North Korea's October ICBM surprise

click to enlarge. Screenshot from KCTV broadcast

Saturday 10 October 2020 saw North Korea's big military parade in PyongYang, connected to the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Workers Party of Korea. A nighttime parade this time, unlike previous years.

Those who follow the North Korean rocket and missile program always eagerly await these parades, as sometimes new missiles are presented. They were not disappointed this year.

The most interesting new missiles presented were a new version of the Pukkuksong SLBM and, at the very end of the parade, a surprise appearance of four immense 11-axle TEL's, each carrying a very large missile that appears to be a new Hwasong ICBM variant (see images above and below).

 

click to enlarge. Screenshot from KCTV broadcast

 

This missile at first sight looks like a larger variant of the flight-proven Hwasong 15 from 2017 (several of which were also shown in the parade). Below is my attempt at getting dimensions for this potential new ICBM:

 

click to enlarge

First, some caveats with this dimensional analysis:

* I had to work from a limited resolution screenshot I took from the KCTV broadcast;

* The baseline used is based on a Google Earth measurement;

* The image is wide angle and has some barrel distortion. This means that the straight sightlines I have drawn, are an approximation.

All these points will cause uncertainties in the measurements, so don't take them too strictly. Behind the decimal, they are probably no more accurate than to 0.2 meter or perhaps even worse.

The dimensional baseline I used is the distance from the stair entrance at left to the center of the area between the grass borders. The platform with stairs is visible on a Google Earth image, and I measure a distance of ~26.25 meter to the square center line, which is used as the base referal length here (please note: I assumed the two patches of grass are at equal distance to this centerline. Similar for the area with the orchestra at the other side of the road).

In this way, I get the following approximate dimensions:

* 25.6 meter for the total missile length (not counting nozzle);

* 2.7 to 2.8 meter for the first stage diameter;

* 2.3 meter for the base diameter of the nose fairing/Post Boost Vehicle;

* 30.5 meter for the TEL, from front bumper to the feet of the firing table;

* 16.9 meter for the first stage length (assuming it ends at the chequer-pattern);

* 4.5 meter for the second stage length.

As Jeffrey Lewis noted, the second stage appears to be slightly tapered in shape.

By comparison: the Hwasong 15 (test flown in 2017) measures 21.5 meter in length (not counting the exhaust nozzle) and is about 2.4 meter in diameter. 

Hence, this new Hwasong variant appears to be a factor of 1.2 larger in both length and diameter compared to the Hwasong 15. Several commenters have pointed out that this makes it the largest road-mobile ICBM ever.

As is usual, discussion has emerged whether this is a real missile, or just a fancy mock-up. There is still too much of a tendency, especially among an American audience, to regard North Korean missiles as all 'smoke and mirrors'. Given North Korea's 2017 track record with succesful Hwasong 12 IRBM and Hwasong 15 ICBM test flights, I do not think that the default reaction should be that this new missile must be a deception. Of course, we will only know for sure when we see it launched.

It will be interesting to see if, and if so when, this large missile is test-flown.

A French M51 SLBM test with a 6000 km range on June 12

click image to enlarge

On the morning of June 12, 2020, the French Navy test launched an unarmed M51 SLBM from the Triomphant-class submarine Le Téméraire.

The launch was from a spot near the French coast just south of Audierne Bay in Bretagne, not far from the French Naval port of Brest, according to a French Government bulletin. Navigational Warnings place it around 47^o.65 N, 4^o.15 W. The launch direction was towards the Caribean, with impact in the Atlantic Ocean near 24^o.4 N, 66^o.1 W according to the same Navigational Warnings.

The locations of the hazard areas from these Navigational Warnings point to a 6000 km flight trajectory (see figures above and below):


HYDROLANT 1882/20

EASTERN NORTH ATLANTIC.
CELTIC SEA.
BAY OF BISCAY.
FRANCE.
DNC 08.
1. MISSILE OPERATIONS 0200Z TO 1100Z DAILY
11 JUN THRU 11 JUL IN AREAS BOUND BY:
A. 47-12N 010-25W, 47-49N 004-31W,
47-39N 004-01W, 47-24N 004-11W,
46-44N 010-17W.
B. 46-17N 019-54W, 46-50N 017-09W,
45-07N 016-29W, 44-35N 019-01W.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 111200Z JUL 20.//

Authority: NAVAREA II 167/20 042002Z JUN 20.

Date: 060713Z JUN 20
Cancel: 11120000 Jul 20


 
NAVAREA IV 485/20

NORTH ATLANTIC.
1. MISSILE OPERATIONS 0200Z TO 1100Z DAILY
11 JUN THRU 11 JUL:
A. IN AREA BOUND BY
39-37N 040-14W, 40-40N 037-48W,
39-41N 037-07W, 38-39N 039-31W.
B. IN AREA WITHIN 92 MILES OF 24-24N 066-06W.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 111200Z JUL 20.//

Authority: AVURNAV BREST 070808Z JUN 20.

Date: 070851Z JUN 20
Cancel: 11120000 Jul 20


I have plotted the Navigational Warnings on the map below. The line shown is a simple STK-modelled ballistic trajectory, which fits these area's well. Assuming a 1200 km apogee, the flight-time should have been around 23 minutes.

Click map to enlarge

The M51 is  the newest French SLBM. It is in service since mid-2010. It has three stages and can carry up to 10 RV's. It's maximum range is said to be near 11 000 km, i.e. comparable to the Trident-II SLBM of the US Navy and Royal British Navy. This is the 5th succesful test of an M51 SLBM (a 6th test attempt in May 2013 ended in failure).

A nice summary of what is known from public sources about this test is provided in this article by Tyler Rogoway on The Drive.


Note added
For those interested in these issues: last year, I did an in-depth analysis of several Trident-II SLBM test launches, including one that was serendipitously photographed by an astrophotographer from the Canary Island. The latter observation allowed to estimate the apogee altitude of that test.

A reanalysis of the Trident SLBM test of 10 September 2013 and other tests

9 May 2019 Trident-II D5 test launch from USS Rhode Island in front of Florida
Photo: John Kowalski/US Navy

NOTE: This post reanalyses a case from September 2013 that turned out to be a Trident SLBM test launch. New information on the launch trajectory allows to glean information on the missile's apogee. The 10 September 2013 test launch trajectory is compared to those of several other Atlantic Trident test launches in subsequent years. 

Elements of this re-analysis were already published in May of this year in two Twitter threads here and here. As Twitter is highly ephemeral in nature, this blog post serves to preserve and consolidate the two analysis.

*********

On 9 May 2019, I noted a Maritime Broadcast Warning issued for the period of May 9 to 12, that clearly defined the trajectory of  a Trident-II SLBM test in the Atlantic (this was was later confirmed to be a Trident test launch from the submarine USS Rhode Island):

NAVAREA IV 394/2019 

(Cancelled by NAVAREA IV 403/2019)

WESTERN NORTH ATLANTIC.
FLORIDA.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS, ROCKET LAUNCHING
   091340Z TO 120026Z MAY IN AREAS BOUND BY:
   A. 28-53N 080-01W, 29-00N 079-35W, 28-55N 078-58W,
      28-38N 079-00W, 28-40N 079-37W, 28-50N 080-01W.
   B. 28-34N 076-26W, 28-24N 075-24W, 28-10N 075-27W,
      28-21N 076-29W.
   C. 27-45N 070-22W, 27-14N 068-45W, 26-48N 068-56W,
      27-18N 070-32W.
   D. 17-46N 045-38W, 16-22N 042-18W, 15-44N 042-36W,
      17-09N 045-55W.
   E. 15-47S 004-32E, 17-17S 007-04E, 17-10S 007-08E,
      17-29S 007-49E, 17-20S 007-52E, 17-19S 008-07E,
      17-28S 008-12E, 17-41S 008-04E, 17-45S 008-14E,
      18-27S 007-50E, 17-51S 006-44E, 17-43S 006-50E,
      16-11S 004-16E.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 120126Z MAY 19.

071718Z MAY 2019 EASTERN RANGE 071600Z MAY 19.

The five hazard areas defined in the Broadcast Warning correspond to: the launch area in front of the coast of Florida; the splash-down zones of the three booster stages;  and the MIRV target area in front of the Namibian coast. This is what it looks like when the coordinates are mapped - the dashed line in the map below is a modelled simple ballistic trajectory between the lauch area and target area:

click map to enlarge

The case brought me back six years, to September 2013, when I was asked to look at photographs made by German astrophotographer Jan Hattenbach that showed something mysterious. I suggested it was a missile test, a suggestion which was later confirmed.

In this blog post, I revisit the 2013 analysis in the light of new information about this test, and compare it to other tests for which I could find trajectory information.

In the evening of 10 September 2013, Jan Hattenbach was making a time-lapse of the night sky near the GranTeCa dome at the Roque de los Muchachos observatory on La Palma in the Canary Islands, at 2300 meter altitude.

Suddenly, a strange fuzzy objects producing cloudy "puffs" moved through the sky. I wrote about it in two blog posts in 2013 (here, and follow-up here), identifying the phenomena as a Trident-II SLBM test launch conducted from a US Navy Ohio-class submarine.

This is Hattenbach's time lapse of the phenomena: the fuzzy cloud moving from bottom center to upper left is the missile (the other moving object briefly visible above the dome is a Russian satellite, Kosmos 1410). The distinct "puffs" are likely the missile's Post-Boost Control System (PBCS) reorienting while deploying RV's during the post-boost phase:





Here is a stack of the frames from the time-lapse, and a detail of one of the frames:

click to enlarge

click to enlarge

At that time, Ted Molczan had managed to dig up a Broadcast Warning that appeared to be for the MIRV target area:

( 090508Z SEP 2013 )
HYDROLANT 2203/2013 (57) 
(Cancelled by HYDROLANT 2203/2013)

SOUTH ATLANTIC.
ROCKETS.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 091400Z TO 140130Z SEP
   IN AREA BOUND BY
   09-18S 000-26W, 09-50S 000-32E,
   12-03S 002-39E, 13-40S 004-09E,
   14-09S 003-49E, 13-06S 001-56E,
   11-05S 000-58W, 10-55S 001-05W,
   09-56S 000-50W.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 140230Z SEP 13.


The case of May this year made me realize there should be Broadcast Warnings for the launch area and stage splashdown zones as well. Searching the database for such Navigational Warnings, I indeed managed to find them, as a separate Broadcast Warning:

( 082155Z SEP 2013 )
NAVAREA IV 546/2013 (24,25,26) 
(Cancelled by NAVAREA IV 546/2013)

WESTERN NORTH ATLANTIC.
ROCKETS.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 091400Z TO 140130Z SEP
   IN AREAS BOUND BY:
   A. 28-57N 076-17W, 28-56N 075-54W,
      28-44N 075-11W, 28-29N 075-13W,
      28-43N 076-17W.
   B. 27-53N 073-02W, 28-14N 072-56W,
      27-58N 071-52W, 27-46N 071-08W,
      27-38N 071-11W, 27-39N 071-43W,
      27-39N 071-48W, 27-41N 072-04W.
   C. 26-42N 066-58W, 26-16N 065-36W,
      25-37N 063-38W, 25-18N 063-35W,
      25-06N 063-42W, 25-02N 063-52W,
      25-39N 065-51W, 26-07N 067-12W.
   D. 15-59N 043-47W, 16-51N 043-14W,
      15-54N 040-54W, 14-19N 038-09W,
      13-48N 038-28W, 13-30N 039-26W.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 140230Z SEP 13.

When the coordinates of these two Broadcast Warnings are mapped, they define a clear trajectory for this test (map below). It is somewhat different from the hypothetical trajectory we reconstructed in 2013 (the launch site is at a different location, much closer to Florida) and it is very similar to that of the recent May 2019 test. The dashed line is, again, a modelled simple Ballistic trajectory between the launch area and MIRV impact area, this time fitting the hazard areas extremely well:

click map to enlarge

The trajectory depicted is for an apogee height of 1800 km. This altitude was found by modelling ballistic trajectories for various apogee altitudes, and next looking which one of them matches the actual sky positions seen in Hattenbach's photographs from La Palma best.

In order to do so, I astrometrically measured Jan Hattenbach's images in AstroRecord, measuring RA and declination of the missile in each image using the stars on the images as a reference. The starmap below shows these measured sky positions, as red crosses.

When compared to various modelled apogee altitudes (black lines in the starmap), the measured positions best match an apogee altitude of ~1800 km:

click starmap to enlarge

So, we have learned something new about the Trident-II D5 apogee from Hattenbach's La Palma observations. At 1800 km the apogee is a bit higher than initially expected (ICBM/SLBM apogees normally are in the 1200-1400 km range).

This is how it approximately looks like in 3D (green lines depict the approximate trajectories of the missile stages). The ground range of this test was about 9800 km:

click to enlarge

Out of curiosity, and now knowing what to look for in terms of locations, I next searched the Broadcast Warning database for more Broadcast Warnings connected to potential Trident-II tests. I found six of them between 2013 and 2019, including the 10 September 2013 and 9 May 2019 test launches. It concerns additional test launches in June 2014, March 2016, June 2016, and June 2018. Putting them on a map reveals some interesting patterns, similarities and dissimilarities:

click map to enlarge

The set of Broadcast warnings points to at least two different launch areas, and three different MIRV target areas.

The two launch areas are in front of the Florida coast, out of Port Canaveral. One (labelled A in the map) is located some 60 km out of the coast, the other (labelled B in the map) is further away, some 400 km out of the coast.

I suspect that the area closest to Florida is used for test launches special enough to gather an audience of high ranking military officials. The recent test of 9 May 2019 belongs into this category, as well as a test in June 2014, and also the infamous British Royal Navy test of June 2016 (I will tell you why this test has become infamous a bit later in this blog post).

As to why area A is tapered and area B isn't, I am not sure, except that the launch location for these tests could perhaps be more defined, restrained by the audience that needs a good, predefined and safe spot to view it.

Click map to enlarge

Not only are there two different launch locations near Florida, but likewise there are at least three different MIRV target areas near Africa.

Four tests, including the 10 September 2013 test imaged by Hattenbach, target the same general area, some 1000 km out of the coast of Angola (indicated as 'impact area 1' in the map below). Two of the tests however target a slightly different location.

click map to enlarge

One of these two deviating tests is the earlier mentioned infamous Trident-II test by the British Royal Navy from June 2016.

This test has become notorious because the Trident missile, fired from the submarine HMS Vengeance, never made it to the target area. Instead it took a wrong course after launch, towards Florida (!)  and had to be destroyed. That test had a planned target area (dark green in the map above) somewat shortrange from the other tests, closer to Ascension island. This is the shortest ground range test of all the tests discussed here, approximately 8900 km, some 1000 km short of most other tests. Incidently, the choice of launch area indicates this failed test had a launch audience, so I reckon some top brass was not amused that day.

The other is the recent 9 May 2019 test. This US Navy test had a target area (red in the map above) some 400 km out of the African coast, further downrange from previous tests. This is the longest range test of all the tests discussed here, with a ground range of approximately 10 700 km, about 700 km longer than the other tests. From the choice of launch area, this test too might have had a launch audience.

The other tests had a range of 9600 to 9900 km. The different ranges could point to different payload masses (e.g. number or type of RV's), different missile configurations, or different test constraints.

There have certainly been many more Trident-II tests than the six I could identify in Broadcast Warnings (e.g. see the list here). Why these didn't have Broadcast Warnings issued, or why I was not able to identify those if they were issued, I do not know.

The Trident-II is a 3-staged Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile with nuclear warheads. The missile is an important part of US and British nuclear deterrance strategies. The missiles are caried by both US and British Ballistic Missile submarines.

click to enlarge

Edit 23 Oct 2019:
Considering the Trident-II D5 range, the US Navy clearly needs to update it's own 'fact file' here (which at the time of writing lists a maximum range of 7360 km, well short of the distances found in this analysis)

The Chinese ICBM test of August 7 [UPDATED]

Just after local midnight of August 7-8, 2019, the South Korean amateur astronomer Mr Lee Won-Gyu was taking images of the night sky at Mount Jiri in Korea when he observed and photographed a cloud-like illuminating phenomena in Corona Borealis that to the expert eye is clearly the exhaust cloud from a rocket engine burn.

Mr Lee Won-Gyu's images of the cloud are featured in this article in the Korea Times, where they were presented as a 'UFO'. The images were taken between 00:14 and 00:24 Korean time (corresponding to August 7, 15:14-15:24 UT). Mount Jiri, the location of the sighting, is at approx. 35.34 N, 127.73 E. In this blogpost, I will identify this 'UFO' as a Chinese ICBM test.

Initial speculation on the internet was that this was perhaps related to the AEHF 5 geosynchronous satellite launch from Florida on August 8, 10:13 UT. The observation was however done 19 hours before this launch (there was some initial confusion due to the date difference in local time and UT), and the cloud was seen in a wrong part of the sky for a launch to geosynchronous altitude. So I suggested it could be a Russian or Chinese ICBM test launch.

As it turns out, additional evidence suggests this indeed was an ICBM test, by China. As the result of a private request by me, Twitter user @Cosmic_Penguin managed to dig up NOTAM's for the date and time of the event posted on a Chinese forum by a forum member nicknamed 'kktt'. These NOTAM's with temporary airspace closures from "ground to unlimited" in two parts of China corroborate an ICBM test launch:


A4092/19 NOTAMN
Q) ZBPE/QRTCA/IV/BO/W/000/999/3909N10940E019
A) ZBPE B) 1908071449 C) 1908071511
E) A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY:
N392016E1092107-N391413E1100213-N385819E1095815-N390419E1091716
BACK TO START.VERTICAL LIMITS:GND-UNL. ALL ACFT SHALL BE FORBIDDEN
TO FLY INTO THE RESTRICTED AREA.
F) GND G) UNL


A4094/19 NOTAMN
Q) ZWUQ/QRTCA/IV/BO/W/000/999/3712N08311E108
A) ZWUQ B) 1908071451 C) 1908071548
E) A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED CENTERED AT
N371133E0831033 WITH RADIUS OF 200KM. ALL ACFT ARE FORBIDDEN TO
FLY INTO THE TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA. VERTICAL LIMITS:GND-UNL.
F) GND G) UNL


The NOTAM's have a time window between 14:49 UT and 15:48 UT on 7 August 2019, which fits the phenomena observed from Korea (7 August 15:14-15:24 UT). They also fit the direction of the sky phenomena as seen from Korea: the exhaust cloud was seen at 30 degrees elevation in the sky at azimuth 290-291 degrees (west-northwest). This sightline points directly to the area designated in NOTAM A4092/19.

The map below plots the two areas designated in the NOTAM's. The smaller rectangular area from NOTAM A4092/19 represents the launch area near Hongjian Nur in Shaanxi province. The larger circular area from NOTAM A4094/19 at the southern edge of the Taklamakan desert represents the RV target area. The two areas are some 2300-2400 km distant from each other:

click map to enlarge

I have depicted the sightline from Mr Lee Won-Gyu's photographs from Mt. Jiri in Korea on the map as well (white): it points towards the launch area and it lines up with the direction of that rectangular area. Both time and direction therefore fit the Korean sighting. So does the character of the photographed cloud, which is similar to missile exhaust clouds observed during other ICBM launches.

This was an interesting ICBM launch in that it appears to have been highly lofted, with an apogee at approximately 3000 km altitude. This is based on both the estimated flightime (about 37 minutes) deduced from the NOTAM time window durations; and from an assessment of the exhaust cloud sightings from Korea, the direction and elevation of which point to a burn at 3000 km, close to apogee of the orbit, when combined with a ballistic trajectory between the two areas of the two NOTAM's. The launch happened near 15:00 UT (August 7), the missile engine burn seen from Korea happened some 15 minutes later close to mid-course and was probably meant to change the direction of the missile.

The situation is spatially depicted in the diagram below. The sightline from Korea crosses a 3000 km apogee trajectory twice, at about 2300 km altitude when the missile is ascending, and near apogee at 3000 km altitude. The latter altitude is the most likely location of the engine burn. At these altitudes, exhaust clouds are well above the earth shadow and hence brightly sun-illuminated.

click image to enlarge

When launched on a less lofted trajectory, this missile would have had a ground range of at least 6300 km. The reason to launch it into a lofted trajectory, rather than a more typical trajectory with apogee at 1200 km, is that in this way the test could be done completely within the borders of China. We have seen such lofted trajectories earlier with some early North Korean ICBM tests.

The ICBM appears to have done a dog-leg manoeuvre near apogee, changing the course just before mid-course. One piece of evidence for this is that the orientation of the launch hazard area from NOTAM A4092/19 does not match with a simple ballistic trajectory towards the target area. Neither does the sightline direction from Korea. They would result in a target area more to the north than the area from NOTAM A4094/19.

This can be well seen in the map, where I depicted both a direct ballistic trajectory (solid black line) between the two areas from the NOTAM's, as well as a 'dog-legged' trajectory (dashed black line), with the dogleg at the near-apogee burn imaged from Korea and initial launch direction according to the orientation of the NOTAM A4092/19 area:

click map to enlarge

The direct trajectory clearly does not fit the launch area direction and Korean sighting well, whereas a launch into the direction of the NOTAM A4092/19 area and a dogleg near apogee does, with the latter also clearly fitting the Korean sighting.

A reason for such a dog-leg manoeuvre might be to confuse and evade mid-course anti-Ballistic missile intercepts. So I am wondering if this perhaps was an anti-ballistic missile test as well.

This missile test must in theory (and ignoring cloud cover) have been widely visible over Eastern Asia. The Korean Times article presents one other observation, also from Korea, but I have not seen other observations so far.

UPDATE: Twitter user @LaunchStuff sent me this link to a Weibo page, which includes several photographs of the event from various parts of China and a very cool video shot from Inner Mongolia, showing the spiralling behaviour seen during other ICBM tests as well.


Acknowledgement: I thank Ravi Jagtiani for bringing the Korea Times article to my attention; @Cosmic_Penguin for digging up the NOTAM's; and Jim Oberg and Jonathan McDowell for discussions.

Effects of December 26 Russian TOPOL RS-12M ICBM test also seen from the Netherlands

Image (c) Bussloo Public Observatory/Mark-Jaap ten Hove
click to enlarge

On 26 December 2017, Russia's Strategic Missile Force conducted a flight test with a TOPOL RS-12M ICBM from Kapustin-Yar in Astrakhan. The test was "aimed at testing perspective armament for intercontinental ballistic missiles".

The test resulted in a sky phenomena that was photographed from East and Central Europe, and, as it turns out, even NW Europe. A luminous bubble-cloud like phenomena appeared in the eastern sky as seen from Europe. There is some incredible imagery from Austria, as well as other locations.

I sent out an alert to the operators of the Dutch photographic all-sky meteor camera network to see if perhaps they captured something. Most stations were clouded out, but the station at the Bussloo Public Observatory in the east of the Netherlands did capture the event, amidst clouds!

Above is a part of the all-sky image: the phenomena is the ghostly neon-blue glow due east, behind the clouds. Below it a part of the same image in more detail:

Image (c) Bussloo Public Observatory/Mark-Jaap ten Hove
click to enlarge

Bussloo is at 6.12 E, 52.20 N. It is 2800 km distant from Kapustin-Yar, which is at 82 degrees azimuth as seen from Bussloo, so almost due East.

The cloud is exhaust from the missile at (very) high altitude in space, illuminated by the sun.

In the image, taken at 03:44 UT (December 26), the top of the blue cloud is at an altitude of ~30 degrees (stars from Corona borealis are visible in the blue cloud: the bright star somewhat right of the center in the second image is Arcturus).

Assuming the cloud is right above Kapustin-Yar, this would place the top of the cloud at an altitude of ~3300 km. If it is closer in range (e.g. when expanding and/or drifting westwards), it is lower.


(I thank Bussloo Public Observatory (Mark-Jaap ten Hove) for their kind permission to publish their photographs and all the Dutch all-sky meteor camera operators for checking their imagery)

The Curious Incident of the ICBM that Launched by Night

image: KCNA

North Korea conducted a test launch of a new ICBM, the Hwasong-15 (KN-22)  on 28 November 2017. The launch was at 18:17 UT from a field just north of Pyongsong, not far from Pyongyang. It was a "lofted" test, reaching an incredible 4475 km apogee before coming down near Japan, 950 km east of the launch location and some 250 km out of the Japanese coast. It is a beast of a mobile launched ICBM:

images: KCNA

After the launch, North Korea's KCNA press/propaganda agency published several pictures, showing Kim Jung Un directing the readying of the TEL with missile, and the launch.

Several of these images, both from the missile erection sequence before launch and the launch itself, show stars. As part of the verification of a geolocation attempt, Jeffrey Lewis (@armscontrolwonk on twitter) of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, a well known wonk of the North Korean (and other) missile program, asked me to look into these starry backgrounds. Could I say something about image orientations?

I could, and it became very interesting. I initially looked at and measured these two pre-launch images (Jeffrey provided me with high-res versions of these: the ones shown here are the low-res versions from the KCNA website):

images: KCNA

These two images appear to be real (although, given what I will point out below, all images remain suspect, because they clearly aren't all real. With "real", I mean "untampered with" here). I used them to determine azimuth directions and the Local Sidereal Time (and from that UTC time) these images apparently were taken, by creating an astrometric grid over the image. In the image below, each dotted star is a reference star measured. The two images below it show the reconstructed azimuth range for each picture.

Of course, I now have reason to doubt the validity of this whole exercise. Because (hold on):

The real fun started when, yesterday evening, I started to look at the pictures of the actual launch moment. The fact that some of these show stars in itself is already something, as these images necessitate short exposures (unlike the pre-launch images above, which are long duration exposures), so you do not expect stars. But the real fun came when I looked at these stars visible. There, things clearly were not right!

Take these two images, which I have put next to each other for comparison:

Image: KCNA

The shape of the exhaust cloud and exhaust flame (and the number decal, extremities and paint job on the missile) clearly indicate they were taken from the same viewpoint, probably within a fraction of a second of each other. But take a look at the stars in the background: these then should show the same sky area, right?

But they don't!

One shows Orion, which is south-southeastwest. The other shows Andromeda with the Andromeda galaxy (this is a bit more clear in a higher resolution version I have), which is northwest. So these two images from the same viewpoint, show dramatically opposite sky areas.

Below is another example, doing basically the opposite. The mirror character of these two images, from the exhaust shape plume, exhaust flame shape, and the lack of number decal on the missile in one of the images, indicates they were taken from opposite viewing points. So the sky should show opposite sky areas on each of these, right?

images: KCNA
(NOTE: earlier version of image replaced with version correcting error in labelling)

Again, they don't.

The top one shows Orion (but with Betelgeuze missing). The bottom one shows Canis major (but with Sirius missing). Orion and Canis Major are very close to each other, south-southwest at the time of launch. The images should show opposing sky areas, but don't.

So clearly, the starry sky background was added to the imagery and is not original.

So why should North Korea have done this?

The most likely reason is simply that they did it for aesthetics. An ICBM soaring into the stars makes for good propaganda images. They apparently just didn't care enough to do it correctly.

Aesthetics seem to be important in North Korean propaganda pictures. They frequently photoshop the ears of Kim Jung Un in pictures, for example.

Or maybe they wanted to play a prank on analysts as well: they know these images will be analyzed by the west. Fooling around with clues as to the orientation of images makes it harder to glean information from them on 3-dimensional missile shape, and launch site geolocation.

To be clear (because some hare-brained individuals on social media seemed to think that was implicated, even though it nowhere is): nobody disputes that the launch was real.

It was, and it shows that North Korea now has an ICBM that can reach the whole US mainland. It can even reach my country, the Netherlands (although we are not a very likely target, I must ad):

But at least some of the launch images have been clearly doctored, and show elements that were added later. This is, of course, something we have seen earlier with North Korean propaganda images (some examples are given in the CNN article linked below).



End note: I still think the pre-launch imagery showing the TEL with missile being erected in the field is unaltered. So maybe my azimuth and timing determinations from these is are valid. But I cannot proof it, and of course now all the images must be considered suspect.

They do tally with some other evidence though, including this still I extracted from the KCNA released video, which briefly offers a glimpse of the moon, low in the west-southwest. If the video isn't doctored as well (!), this should be around 16:00-16:15 UT, some two hours before launch:

Still taken from KCNA video: moon indicated

If the video was not altered, then together with earlier images showing the missile on the TEL leaving the plant, this orientation means that any of the launch pictures showing the number decal on the missile should actually be looking Northeast to East.

My findings on the doctoring of the launch imagery featured in this CNN article from 5 December 2017 by Joshua Berlinger:  North Korea missile: Inconsistencies spotted in Hwasong-15 images

"Yay! We fooled those imperialistic coward dogs!" (image: KCNA)

North Korea's July 28 ICBM test

On 28 July 2017 around 14:45 UT, North Korea tested another ICBM. Early reports from US Military sources indicate a night-time launch from a new location (Mupyong-ni), an approximately 45 minute flight time, and launch into a highly lofted trajectory with an apogee as high as 3700 km and a range of about 1000 km, with the launch direction towards Hokaido.

These ballpark figures allow us to estimate a ballpark maximum range for this ICBM. Because this was (again) a lofted test with an almost vertical launch, the true range of the missile is much more than the ~1000 km of the test when it would have been launched on a more normal trajectory.

The results I get are shown in the figure above: using the same delta V impulse as the lofted test but putting the apogee at 1200 km (a typical ICBM apogee) and roughly same launch direction, I get a range of ~8700 km.

That is probably a conservative figure. The true range depends on various factors (including the weight of the warhead, but also whether this test was at maximum missile performance. Reasons why it was perhaps not, is that North Korea might have shown some restraint and  taken precautions in order not to land their missile in or too much near Japan. This is also why they launch in a lofted trajectory).

In the figure above, I have drawn what this cautious reconstruction of the real range entails. It surpasses the distance to Hawaii. It brings San Francisco on the US West Coast in range. Today's test therefore implies that North Korea can strike the US mainland.

Towards the other direction, it brings Moscow in range, and if the true maximum performance of the missile is slightly larger, also Western Europe (*).

By the way, just as with the previous July 4th test, the Russians have come with maverick data for this test again, quoting a much smaller range and lower apogee (732 km and 681 km) based on their own Early Warning Radar observations. There are suspicions that their data only pertain to observations of the ICBM's first stage, explaining the discrepancy.

The analysis in this post is based on the first released ballpark figures for this test. If better data are released, the outcome might slightly change.


UPDATE: North Korea has now published the following figures for their test: apogee  3724.9 km, range 998 km, flight time 47m12s. They say it was a Hwasong-14 tested to simulate maximum range. Photographs published indeed show a missile similar to the one launched on July 4.

photo: Rodong Sinmun

photo: Rodong Sinmun

* the maximum range is (unlike depicted above) not a neat 8700 km circle. The maximum range depends on which direction is launched into, due to Earth rotation effects. Due to this, when launched towards the east the missile will have a somewhat larger range than when launched towards the west. Launched towards the east it gets an extra "push" from the rotating Earth.