it is fair that I should present the reasons for my doubts.

The imagery comes from a Russian government website and was earlier the target of a "photo forensics" analysis by the Bellingcat collective. The latter analysis has drawn fire from professional photo-forensic analysts, who say the analysis was flawed. This critique comes from knowledgeable people on this matter, so should be taken seriously imho.

click image to enlarge

The image (reproduced above) purports to show Ukranian BUK installations in a field near Zaroshchens'ke in Ukraine, 47 deg 59' 00" N, 38 deg 27' 05" E. Text on the image states it was taken on 17 July 2014 at 11:32 (no timezone given, but presumably standard Moscow Time, UTC +3).

The pdf in the blog by "Kremlintroll" discusses the image as part of a larger narrative. In addition (and this was my initial focus), the author of the pdf claims that a US spy satellite actually overflew the MH17 disaster area at the time the missile was fired:

"According to our data from 17:06 till 17:21 Moscow time on July 17 over the South-Eastern territory of Ukraine flew a US space satellite. This is a special device of the experimental space system designed to detect and track various missiles launches"

[edit: the quote above is purportedly from a Russian officer, Lt-Gen Makushev]

US spy satellite fly-over?

Let us examine the latter claim first, as this is squarely within my field of expertise. As we will see, the claim appears to be false.

The description seems to refer to one of the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) demo satellites in Low Earth Orbit (note the given pass time of 15 minutes in the quote above, indicating a satellite in Low Earth Orbit). They are experimental satellites for tracking missiles, serving a role initially projected for the (cancelled) SBIRS LOW segment.  A pass of one of these satellites indeed takes about 15 minutes.

These particular satellites are tracked by our network. I checked their positions for 17 July 2014, 13:20 UT (the time of the MH17 disaster). They did not have sight of the Ukraine at that moment.

STSS demo 1 and STSS demo 2 (2009-052 A and 2009-052B) move as a pair at a fixed distance of each other: STSS demo 1 passes a given location 10 minutes after STSS demo 2 does, along a similar track.

STSS demo 2 passed over the MH17 crash area around 12:35 UT, and STSS demo 1 did so around 12:45 UT. This is more than half an hour before the MH17 disaster took place. STSS demo 1 lost view of the area around 12:55 UT, still 25 minutes before the disaster. At 13:20 UT, the time of the disaster, the satellites were south of Australia, well away from the Ukraine (map below).

click image to enlarge

STSS-ATRR, a third satellite connected to this program, was just east of Sakhalin at that time, so nowhere near the Ukraine either.

Another US spy satellite, USA 161, did pass over the area near 13:20 UT (see my previous post here). This is however a KH-11 optical reconnaissance satellite, not one designed to track missiles as claimed in the pdf analysis hosted by Kremlintroll. It also did not pass over the south-eastern territory of the Ukraine, but well west of the area in question. See my earlier post for a discussion of what this satellite might, or more likely given amongst others that the area of interest was very periferal in the footprint, might not have imaged.

In other words: the claim about a US missile-tracking satellite in Low Earth Orbit overflying the Ukraine at 17:06-17:21 Moscow daylight saving time (13:06-13:21 UT), is factually incorrect.

Of course, we should realise that three SBIRS satellites for missile detection in higher orbits (HEO and GEO) with (semi-) permanent view of the area did cover the relevant area, as I reported to Dutch Parliament, and in that sense this discussion is slightly academic: early warning satellites for missile launches did potentially observe the Ukraine at that time. This SBIRS high component in HEO and GEO however clearly is not the low orbit (fly-over time listed as 15 minutes) experimental missile tracking satellite system the Russian officer was referring to. So, this specific information is incorrect.


The photograph

So what about the satellite photograph distributed by the Russian government, showing purported BUK systems just south of Zaroshchens'ke and discussed in the pdf hosted by Kremlintroll as evidence for Ukrainian BUK deployment in the area.

I was, and am, reluctant to discuss this photograph.

First, I am knowledgeable about satellite orbits, satellite positions and satellite system specifics (the kind of factual information I provided to the Parliament committee during the hearing of Jan 22): but I am not a photo interpreter.

I want to emphasize this. Analysis of this kind of imagery preferably should be done by a professional photo interpreter.

Second, following my role in the Parliament hearing, I prefer to refrain as much as possible from making any statements that might be misconstrued as 'taking sides'.

Nevertheless, while looking at satellite pass information I noted something about this photograph, that I think is relevant. With some reluctance, I provide these observations here in this blogpost. I want to make clear that this only concerns this particular photograph: I am not saying anything about other evidence presented by various parties, and importantly: I have no desire to analyse more images. Again: that should better be done by professional photo interpreters. In a way, given the way this quickly developed on twitter, I regret mentioning my doubts about the satellite image in public, even though (as discussed below) I stand behind these doubts. Given that I mentioned my doubts on twitter, it is fair that I should present the reasons for my doubts below.


1. the satellite

First, the satellite that took the image. The image lists a time, 11:32 on 17 July 2014. Resurs-P1 (2013-030A), a Russian imaging satellite with 1-meter resolution, passed the area shown in the photograph at 08:32 UT (11:32 Moscow Standard Time, or 12:32 Moscow Daylight Saving Time) - an identification earlier also made on a Russian webforum. Other high-resolution Russian imaging satellites do not match the pass time listed. The assumption that the image was made by Resurs-P1 therefore appears a valid one and will be the starting point of the discussion below.

click image to enlarge

Resurs-P1 culminated at 57.5 degrees elevation at 08:32:46 UT (July 17th 2014 - that is 11:32:46 Standard Moscow Time, 12:32:46 Moscow Daylight Saving Time) as seen from the field imaged in the photograph (which is at 47 deg 59' 00" N, 38 deg 27' 05" E). The satellite subpoint was some 281 km west of the location shown on the photograph at the moment of culmination. The location on the photograph is within the satellites known image swath width of ~950 km (~475 km to each side of the satellite nadir).

It is therefore possible that Resurs-P1 did take an image of this field at the listed time.

That does however not necessarily mean that the image is genuine. Something isn't sitting well with me regarding this image, raising my suspicion. I will discuss this below.


2. the photograph: suspicions

(again, I want to emphasize that I am not a professional photo interpreter. Keep that in mind)

So far, what I have written above is all straightforward factual: where were what satellites at a specified moment? What I am going to write below has a larger factor of interpretation.

As mentioned, Resurs-P1 culminated at a maximum altitude of 57.5 degrees for the location in question (that is a factual observation).

This immediately made me uneasy about the featured satellite photograph. For this image seemed to be a head-on image, taken with an angle to the horizon of near 90 degrees (straight down), rather than under an oblique 57.5 degree angle.

The image should, with a culmination altitude of 57.5 degrees for the satellite, instead show the installations obliquely (i.e. skewed, i.e., not just show the tops but also show parts of lateral sides of the purported BUK installations). It should also show the landscape somewhat obliquely.

Resurs-P1 passed west of the area in question. This is towards the left side of the image. The image should therefore show the BUK installations somewhat skewed with something of the lateral sides visible on the left hand side.

I used sketchup to make a simple block-model with the dimensions of a BUK (roughly 9.9 x 3.3 x 3.8 meter), and then rendered it under a 57.5 degree angle with the horizontal. The image below shows the result as an inset in the original image.

To me, it appears that the photograph indeed should show more of the lateral sides of the purported BUK installations than it does: the installations shown in the image appear to be seen too-much head-on compared to the modelled view under a 57.5 degree angle.

There is also something off in the positions of the shadows. They should be slightly displaced to the left, compared to what the image appears to show (the sun was at azimuth 150.7 degrees, i.e. southeast, and elevation 60.6 degrees at 8:32:46 UT. The shadows should point slightly to the left in the image, even more so if the image is taken from a point to the west of the area under a 57.5 degree or smaller angle).

Taken together, it suggests that the photograph does not show a scene compliant with the geometric situation at 8:32 UT on 17 July 2014 as seen from Resurs-P1.

As a caveat, I should emphasize that we are talking about structure at the edge of the satellite's image resolution here, with objects only a few pixels wide (and again: I warn that I am not a professional photo interpreter). There might also have been done some unknown image processing, including resampling, as part of preparing the photo for publication. Still, I feel there is reason to be very cautious about these images.

[Edit: extra material added Feb 17, 2016, now following:] 

The previous discussion was from the viewpoint of an image taken around culmination of the satellite for the area in question, 08:32:49 UT. In a follow-up discussion about this post on Twitter, it was brought up that the image might have been made before culmination when the satellite was still north of the location. That would better match the listed time, 08:32.

I therefore did a new model simulation, based on the satellite-to-location angles for 08:32:00 UT (azimuth 335 degrees (i.e. N-NW), elevation 45.1 degrees). It is given below. Again, it does not appear to match. It should be noted here that from known specifications, 45 degrees is near the limit of what the satellite needs, in terms of elevation angle, in order to image a location.

click to enlarge

In the other imagery provided by the Russian MOD, there are discrepancies too indicating that the images were not taken at the claimed dates and times. A very clear one is the one below (source), that purports to be an image taken on 14 July 2014 11:40 Moscow time (08:40 UT). The Russian optical reconnaissance satellite Kosmos 2486 (Persona 2, 2013-028A) culminated at 08:40:54 UT at an elevation of 83 degrees for this location.

It is however interesting to compare the configuration of vehicles on a parking lot in that image . These vehicles do not seem to be used much. Using Google Earth imagery from April, May and July 2014, a clear long-lasting change in the configuration happens before July 2nd: one vehicle is lightly replaced, and a new vehicle is parked in what previously was an empty space.

click to enlarge

Comparing this to the vehicle configuration on the Russian MOD image from "14 July 2014", shows the first vehicle still in place and the empty space in reality filled in before July 2nd, still an empty space. So I am in agreement here with the observations made by Bellingcat in June 2015: the Russian MOD image claimed to be from "14 July 2014" in reality is from before July 2nd, 2014.

"But how about the Ukrainians?", some have asked me. Well: the vehicle pattern does positively fit with the "July 12" image (upper right image above) published by the Ukrainians (and later ostensibly 'rebutted' by the Russian MOD here: but we now note it are in fact the Russian MOD images that are doctored).

This latter image appears to be commercial imagery obtained from Digitalglobe, shot by the Worldview 1 satellite (which isn't anything unusual: several governments use the services of Digitalglobe). It made a pass culminating at 55 degrees at 08:11 UT (11:11 local time) on July 12.

Note that the Russian MOD claim here that:

"At the time specified in the images, the American electro-optical reconnaissance satellite of the Key Hole series was flying over the crash site area, so the source of the images for Ukrainian Security Service is obvious"

This Russian MOD statement about the Ukrainian images is factually incorrect (as was their claim for STSS passes around the time of the MH17 shootdown, as we have earlier seen): the dates and times listed for the Ukrainian images do not match with passes of  US KH-11 optical satellites.

But they do all match passes of three Digitalglobe satellites: Worldview 1, Worldview 2 and Geoeye 1. Evidently these satellites made these images, not US military KH-11 satellites.

So the Russians are making a lot of factually incorrect claims in this case.

[end of section added 17 Feb 2016]


A few last words on my position in this

I want to note that this is the first and last time I will, with regard to MH17, foray into the domain of satellite photo interpretation, also given the very strong reactions this has already spawned on media like twitter. Agitprops from all sides have jumped on it.

I prefer to keep my further involvement with MH17 focussed on providing factual data on satellite positions and satellite system specifications, in line with the role I played in this month's Parliament hearing. That is a position only people with an agenda could take issue with.

With all the things that have come up over the past 1.5 year, and with multiple parties involved clearly unwilling to provide pertinent data, I have taken a step back, opinion-wise. In the current situation, my aim is to not point fingers until verifiable evidence is put on the table. The report of the Dutch Safety Board is a first step into that direction, but there are still many aspects of the case that are very unclear. Clarifying these was the main point of the Parliament hearing of January 22.


NOTE ADDED 4 March 2016,  10:30 UT:

- sigh.....deep sigh.... -

I wish it would not be necessary to get into this, but some spin deserves a rebuttal when the spin in question really is too outrageous:

As an example of how some propagandists are trying to spin unwelcome analytical results (such as those of this analysis), I bring you the twitter troll Deus Abscondis.

For reasons only known to him/herself, (s)he tries to (falsely) insist that I initially ignored the Persona 2 satellite. The goal, of course, is to try to suggest that my analysis should be dismissed and my expertise questioned.

Here is the flaw in his/her logic: the fact that I did not mention Persona 2 until Deus Abscondis named that satellite on twitter (and I answered that Persona 2 appeared to have made some of the other images) simply does not mean I didn't consider Persona 2 earlier. I did, matter of fact.

It is important to realize that my blogpost initially (and at the moment Deus Abscondis posted his twitter question) discussed only one image: that with the "BUK's in a field near Zaroshchens’ke".

I wrote about this image, in the original blog-post (emphasis added):

The image lists a time, 11:32 on 17 July 2014. Resurs P1 (2013-030A), a Russian imaging satellite with 1-meter resolution, passed the area shown in the photograph at 08:32 UT (11:32 Moscow Standard Time, or 12:32 Moscow Daylight Saving Time) - an identification earlier also made on a Russian webforum. Other high-resolution Russian imaging satellites do not match the pass time listed.

Take a look at that last sentence.

The sentence highlighted in black makes very clear that I considered other satellites than Resurs P1 as well. The latter category of checked satellites not fitting the pass time for the Zharoshchens'ke image actually included Persona 2.


In addition to Persona 2, the ones I checked but rejected also included Resurs DK1, Kanopus V1 and the Kobalt-M photoreturn mission Kosmos 2495 (still on-orbit at that time).

When Deus Abscondis days later asked about whether I had considered Persona 2,  my answer to him was that Persona 2 could have made some of the other image, i.e. I told him/her that I was well aware that some of the other imagery could be from Persona 2. I also informed him that this other imagery was not unproblematic either (and updated my blogpost next to show why):

Note that nowhere does my answer implicate that I had not considered Persona 2 in my original analysis, of the Zharoshchens'ke image. I simply point out that Persona 2 is of relevance only to some of the other imagery, not to the image discussed at the blog at that moment. Discussion of that other imagery was added later, as an update of the post.

The twist that Deus Abscondis is now trying to give to that conversation, is therefore extremely insincere.

It is a good example of the kind of spin some propagandists are producing when trying to suppress unwelcome analytical facts.


Note added 10 June 2020:

In the MH17 trial yesterday (June 9 2020), the prosecution tore apart the validity of this imagery as well, based on an analysis by ESA.

The Parliament Hearing

Last Friday was the MH17 hearing of the committee for Foreign Affairs of Dutch Parliament in the Dutch Parliament building in the Hague. I had been  invited as an external expert to this hearing (see a previous post), with the task to brief the parliament members on what military satellite systems from what countries might have observed the disaster, and could potentially provide useful information with a view on the criminal prosecution of the case.

An audio record of the block of the hearing that featured my presence can be downloaded here (it is in Dutch of course). Related to this, I also appeared on national television that evening (video here and below) in a long item in EénVandaag, a news background program broadcast nationwide at 6 pm. After the hearing, I also did a 20-minute live interview on national radio (audio here, below the video on that page).

It was quite an experience to be in this role, a role which I never had expected to have to play when I wrote my first blogpost on this all. I spent the better part of January doing research into even the most remotely possible questions I could imagine, digging up information, checking and re-checking facts, and writing the position paper.

The full hearing itself took 8 hours (I myself only attended some two hour of these though), and the block that included me took one hour (from 12:00 to 13:00 CET). I shared this block with Paul Riemens, who is the head of Dutch air traffic control; and prof. Piet van Genderen, who is a radar expert from Delft University.

Letter by the Minister

In the evening before the hearing, the Minister of Justice and Security, Van der Steur, had suddenly dispatched a letter to Parliament in answer to questions by Omtzigt , in which he stated that the prosecutor did receive radar and satellite data, and that in their perception there was "no need" for additional requests of those. He also mentioned that the prosecutor had insight in these data "through the MIVD"  (the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service) by means of "ambtsberichten" (i.e. brief statements on what the data show, not the data itself). The latter suggested to me, that the data are not declassified, and perhaps will not be declassified. Which is odd and unnecessary, as well as unwise, as I will discuss later in this blogpost.

The timing (combined with the fact that similar earlier questions by MP's Omtzigt and Sjoerdsma got unanswered) suggests that the Minister's letter to Parliament was a direct response to the position papers by Van Genderen and me, so it does seem our input into this discussion had some immediate effect.

Parliament members present

Parliament members attending the block of the hearing which I participated in, were Michiel Servaes (Labour party); Harry van Bommel (Socialist Party); Pieter Omtzigt (Christian Democrats); Louis Bontes (list Bontes/Van Klaveren, a right-wing splinter party split off from Wilders' Party for Freedom); Raymond de Roon (Party for Freedom); Sjoerd Sjoerdsma (Democrats '66); and Han ten Broeke (Party for Freedom and Liberty). Chairman of the hearing was MP Fred Teeven (Party for Freedom and Liberty: who incidentally was State Secretary at the Justice and Security department at the time of the MH17 tragedy), who is vice-chairman of the parliament committee in question.

some of the Parliament members during the hearing:
 f.l.t.r. Ten Broeke, Servaes, van Bommel and Omtzigt

Hearing proceedings and questions

Riemens, Van Genderen and me all three got a few minutes to present our information to the MP's. My main message to the committee was that there are a lot of military systems, from several countries including more than one ally of our country, that might provide useful information. I briefly outlined what kind of systems might provide what information, mentioning SBIRS, but also SIGINT and IMINT.

Next, the parliament members in the committee asked us further questions and clarifications. Servaes asked me which indications I had whether the Dutch prosecutor really needed more satellite data (harking back to the suggestions in the Minister's letter of the previous evening). Related to that, Van Bommel asked me whether my plea for an attempt to get these data and get them declassified was in the interest of transparency, or had some other additional goal. He also asked whether these data might help to further restrict the location from where the missile was fired or not. Ten Broeke asked me (and Van Genderen) for my opinion on the current government position in this.

answering questions

I amongst others answered that I was not a lawyer or attorney, but that it seemed to me that declassifying the evidence was crucial in order to be able to use them for a criminal prosecution, as well as indeed in the general interest of transparency and accountability. There are so many questions around this subject, and so many (conspiracy-) theories and different views (not to speak of desinformation floating around), that the final conclusions should be verifiable to all (after the hearing, I pointed out in the radio interview that it is also very important to the families of the victims to be able to judge these results, something also pointed out in the tv item by a father who lost his son in the tragedy).

In this context I also pointed to remarks made a year ago (17 Dec 2014) by Victoria Nuland, assistant secretary of  European and Eurasian affairs in the US government, and read these out loud to the Parliament members. During a Q & A session at the American Enterprise Institute, Nuland answered questions by a Russian reporter and said that the US government had already shared data with the Netherlands, but moreover that she expected that there:

"..will be, I believe, in the context of the Dutch case, when they roll it out – they are likely to ask us to declassify some of that, and I think we will be able to help in that regard"

In other words: she not only expects a request for declassification from the Dutch government: but she also expects that the US Government will answer positively to that request!

During the hearing, and partly in response to some of the questions,  I warned the parliament members that if these satellite data would not be pursued and a request to declassify them not be made, this could possibly stimulate a lingering feeling that the Dutch prosecution left data unchecked or unreveiled. I told them that if things transpired this way (the wording of the letter by the Minister was not so encouraging in this respect) I feared that this would potentially provide handles to those parties with an interest in denying the conclusions of the investigation, to question these results.

Omtzigt asked me if there were earlier precedents of these kinds of data being declassified. There are: in the hearing I provided the examples of infrared data on meteoric fireballs (which these satellites also register) being released to astronomers for analysis; the declassification of satellite imagery in order to argue the necessity of the invasion of Iraq at the start of the second Gulf War; and China providing satellite imagery of potential floating debris in the case of the search for the missing MH370 aircraft.

Sjoerdsma asked me whether, in case the data would be declassified and supplied, our country had the expertise to independently analyse them and verify the claims made from them. For the infrared data I answered that I am not sure, so could answer neither positively nor negatively. For IMINT and SIGINT, our country certainly has that expertise, both within our own military as well as on Dutch universities.

De Roon wanted me to clarify further which countries had what satellite systems. Bontes asked me whether the fact that we were now so reliant on foreign data from foreign systems, might be an argument to start to build, as a country, surveillance satellite capacity ourselves (I think I am really not the person to answer that question).

During my answering all these questions, van Bommel additionally asked me in what phase of the criminal investigation these data should be made public, and whether it was perhaps too early for that in the current phase.

To the latter I can agree, although (again) I am no lawyer or attorney. But I can understand that perhaps, in this phase of the inquiry, the prosecutors do not want to publicly show their hand of cards.

I do have some concern though, about whether at the end of the trajectory these data are going to be made public, in the interest of verifiability. In my opinion, they should. I find the wording of the letter by the Minister of 21 January 2016 however not very promising in that respect.

The  contributions by the other invited experts contained some significant points. Van Genderen for example made very clear that having the secondary radar data is not enough. He also made very clear that Ukrainian claims that all their radar systems were down for maintenance that day, are hard to believe, as that is against what is normal. Riemens made clear that normally, the air traffic controller on duty will be heard in the investigation (which has not happened in this case) and that radar data normally are available within an hour. Later during the hearing, well-known lawyer Knoops made very clear that without the original raw (radar, satellite) data being available, the prosecution would have no leg to stand on.